THE NAHDLATUL-ULAMA PARTY

(1952 - 1955)

An inquiry into the origin

of its electoral success

by

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Preface :

In the history of Islam in Indonesia, the Islamic movement of Nahdlatul Ulama may be regarded as a unique one. A bit more than a quarter of a century ago it rose to face "the endangering elements" from reformist-modernist group who introduced and carried on the ideas of Abduh and Al-Afghani in Indonesia. The N.U. suspected that this group intended not only to lead Indonesian Islam away from the idea and principles of mazhabite teachings, but also to weaken the traditional position of *ulama* in the *ummat* society. From one angle, the N.U. movement, therefore, was similar to the one of the Azharite *ulama* which fiercely opposed the new ideas carried out by the two leading figures mentioned above. The pages of the history of Islam in Indonesia since then may be said to have been 'decorated' by conflicts and reconciliations between these two blocs. Actions and reactions from both sides will continue so long as the two ideological and *Weltanschauung* generators rotate on different axes.

Because this is such an extensive question, this study intends to observe and discuss only a certain aspect of it, namely the influence and strengths possessed by the conservative, *mazhab* oriented, Indonesian *ulama* who are assembled in the organization of N.U. Their influence and strengths, potential as well as actual, proved to be great and deep-rooted in the *ummat* society, especially in the village.

This was made clear by the results obtained by the N.U. Party in the General Elections of 1955. N.U., which before the General Elections had been generally considered an inconsequential party, and which in the provisional Parliament had had only eight representatives, emerged triumphant from these elections. N.U. succeeded in taking its position as one of the "Big Four", and multiplied its seats as many as almost six times the number it had occupied in the previous Parliament.

In this thesis the N.U. will be observed in its two essential aspects: the N.U. as a political party, and the N.U. as a *kijahi* (*ulama*) movement. As to the first, the present writer will limit himself to the development of N.U. Party during its first three years, namely the years from its emergence as a political party (Palembang Congress, April 1952) up to the holding of the Indonesian General Elections in 1955. This short span of time proved to be very important, even decisive, for the N.U. In this period the future of the N.U. was truly at stake. General Elections were to decide whether it had a *raison d'etre* in a democratic country where "the voice of people is the voice of God". After examining the reasons for the N.U.'s quitting the Masjumi (Chapter I), the following two chapters (Chapters II and III) will try to uncover how the N.U. played its role as a balance of power between the two contending "giants" (P.N.I. and Masjumi). In Chapter III especially an attempt is made to

reveal how the N.U. appealed to the masses in its election campaign.

Chapters IV and V try to seek the explanation for its success in the cultural, sociological, and religious realms of the society which backed it. Since the majority of votes gathered by the N.U. was actually confined only to two eleetoral districts, viz., East (including Madura) and Central Java, it is geo-culturally logical, therefore, to limit the observation to the confined areas which both apparently have the same Javanese cultural background. To what extent a reciprocal relationship exists between the two aspects of life, the political and the cultural, is also to be seen.

Eventually, in preparing for this thesis, a few words of grateful acknowledgement should be made here, although the writer is fully aware of the impossibility of adequately expressing his indebtedness. First of all, the writer feels indebted to Professor W.C.Smith, in his capacity as Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, who has invited him and enabled him to follow the courses in the Institute, and given him priceless help, moral as well as material. Secondly, to the Asia Foundation which has kindly supported him by financial aid, he extends his thanks. To the professors, teachers and Staff members of the Institute, and especially to his advisor, Professor Mohammad Rasjidi, the writer expresses his deepest gratitude.

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I. N.U. versus Masjumi; factors that led to the emergence of N.U. as a political party.

The 19th Congress of N.U., which was held in Palembang the latter part of April, 1952, was a decisive one. It turned the page in the history of the development of the N.U.[1)] It represented a breaking point in the tradition of the movement which had been held for a quarter of a century. The N.U., until then purely a social, educational and religious Islamic movement, now became also a political party. It now became itself like a miniature structure of Islam which embraces every aspect of Life. From that time on, the struggle of N.U., in its relationship to other Islamic organizations and movements, was no longer a complementary factor, filling the lacks of the others, but an independent and competitive factor. The future of N.U. is now a wide battlefield in which it must be able to demonstrate its strength against its rivals--not only against rivals of the *linea recta* opposed to the spirit and foundations of its struggle, but if possible also to spiritual friends differing in methods.

The attitude of the general public at that time was: *Quo Vadis* N.U.? There were many who failed to understand and wondered, Why did the N.U. want to leave the Masjumi to establish an independent political party? They could not figure out why the *ulama*, who are gifted in the field of religion but naive in political matters would be able to combat in the political field,[2)] where "*halal* (permission) and *haram* (prohibition) are difficult to distinguish!"? There was suspense as to what political quality would be played by the N.U., other than that which lies in the realm of religion? What would be the social and governmental concepts of

the N.U. which cause it to have an independent raison d'etre? More serious still, what would be the appeal of N.U. as a political party in respect to the people, so that the people can follow the steps of its struggle, and support it in the coming General Elections on which there were already at the threshold?

The Palembang Congress, which seemed so puzzling to outsiders, was for the N.U. itself, in fact, an imperative. This Congress was of a chain of causes which had been joined in the past. It was not merely a reaction and irritation because the N.U. had not succeeded in obtaining the portfolio of religious affairs, and that Sukiman had been rejected by the Masjumi as a candidate for the premiership, as was apparent to the public at that time, so that the N.U. had threatened to quit the Masjumi. It was not merely that Wahid Hasjim was not returned for the fourth time[3] to the "soft chair" of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the following cabinet--Wilopo Cabinet, April 4, 1952-June 2, 1953--but it was Fakih Usman from Muhammadijah, and then these were taken as the decisive reasons for separating from the mother organization, namely Masjumi. If these could be taken as the cause, then these were in fact only a casus belli in the complications and internal conflicts which had already piled up. From the short view it began with the birth of Masjumi, while from the long view it could be pursued to the establishment of N.U.

The Palembang Congress from one aspect was, thus, a repetition of the history of N.U. twenty-five years back at which the conservative-madhhab-oriented-ulama arose to fight the "dangers" of reformist groups who wished to "modify Islam in Indonesia and to lead it astray from the religious tradition which for centuries had been followed." The name

itself of the ulama movement was sufficient to show in what direction the movement would be led. "The modern movement in the Islamic world in Java," says Blumberger, "... led to the establishment of the movement, in January 1926, of a union of orthodox scholars in Surabaja called Nahdlatul Ulama, that is, the awakening of the religious scholars."[4] While Kijahi Masjkur, in defending the "beleid"- policy - of the Central Board in front of the Congress, says:

> "... The organization of N.U. was created and set up because of the emergence of the movement whose desire was to abolish the madhhab schools, in Indonesia as well as in Hijaz where Ibnu Su'ud wrested the power. This stream did not respect the religious scholars and undermined their position in the society."[5]

The statement that 'this movement did not respect the religious scholars and undermined their position in society' echoed and repeated so that one could draw the conclusion that the motive of the desertion from the Masjumi was parallel with the reason of the formation of N.U. in 1926, which in other words means a separation of the madhhab-ulama from the modern group. The pages of the history of Islam in Indonesia since then may be said to have been 'decorated' by conflicts and reconciliations between these two blocks, that is the conservative block which firmly hold to madhhab doctrine and Islamic tradition, which drives the carriage of N.U., and the progressive block, oriented towards the modernism of Abduh and Riḍa's Al Manar, who drives the carriage of Muhammadijah, Sarekat Islam, Persatuan Islam, and so on.

It is true that in the subsequent development it could be seen that attempts were made to bring these two camps together; however, such attempts in the field of doctrine were not to be seen.[6] The establishment of N.U.

itself could be interpreted as the readiness of the ulama group to follow and exercise the technique of organization of the modern group, so that "though organizationally for a long time less impressive than Muhammadijah, the new movement soon spread throughout Java and in later years forcefully competed with Indonesian reformism in missionary work in the Outer Islands".[7] In addition to these there were factors from without which helped to draw them together. The national movements with their desire to be free of colonialism, with nationalism and desiring independence, while on the other hand, the more intensive attacks which done by non-Islamic elements such as the rise of a non religious Western educated political elite, Christian missionary activities which got support and became anak mad of the government, restrictions which were imposed by the government on the freedom of movement of Islamic organizations - all of this caused them to look for a rapprochement[8] although the status quo in the ideological-doctrinal field remained fast. Such factors as these eventually brought them together in a federation of Islamic organizations which was called Madjlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia, abbreviated as M.I.A.I., or Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia. This body was set up in the year 1937, which the N.U., together with the Muhammadijah became its backbone. As to the immidiate and urgent causes which stimulated the establishment of M.I.A.I., are, among others, the emergence of articles, in books and magazines as well as newspapers which boldly and openly insulted the Prophet Muhammad, the Quran, the Islamic religion, and Muslims as such. An example is the articles of Siti Soemandari in the fortnightly Bangoen[9]

which found furious response from pious Muslims. Moreover, it was also stimulated by the intervention of the Dutch government in matrimonial and inheritance affairs of Muslims by transferring the affairs of inheritance rights from the Raad Agama (religious court) to the Landraad (civil court). Even at that time was beginning to be felt the importance of a unified matrimonial code in accordance with religious law for all Muslims in Indonesia. Also efforts were made to unify the beginning of puasa (fasting in the month of Ramadan), which for long had become a disputed matter. And as to the fate of other Muslims in other countries who were awakened against Western colonialism, Muslim Indonesians also paid much of their attentions and sympathy.[10]

The aims of the M.I.A.I., as set forth in its constitution, are:

1. To federate all Indonesian Muslim organizations in order for them to cooperate.
2. To reconcile any conflicts arising among Indonesian Muslim groups, either those already members of the M.I.A.I. or not yet.
3. To foster relations between Muslims in Indonesia and those abroad.
4. To strive for the benefit of the Islam and its followers.
5. To establish a "Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (or K.M.I.)".[11]

Until the arrival of Japanese armed forces in Indonesia M.I.A.I. was able to congresses a number of times. The first was held in Surabaja, a few months following the establishment of the organization (February 26 - March 1, 1938). The second Congress was held

in Solo (May, 1939), while the third was again held in Solo (July, 1941) at the time when World War the second had already been directly felt in Indonesia. In these congresses, matters bearing directly on the lives of Muslims, whether internal, external or related to the religion of Islam itself were discussed.[12] However, it was to be expected that if the discussions had transgressed the field of each doctrinal foundations then the congress usually could not reach a decision and with "polite" words it was pinted out in the conclusions that 'it has not yet been ripe to discuss'. Among the matters which was never resolved was the problem of how to determine the beginning of fasting day, where the N.U. and other conservative groups remained firm on ru'yah , while the Muhammadijah believed in the scientific infallibility of hisab.[13]

After a short break, the life of M.I.A.I. was continued sometime after the entrance of the Japanese forces. In its meeting held on September 5, 2602 (1942 A.D.) it was agreed and reaffirmed that M.I.A.I. to be the Pusat Pimpinan Persatuan Ummat Islam Indonesia (Central Leadership of the Union of All Indonesian Muslims) and rendered all the respomsibility concerning Islam and the lives of Muslims.
To it the duty was imposed:

a. To give place to Islam in the Indonesian society, proportionate to the importance and position of Islam as such.
b. To determine the situation and the strategy in the transitional period.[14]

However, a year later the Japanese Military Government in Java

terminated the life of M.I.A.I. (end of 1943), because the Military government felt that the cooperation with Muslims via M.I.A.I. could not be continued. It was fortunate for the N.U. and Muahmmadijah before the liquidation of M.I.A.I. had obtained legal status and were given freedom of movement throughout Java, a "gift" which could only be tasted by them at that time.[15)]

A few weeks later (November, 1943), Masjumi (Madjlis Sjura Muslimin Indonesia; Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was established[16)], which, the Japanese expected, would give moral support in continuing the great East Asia War, where at that time the Japanese had already begun to lose in the War in the Pacific. With Masjumi, which in fact was the same as the old M.I.A.I., Muhammadijah and N.U. could once again work together and became the backbone of this new federation. But with the birth of the Masjumi at the same time there grew unconsciously the seed of conflict whose consequences could only be felt after Masjumi jumped into the period of Independence, which in an All Indonesian Muslim Congress held in Jogja on November 7, 1945, was decreed as the only political party for the all Muslims in Indonesia.[17)]

The structural weaknesses which was discovered within the body of Masjumi -which even today remains unchanged - is based mainly on the dualism of membership[18)] and secondly the lack of division of duties and the clearcut field between Masjumi as a political body and as that which combines the whole daughter organizations and special members whose fields are mainly social, educational and religious. In their membership system it was found that the so called regular

member, that is an individual member, and the special member, that is consisting of non-political Muslim organizations. The fourth chapter of the first Masjumi constitution mentioned: "The regular member comrises citizens of Indonesia, Muslims, male and female, and who do not belong to another political party. Special members are Islamic organizations which are not political parties".[19] In addition are 'kernlid' -nuclear members- who were nominated by branches and who consist practically of well known kijahis in regions.[20]

Moreover, the Masjumi established special, autonomous, bodies[21] for administering affairs directly related to various aspects of social life. Among these are:

1. S.B.I.I. (Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Muslim Workers), as the central body for trade unions under Masjumi political leadership. This was established in 194.
2. S.T.I.I. (Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Muslim Peasants), established in 1946 at Kediri.
3. S.N.I.I. (Serikat Nelajan Islam Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Muslim Fishers), established in 194.
4. S.D.I.I. (Serikat Dagang Islam Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Muslim Traders), established in 1947.
5. G.P.I.I. (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement), established a few weeks before the birth of Masjumi in Djakarta (October 2, 1945), and taken over by the Masjumi, as the coordinated body of various Muslim youth and student organizations.

6. Muslimat Masjumi, the autonomous women's wing of the Masjumi which was established coincidentally with the Masjumi.

7. And, at the beginning of the Revolution also: Hizbullah and Sabilillah People's Armies--which were later absorbed into the Indonesian Armed Forces.

This structural situation remained without there being any opportunity for correction or analysis because, partly, of the Revolution which demanded the compact unity of the people, and the Masjumi in particular which was recognized as one of the dominant prime-movers of the Revolution.[22)] But after the recognition of the Independence, when the common enemy had left, the time was ripe for each faction, intent its own interests, tried to fit itself to the new, changed, situation.[23)]

Within the Masjumi itself, neglecting to overcome the internal conflicts, not drawing clear lines of distinction between the duties and rights belonging to organization members and the Masjumi as the coordination body and as a political party, there was what had long been expected quickly appeared: the emergence in the party of rifts between the party and member organizations, and between member organizations themselves, which, it goes without saying, spiced with the personal conflicts which had become an old refrain. Moreover, political interests among the special members began to be felt, both because of dissatisfaction with the political party of the Central Executive Board and because of pushed by the desires to monopolize the seats by those of the same coloration.

How the internal situation of Masjumi was exposed by the N.U. can be followed from the speech of Rais'Ām -Supreme leader-, K.H.A.Wahab Hasbullah, at the opening of the Palembang Congress, who says, among other things:

"The amalgamation of N.U. with the Masjumi at the time when the latter was established had by no means modified the former structure of N.U. as an organization which has its own statute and has its specific field of endeavor and interests in promoting and propagating Islam by way of establishing mosques and religious schools and missionary works. While the Masjumi as a political party which has two kinds of membership: 1) from organizations and 2) from individuals, should and must only work within the limit of political field, and all the platforms that lie without it should and must be given to member organizations, so that, by that way, any undesired conflicts can be eliminated.

It is true that the structural form of the Masjumi which has obtained until now is puzzling and has to some extent even produced difficulties in defining the tasks of its organizational members. This is especially so if we see that many of our ummat have only just recently become acquainted with an organization, above all in the realm of politics. It is therefore not astonishing if we hear that Masjumi hold public gatherings to celebrate the Prophet's birthday as well as commemorating the Isrā and Mi'rāj of the Holy Prophet, and that in other places Masjumi levied the zakat to be distributed to the poor and needy.

In view of the above we realize that the majority of our ummat have not understood the dividing line between the tasks of a social-charitable organization and a political party. Therefore many of them are confused and sometimes appear suspicious."24)

A more urgent factor advanced by the N.U. as a major reason for quitting the Masjumi concerns the function and position of the ulama within the party framework. The endorsement by the N.U. of Masjumi as the only Muslim political party partaking in the All Islamic Congress in Jogja in 1945 was in fact aimed not only at strengthening the unity of Muslim ummat in carrying out the revolution and raising arms against

the Allies and the Dutch whom the Allies hid behind them, but also at raising the ulama to supreme leadership of the party, to be the spiritual commanders of the revolution and those who would decide legislative matters pertaining to issues concerning the Islamic religion. N.U.'s support was reaffirmed at its 16th Congress, the first after independence, in Purwokerto (March 1946, Rabi'ul Akhir, 1356), where the Congress urged all members of the N.U. to join the Masjumi Party.[25] The Congress also formulated a conception which was to be proposed to the Masjumi, requesting it to embody a Madjlis Sjura, the highest body within the party hierarchy along the Mu'tamar (Congress). The Madjlis Sjura would comprise ulama and kijahis whose functions were to give advice and fatwas in the religious matters, to judge the policy of the Central Executive Board (Dewan Pimpinan Partai), and to act as a Legislative Body of the Party.[26] The conception was accepted by the Masjumi and constituted in the party statute. As to the rights and duties of the Madjlis Sjura are defined in the statute as follows:

a. Madjlis Sjura has the right to propose any political issues to the Dewan Pimpinan Partai.

b. Madjlis Sjura is to answer questions concerning religious issues raised by the Dewan Pimpinan Partai.

c. Dewan Pimpinan Partai ought to ask Madjlis Sjura for fatwa on political matters which are considered to have relations with religious codes.

d. A unanimous decision of Madjlis Sjura on religious matters is final.

e. Rights and duties of the Madjlis Sjura outside the general session are represented and executed by a Dewan Harian Madjlis Sjura (Working Committee of the Madjlis).

f. Dewan Harian is responsible to the General Session of the Madjlis Sjura.[27)]

These were the factors which stimulated and encouraged the N.U. to cooperate with other affiliated organizations in the Masjumi. And N.U. even had the prospect that its ulama would soon be a dominant power in the party.

However, situations which developed later, especially after the armed struggle against the Dutch was succeeded by a political struggle around the diplomatic table, the significance and functions of the ulama began to decline and they began to feel that they were being gradually set aside. They felt that they were used only so long as they were needed to rouse the fighting spirit of the people to go into the battle-fields by shouting Allahu Akbars, and reciting the jihad verses so that the people were not afraid to meet death. But now the battle-fields had changed. The participants should also change. Those who now came forward were a younger generation in the party, politically and intellectually trained, unskilled and moderate in religious matters, who did not want to be bound by the fatwa of the ulama but wished to exercise their own ijtihad. In secular matters they were eager to adopt all advantages from the West. The West was for them another Mecca for worldly affairs, especially those closely related

to methodological and technological aspects of life. Tradition for them was acceptable only so long as it was suitable to time and condition and if not, it should be remodelled.

But all this was unacceptable by the ulama. They felt that they were not only to be pushed to the fore in time of difficulties and war but even more so in time of peace - yes, in any time they must be in the lead. Ulama for them means leader of the ummat "who are willed by the Prophet to continue his leadership"[28), a motto which has since been used by the N.U. The saying that "this group does not give respect to the ulama but even undermines their position among the masses, was echoed and reechoed.

These unsatisfactory conditions were more and more felt after the Masjumi held its fourth Congress in Jogjakarta in the late 1949 (15 - 19 December) where the Masjumi underwent some major structural reorganizations What directly affected the N.U. was the new position of Madjlis Sjura. "In the beginning", Abubakar explains,"Madjlis Sjura which was comprised of Ulama, had held an important position by the side of the Dewan Pimpinan Partai and had acted as a legislative council. But ever since the Madjlis Sjura was as if only made as the Advisory Council[29) whose roles and positions were gradually diminished. The Ulama from various groups understood this, especially those who were directly or indirectly affiliated to the N.U., who during the revolution were very active in leading the armed Muslim people, They seemed to retreat and to be no longer active. Was not it then the case that almost all of the problems were projected by the Masjumi only through political scope and hardly ever through the fatwas and advice issued by the ulama within and without the Madjlis Sjura?"[30)

Zainul Arifin, in commenting the reasons of the N.U.'s quit from the Masjumi in Palembang Congress, says:

> "...But this Madjlis Sjura which was predominantly occupied by our ulama was only used as a juwelled ring worn only for going to the feasts and locked in the drawer when they are finished. Since then Madjlis Sjura had never been invited to discuss matters related to the steps that were to be taken by the Masjumi. While, in fact, our ulama had and have enough skills and tacts. As such had been proved in the Madiun Congress, March[31] 1947, where our ulama squeezed their sweats and thought to resolve and analyze problems directly connected with politics, national and international. Nevertheless, all the resolutions which were then proceeded to the Masjumi were neglected and let them freezed in the ice box." [32]

At the same time, the shift of leadership from the Sukiman group, which was generally considered as the conservative wing of the party, to the Natsir group -the progressive group, or as Kahin calls it, the religious socialist[33] - had widened the rift between N.U. and the Masjumi. As the shift continued, the wider became the rift dividing the blocks. "The problems of Cabinet formations, San Francisco agreement, and also Mutual Security Act (M.S.A.)", says Masjkur in defending the policy of the N.U. party Supreme Board, "were among the so many complex problems frustratingly faced by the Masjumi. When Dr.Sukiman was appointed as the cabinet formator, The Central Executive Board of the Masjumi gave him the full mandate. But six hours prior to his visit to the President to report his success in composing his cabinet, all of a sudden came the announcement from the Central Executive Board stating the illegitimacy of Sukiman in continuing his effort to form a new cabinet on behalf of the Masjumi. Moreover, when the new Sukiman Cabinet was about to be sworn

at nine in the morning, at six thirty the Central Board of the party announced that the Masjumi was not going to back the new cabinet of Sukiman".[34)]

The fall of the Sukiman Cabinet which had been fully supported by the N.U., had brought to a climax the ideollgical conflict btween N.U. and the progressive wing of the Masjumi. Soon after the signing of the M.S.A., the Natsir group, through the Central Board of the party, had decided not to accept or be responsible for the treaty's signature, as it was considered to be going astray from the active and independent foreign policy of Indonesia and binding her to a certain block if she accepted conditions which would reduce the sovereignty of the State.[35)] All of this was obviously felt as a heavy blow for the Sukiman group and, of course, for N.U., which fully backed the policy of Sukiman.

The conflict between N.U. and the progressive gropp of the Masjumi eventually came to a breaking point right in the time when parties were busying themselves in striving for seats in the succeeding cabinet of P.N.I's Wilopo. The N.U. once again came forward with its proposal to renominate Sukiman as Premier, and Wahid Hasjim as the single candidate to reoccupy the Religious Affairs portfolio. The N.U.'s demands, however, were apparently rejected by the party Central Board, which, instead, installed Fakih Usman from Muhammadijah as Minister of Religious Affairs. At the peak of this conflict, Kijahi Masjkur not unexpectedly, came out saying,

"... However, up until now all the ideas and efforts of the N.U. were always minimized by the Masjumi, so that the Masjumi now in its political struggle has obviously gone astray from the Islamic teachings. As the result of this wrong policy there were many of our ulama and our ummat who became the victims."36)

Judging from the chain of causes put forth by the N.U., the N.U. felt that it had strong reasons for quitting the Masjumi. If we should summarize these reasons, they would be as follows:

1. The existence of dualistic membership in the Masjumi, enabling a person who is already a member of any Islamic organization amalgamated in the Masjumi to become a member of Masjumi, or vice versa; while at the same time the Masjumi as a political body is also involved in activities beyond the political arena, involvements which should by right be the task of member bodies. This resulted in a confusion of duties the effects of which were puzzling to the ummat. At the same time, the scope of activities of N.U. and other ~~member~~ non political member organizations was curtailed, while, morepver, they found themselves competing with Masjumi.
2. The concentration of party power in the hands of the Dewan Pimpinan Partai (since the Jogja Congress of 1949), using the Madjlis Sjura only as a decorative ornament. ~~The ulama~~ The ulama were given seats in the Madjlis Sjura in order to give advice and fatwa only when the D.P.P. (Dewan Pimpinan Partai) should request it, and it was not even incumbent on the D.P.P. to accept it if the D.P.P. should hold a

different opinion. (article 30, sub 3 and 5, Anggaran Rumah Tangga; by law). By this way removing the claws of power of the ulama, "they were gradually withdrawn and no longer participated actively in the field of struggle, because all the problems are only observed through political spectacle by paying no attention to religious compass."[37)]

3. Even long before the status change of the Madjlis Sjura, the P.S.I.I. (Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia) leaders had quit the Masjumi and reactivated their own P.S.I.I. party; this means that Masjumi's position of being the only Muslim Political Party can no longer be defended. Ever since the N.U. has felt the need of reforming the Masjumi into a federal body. Such a proposal had often been presented by the N.U. to the Masjumi Congresses as well as in the sessions of the D.P.P. These suggestions, however, were ignored by the Masjumi.[38)]

4. Various policies of the dominant progressive wing of the D.P.P. were in many instances at variance with the ideas of N.U.

The way out of all these complications, as seen by the N.U. group, was therefore to enter the political arena and for Masjumi to be merely a federal body. In such a federal body, the dualistic elements would instantly disappear and it would become a genuinely coordinated body and a Congress for the various Islamic organizations

in which each would have equality. The decision at the Palembang Congress concerning this states:

> "To agree, by 61 for, 9 against, and 7 abstention, with the resolution of the Pengurus Besar (Supreme Board) of the N.U. taken in a Surabaya Conference on 5 and 6 of April, 1952, stating that the N.U. organizationally should quit the Masjumi and the Masjumi to be organized and becomes a federative body". 39)

But would the Masjumi accept the aforementioned arguments, or would it at least understand such arguments? In other words, should all the exposed mistakes be imposed solely on the shoulder of the Masjumi so that it was pushed ahead to be the single convict deserving trial, and in such a way that the N.U. would wash its hands? Against the arguments confronted by the N.U., would not the Masjumi have equally strong arguments, so that the Masjumi would feel that it was not it that has to be tried but the N.U.?

If the Masjumi were to present counter arguments to the N.U. they would run as follows:

1. By quitting the Masjumi and forming a political party, did not the N.U. feel that it had broken its promise and violated the sacred oath taken together in the All Islamic Congress at Jogjakarta in 1945, that there must be no other political parties other than the Masjumi? Is it not so that by the birth of Masjumi was meant the unification of the scattered and unorganized ummat who however differing from each other in ideological outlook was united in political outlook?

2. Did the N.U. not realize from the beginning that the existence of membership dualism in the Masjumi was not the creation of a faction within the Masjumi or a thing smuggled in later from the outside, but simply the result of a common desire, as exemplified in the Jogja All Islamic Congress, for example, where the N.U. was openly recognized the <u>soko-guru</u> (the prime mover)? Moreover, is it not true that this tradition had existed ever since the Masjumi was still in the shadow of Japanese rule, when the kijahis had personal priority and were dignified by membership?[40)]

3. Did the N.U. not realize that there surely must be a division of work in the party organization based upon strategic needs, calling for the right man in the right place? Is it not true that in the D.P.P. itself --according to article X, paragraph 2 c of the party constitution-- there is a provision for two representatives from each member organizations? And, in addition to the full provision in the <u>Madjlis Sjura</u>, is not it so that the door is laid open to member organizations to man various <u>badan2 chusus</u> (satelite organizations put under the supervision of the Masjumi party) which are to carry out the party platforms in agreement to their respective nature and field? All this should be understood as a necessary means to accelerate the wheels of party machinery, to achieve the maximum efficiency, and to eliminate any tendency towards

centralism and autocratism in the party leadership. As to the inertia of the Madjlis Sjura, should not the causes of it be discovered within itself which evidently did not show its own activities and even neglected its functions as the religious advisory body of the party? Would it then be logical if after the clarification of work divisions, the Madjlis Sjura, or rather a number of ulamas in it, still intervenes the tasks of D.P.P. except those that have been pointed in the party constitution?

4. Does this not mean that the federal system a la N.U. would, directly or indirectly, stimulate other non-political Islamic organizations, which are now still amalgamated with the Masjumi would secede and establish their own political parties? This, from the point of view of Masjumi, would not bring Masjumi and all of the Islamic ummat closer to their goal -- as was solemnly agreed upon at the Jogja Congress-- but the reverse? And would it not, eventually, be much easier for the enemies to insert their needle of divide et impera polity to break the unity of the ummat?

However, so far as can be traced through the sources, the Masjumi, up to the Masjumi Congress at the end of August, 1952, never expressed any official reaction to the secession of N.U., with the exeption of individual regrets and reactions voiced by some dominant Masjumi leaders, that, in the observation of the writer complied closely with the points outlined above. The letter sent by the N.U. to the Masjumi,

dated May 31, 1952, advising of the resolutions taken in the Palembang Congress was, according to the N.U., ignored by the Masjumi, a sign that the Masjumi was bitterly disappointed by the N.U.'s line of thinking and would therefore let the N.U. find its way alone.[41)]

In the 6th Congress of the Masjumi, which was held in Djakarta from August 24th to 30th, 1952, a number of urgent problems came in for discussion. In regard to internal matters, the Congress debated the future relations between Masjumi and its member organizations. This debate was clearly stimulated by N.U.'s quitting the party and the subsequent widely spread rumor purposely insinuated by enemies of the Masjumi that the strongest supporter of Masjumi, the Muhammadijah, would follow in the footsteps of the N.U.- a circumstance ardently desired by these enemies. It was hoped that in this way Masjumi, which was thought to stand the greatest chance to win over its rivals in the coming election, could be fatally paralyzed. Although the debate was hot, and nearly imperiled the life of the party, a rift was eventually avoided by emphasizing the importance of Masjumi's giving proper attention to the provision of Lebensraum and common welfare of its member organizations, while at the same time the member organizations must back and carry out the ideas and programs of Masjumi ensemble.[42)] Moreover, the Congress, in addition, modified the organization of the party, abolishing the Presidium of the Congress, that had acted for the party Congress when it was not in session. The existance of this presidium, in addition to the party's nineteen member Executive Council, was felt to be impractical

and to give rise to dual leadership within the party.[43)]

The abolishment of the Presidium of the Congress, which was generally considered to be the last bastion of the conservative group - the Presidium was at that time presided over by Sukiman - meant another victory for the Natsir progressive group, an issue which was being awaited anxiously outside the Congress meeting place at that time. The Congress, however, by installing Sukiman in the spot of first Deputy Chairman of the new D.P.P., along side Natsir as the reappointed General Chairman, had ultimately succeeded in creating an optimum modus vivendi for the two groups, although the common saying that the Natsir group had gained a tremendous victory in the Congress was apparently irrefutable. This was clearly proved by the ensuing party platform which, reflected the pregnant desire of the Natsir group.

As to domestic as well as international issues, "...the Masjumi", writes Mochtar Lubis, "proposes a fundamental change in the present governmental system of Indonesia. Instead of the present parliamentary cabinet, the Masjumi asks for a presidential cabinet, with the President held responsible to Parliament. The party further wants a bicameral legislature, with a lower house and a senate".[44)] As to Indonesian foreign policy, which during the Sukiman cabinet was one of the great sources of conflict among the various political parties, and, in fact eventually led to the fall of the Sukiman cabinet because of the failure to defend the policy on the M.S.A. agreement, the Masjumi reiterated its standpoint that Indonesia should maintain its

active independent foreign policy, which in Masjumi's own terms was called "the policy of world peace and fraternity". "Based on Islamic principles, which teach people to live peacefully among themselves", Masjumi points out, in its new platform, "Masjumi is of the opinion that Indonesian foreign policy aims at defending world peace and seeking friendship with all people, especially with nations which are based in the belief in God and democracy".[45] Moreover, as to Indonesia's relations with the United Nations, Masjumi stressed that "Indonesia should join actively in strengthening the U.N.'s position as an international body which maintains and defends world peace".[46] As for its attitude towards foreign aid, Masjumi maintained that "agreements on foreign aid for the purpose of accelerating the national developments are acceptable, provided that they are not linked with any military or political ties limiting the sovereignty of the State".[47]

Strangely enough, the closing date of the Masjumi Congress - - August 30- coincided with the opening day, in the same city, of a joint meeting of N.U. , P.S.I.I. and Perti (Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah; Union for the Islamic teaching) to inaugurate the establishment of a new federated "Liga Muslimin Indonesia" (Indonesian Muslim League),[48] a body long dreamed of by the N.U. A month previously, on July 31, 1952, after its letter to Masjumi had been ignored, N.U. officially quit the Masjumi in the Parliament and declared the establisment of the N.U. Party. Eight Masjumi members of Parliament seceded and formed a new faction: Fraksi Nahdlatul Ulama.[49]

So far, in analyzing the complications and causes for N.U.'s quitting the Masjumi, the writer has tried to focus on two major aspects, namely, the legal and constitutional aspect, as it was always maintained by the N.U. to be the prime reason of its secession, and the psychological aspect, embodied in the struggle between two polarizing blocs -the conservative kijahi bloc leaning towards N.U. and the progressive intelectual bloc leaning towards Muhammadijah and leadership of younger generations- for the achievement of hegemony and leadership in the Masjumi. However weak the constitutional foundations of Masjumi may be --such as the existence of dualism in membership, ill-defined division of labor between Masjumi as a political body and the member organizations as social, educational, charitable, and religious bodies, and the limited opportunities open for the ulama in the party, the writer nevertheless believes the second aspect to be more meaningful in explaining the reason for the secession of N.U. In other words, it was the increasing tension of the polaristic tendency of the two power factions that answer the question of why the N.U. had to secede from the Masjumi. Had the N.U. been pushed aside in its struggle for the hegemony of the Masjumi, but Muhammadijah, it would have logically not the N.U. but Muhammadijah which would have seceded from the Masjumi and established its own independent party: Partai Muhammadijah.

The victory of Muhammadijah and the intellectual groups in the Masjumi, however, was *ipso facto* logical. The position of Masjumi as the largest political party -as it was generally regarded prior to

the General Elections- which was playing an increasingly important role in national as well as in ternational politics and diplomacy, required its intellectual groups to be pushed to the fore to meet the needs of a modern state for certain knowledges and skills. The hegemony they gained in the party leadership on this account made their victory a logical one.

The history of Masjumi, from November 1945 to the N.U. Congress at Palembang in 1952, reveals a trend of gradually pushing N.U. into a corner while the intellectual groups, above all, in the Masjumi, grew more and more powerful. Up to the 1949 Congress at Jogjakarta, the N.U. was relatively powerful. This was made possible because of its focal position for the ulama and kijahis during the revolution who had demonstrated their undeniable spiritual leadership. From 1949 on the N.U.'s authority and influence gardually decreased; so that the Palembang Congress in 1952, as has been pointed out, was in fact but a repetition of the history of the founding of N.U. twenty five years before. L'histoire se repete!

FOOTNOTES :

1. See K.H.M.Dahlan, "N.U. dan Perdjuangannja", in Risalah Politik no. 2, p. 1, Pengurus Besar N.U., Djakarta, 1954.
2. Cf., the speech of Zainul Arifin in Palembang Congress, Verslag Lengkap Muktamar N.U. ke 19 di Palembang, p. 33, Pengurus Besar N.U. bagian Da'wah, Djakarta, 1952; and, Dahlan, ibid., p. 1.
3. See Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952 - 1953; A Turning Point in Post Revolutionary Indonesia, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958, p. 74.
4. J.Th.P.Blumberger, "Nahdlatoel Oelama", art. in Encyclopaedia van Ned. Oost Indie, VI, p. 272.
5. "Beleid Pekerdjaan P.B.N.U. selama Muktamar ke 18 s/d 19", Verslag Lengkap Muktamar, op.cit., p. 1.
6. The Writer disagrees with H.J.Benda who says : "... More important still was the fact that the rift --at no time extending to the doctrinal field proper-- had no sufficient basis in socio-economic differentiation." ~~Cf., H.J.Benda,~~ (The Crescent and the Rising Sun; Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942 - 1945 ; W.Van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958; p. 51).
7. H.J.Benda, ibid., p. 59. It should be noted that the spread of N.U.'s influence to the Outer Islands before the War was practically confined only to the region of South Kalimantan which had already had a long historical and religious ties with Java.

8. Ibid., pp. 51 - 52.

9. Siti Soemandari, "Huwelijksordonantie en Vrouwenemancipatie", Bangoen, no. 8 and 9, I, October - November, 1937, Solo.; cf., Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I., 1937 - 1941, Pertjetakan Agil, Soerabaya, 1941, pp. 6 - 9.

10. Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I., ibid., pp. 6 - 9. See also, H.Abubakar, et.al., Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar, Panitya Buku Peringatan almarhum K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, Djakarta, 1957, p. 311.

11. Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I., ibid., p. 30. The 1st M.I.A.I. Congress, which was also called Kongres Islam the X, held in Surabaja, selected the abovementioned items as the agenda. The 2nd Congress was held in Solo, from 2 to 7 May, 1939, and discussed the problems which were similar to the first Congress agenda, with the addition as the demand to the government to abolish article 177 and 178 of the Indische Staatsregeling which were feared to have provided the Christian missionaries to expand their religious activities in Indonesia in full swing. Also the problems of the necessity to unite all Islamic teachers in an organization, and the Madjlis Sjar'i. The 3rd Congress was again held in Solo, 5 - 8 July, 1941, with the new name as Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (K.M.I.), as was already dreamed over by the M.I.A.I. since the time of its foundation. This Congress discussed a number of urgent and important problems due to the pending critical situation facing the second World War. Among

them are: the problem of the possible structural change of the State, that Indonesia was to have a Parliament based on Islam; the rejection of militie dienstplicht for the Muslim ummat; the adoption of blood transfusion method as the necessary aid for the needed so long as it is not used for the aims harmful to the law of God, etc. Cf., Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I., ibid., pp. 20 - 27.

12. Ibid.

13. Point VIII of the resolution taken in Kongres al Islam Indonesia in Solo mentions about this as follows: "The Congress considered that the time is not ripe yet to discuss the problem of the beginning of the fasting day, for each of the participants still fastly holds to his own belief, that is, there are those who believe in 'hisab' and there those who believe in ru'jah, while both are agreed by the religion. It is therefore up to the concerned organizations to follow their own way. See Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I. , ibid., pp. 11 - 12.

14. H.Abubakar, op.cit., p. 321.

15. The decree was issued on Sept. 10, 1943. See Benda, op.cit., pp. 147 and 260n. For further discussions on M.I.A.I., see Benda, ibid., ch.VI; H.Abubakar, ch. III; and Boekoe Peringatan M.I.A.I., op.cit.,

16. G.McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952, pp. 110 - 111; Benda, ibid., ch. VII, pp. 150 sqq.

17. Kahin, ibid., p. 156; Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan R.I., Djakarta, 1954, p. 443; Abubakar, op. cit., pp. 349 sqq.

18. Wahid Hasjim, "Masjumi Lima Tahun", Suara Partai Masjumi, V, no. 2, Dec. 1950; Abubakar, ibid., p. 736.

19. Kepartaian di Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan R.I., 1951, "Anggaran Dasar Masjumi", art. IV, sub 1, p. 15.

20. Kepartaian, 1954, op. cit., p. 444.

21. Art. XIV, Masjumi Statute, Kepartaian, 1954, p. 446.

22. Zainal Arifin, Verslag Muktamar Palembang, op. cit., p. 33.

23. Cf., the speech of K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah in Palembang Congress, ibid., p. 5.

24. Ibid., p. 5. As to the foundation of S.T.I.I. and S.D.I.I., Kahin says that these organizations were first established as the means to levy the zakat among the peasants and traders to support the Indonesian revolution. See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

25. Abubakar, op. cit., p. 563; cf., Verslag Palembang, op. cit., p. 33.

26. See Abubakar, ibid., p. 563; cf., Kepartaian, 1954, op. cit., p. 412, no. c.

27. Kepartaian, 1951, op. cit., p. 20.

28. Hadith: Al'Ulamā warathat al Anbiyā.

29. See art. VIII, The Statute of Masjumi concerning Madjlis Sjura, and ch. IX by-law, pp. 27-34.

30. Abubakar, p. 563; see also, Kepartaian, 1954, op. cit., p. 412, c.

31. *Cf.*, Nj.Aisjah Dahlan, *Sedjarah Lahirnja Muslimat N.U.*, P.B.N.U. Bagian Penerbitan, Djakarta, p. 39.
32. *Verslag Palembang*, *op.cit.*, p. 33.
33. Kahin, *op.cit.*, p. 157.
34. *Verslag Palembang*, p. 34.
35. The decision of the Masjumi's D.P.P. on Febr. 12, 1952; *cf.*, Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet*, *op.cit.*, p. 63. As to the reasons of the fall of Sukiman Cabinet, Feith among ather things says; "The Mutual Security Agreement issue was certainly a major cause of the fall. So also were a number of other issues, including deadlocks between the two major parties (between P.N.I. and Masjumi) over ratification of the San Fransisco Treaty and the proposed new regulation to replace Regulation 39 on the interim composition of the regional councils, disagreements on the handling of the Irian issue and relations with Holland generally, and conflicts on import and budgetary policies". (*The Wilopo Cabinet*, p. 65).
36. *Verslag Palembang*, op.cit., p. 34.
37. *Kepartaian*, 1954, p.456.
38. The general session of the P.B.N.U. at Surabaya, *Verslag Palembang*, p. 32. According to Abubakar, the conference was held in Djombang, at the house of K.Ma'sum Chalil, Djagalan. See, Abubakar, p. 564n.
39. Abubakar, *ibid.*, p. 564.

40. Benda says: "Of equally importance was the fact that individual <u>kijahi</u> and <u>ulama</u>, whom the M.I.A.I. had for long unsuccessfully tried to organize, could likewise become members of <u>Masjumi</u> with the approval of the <u>Shumubu</u>, which thus obtained complete control over the membership of the new federation".(<u>The Crescent</u>, p. 151). <u>Cf</u>., art. V, sub 1b, The Statute of Masjumi.

41. Dahlan, "N.U. dan Perdjuangannja", <u>op.cit</u>., p. 2.

42. No.5 decision of the Congress. ; see, Abubakar, p. 368.

43. Mochtar Lubis, "Party Confusion in Indonesia", art. in <u>Far Eastern Survey</u>, Oct. 29, 1952, p. 155.

44. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 155 - 156.

45. <u>Kepartaian</u>, 1954, p. 465.

46. <u>Ibid</u>.

47. <u>Ibid</u>.

48. To realize the idea of establishing a federal body, coordinating all Islamic organizations and parties, as was set forward in the Palembang Congress, the P.B.N.U. wrote a letter (no.114/Tanf./VI-52), dated on June 23, 1952, to 18 Islamic parties and organizations,inviting them to form a federative body for all Islamic organizations and parties in Indonesia, and letting it organized by any party or organization which was prepared to have the initiative, and, with the provision that N.U. would take the initiative if non of them which was willing to. The invitation was sent after the N.U.'s first invitation to the Masjumi was ignored. (letter dated on May 31, 1952.). But from the so many

which were invited there were only P.S.I.I. and Perti which responded and accepted the invitation. A few months later (30th August, 1952, 9th Dhul Hijjah, 1371), Liga Muslimin Indonesia was set forward with a ceremony which took place in the lobby of the Parliament building. See, Dahlan, op.cit., p.2; Abubakar, op.cit., p.564.

49. The names of the members seceded and formed the Fraksi N.U.were: 1) A.A.Achsien; 2) A.S.Bachmid ; 3) K.H.M.Iljas ; 4) Idham Chalid; 5) K.H.A.Wahab Hasbullah; 6) R.T.Surjaningpradja; 7) Zainul Arifin; 8) K.H.M.Masjkur. See Kepartaian, 1954, p. 425; Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, p. 44.

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II. N.U. between the two giants; its position as a balance of power.

The period from 1952 to 1955, from its origin as a political party to the General Elections, was for the N.U. a difficult and a decisive one. Within this short span of time, the fate of N.U. was truly at stake. It had to show to the public, as a newly emerging political party, its ability in political fancing. At the same time, in facing the long awaited General Elections when *vox populi* would become *vox Dei*, it had to dare to face its giant rivals and to show to the people that the N.U. was their party, the party which fights for their political aims, and above all, the establishment and realization of God's commands on Indonesian earth. How heavy was the burden and how short was the time was quite obvious.

In internal matters it had to prepare and be ready for such huge tasks. Not only at the center it had to make all kinds of peeparations for the establishment of various necessary departments, but also down to the lowest political level through provinces, *kabupatens*, to villages, as is normal for any political party. The framework of the party was gradually set up along the lines of government bureaucracy. In places where the N.U. already had branches and sections, they had to be transformed into branches and sections of *Partai Politik N.U.*[1)]

Meanwhile there was a steady flowing away from the Masjumi.

A number of kijahis whose religious inclinations were towards the N.U. sooner or later jumped over to the N.U. camp and discarded their Masjumi identity cards. The grassroots in the villages waited to see what their kijahis would do, and then readily followed suit. In general, it was the kijahis who prior to or following the founding of the Masjumi were N.U. members who were quick to take the initiative to build and fire the engines of the N.U. party in regions and villages. They found that their opportunities in the Masjumi were limited and there they felt they were not properly treated. In regions where the N.U. movement had never permeated, it now set up new branches and sections.[2] Expansion activities were aimed especially at outposts in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, etc. Thereby the N.U. within a short time had succeeded in putting out its nets, a goal dreamt of but not realized until it became a political party. The N.U. political party, which previously had been known as merely a 'Javanese kijahi movement', now, at least organizationally, had gained national standing, in the sense that it had already become a nation wide political party with its branches almost everywhere.

It was, however, from a psychological point of view understandable, that where the public was somewhat cold and beguiled in its attitude towards the emergence of the N.U. party as a reflection of the common notion that the kijahis were not the men fit to step into the political arena, and that the N.U. party

was merely a small, worth-forgetting party, it was taken as an ipso facto driving force by the N.U. that it had to destroy the public illusions as to its intrinsic strength and try energetically to show to the public that the kijahis were not merely leaders of the ummat in mosques and pesantrens, but also commanders in the political field. The N.U. party, they argued, had the real bulk of followers in the countries. This compensatory attitude which was consciously expressed by the N.U. was to a great extent a strong explanation of why the N.U. was so quickly successful in moving ahead and competing with others in various fields of social and national lives.

The already existing daughter organizations whose duties were to carry out N.U.'s platforms in a number of fields, such as women, youths, students, and boy scouts, organizations, were soon reactivated and coordinated from above by the N.U. supreme board.[3] In the meantime the party also set up workers, traders, as well as peasant unions, as was the case with other political parties. Thus far the N.U. even set up a shipping company for the transportation of hadji-pilgrims to and from Jeddah.[4] The readiness to imitate the patterns and structure of similar party organizations, however, made it easier for the N.U. to put them into functions.

To what extent the N.U., through these special organizations, permeated the life of workers, peasants, and traders, is not so easy to determine. However, the influence of N.U. among the workers and civil servants was actually very slight. This is either because of the lack of skilled organizers or, as is more likely, because the N.U.'s real appeal was not there. The N.U.'s appeal was

particularly felt in villages among the peasants and land-holders, and among traders and pedlars. Accordingly, it could be assumed that the N.U.'s influence was relatively strong among them, and they served as the N.U.'s financial and moral backbone when it strived for an election success. Of course the N.U.'s role among the village peasants was primarily enacted by the kijahis, who were not only the men to whom these villagers sought spiritual and religious succor, but also the men to whom they were dependent as to their economic and social lives.[4)]

In regard to party external affairs, as has been pointed out before, the first step undertaken by the N.U. was the formation of a federative body coordinating, supposedly, all political and social-charitable Islamic organizations throughout Indonesia, as was desired by the Palembang Congress. This task was eventually taken over almost single-handed by the N.U. after the Masjumi rejected or simply ignored the N.U.'s proposal. This federated body which had so far been dreamt up by the N.U. did, nevertheless, come into being, with the P.S.I.I. (Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia) and Perti (Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah) as its co-members. However, sixteen other invited Islamic organizations reacted in the same way as the Masjumi.

It would be interesting to know why only P.S.I.I. and Perti accepted the invitation to join the Liga Muslimin Indonesia[5)], while others ignored or even rejected it? It was commonly understood that among the 16 organizations which rejected the invitation there were quite a few whose religious way of thinking was parallel to that

of N.U., in the sense that they were all based on madhhab orthodoxy, somewwhat anti reformism, and anti Westernism. Nevertheless, besides the similarities in way of thinking, some also saw a clear distinction between th trio P.S.I.I.-Perti-N.U. and those other organizations. Such a distinction was mainly found on their respective attitude towards the Masjumi.

The P.S.I.I., for example, has long displayed its antipathy towards the Masjumi. Although the P.S.I.I. was organizatioaally and constitutionally amalgamated into the Masjumi in 1945, it must be made clear that the P.S.I.I. remained in existence as a member organization of the Masjumi, but felt that it had made a political error and suffered a lost. It had always been proud of its distinctive share in the national struggles of the past.[6] It would therefore not be astonishing to know that at the time when Amir Sjarifuddin was appointed as cabinet formateur in 1947, the Masjumi rejected a share in a coalition cabinet because the conditions it presented were unacceptable to other invited parties,[7] but the P.S.I.I., however, accepted the formateur's invitation to represent the Islamic group in the cabinet; and in so doing succeeded in securing six seats in the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet.[8] The P.S.I.I. since then hurriedly quit the Masjumi and reactivated the new party of P.S.I.I. It was this opportunistic character and the bias outlook towards Masjumi which explains why the P.S.I.I. spontaneously accepted the N.U.'s inritation to incorporate the Liga Muslimin whose goal was apparently

to rival the Masjumi and wrestle against it for the hegemony of the ummat.

As to the smaller Partai Politik Islam Perti, whose influence was more or less limited only to some areas in Sumatra, particularly Central Sumatra, Atjeh and Bengkulen, it also had experienced a long history of conflicts with Muhammadijah which was, in a way, manifested in the conflicts of kaum muda (younger generation) versus kaum tua (older generation), or Islamic Cairo-oriented Modernists versus conservative madhhab-oriented ulama. The latter, it goes without saying, was encircled around the Perti movement. The obscure participation of Perti in the Masjumi in 1945 was soon ended with the proclamation of this movement to be the political party: Partai Politik Islam Perti.[9)]

From the Liga charter jointly signed by these three parties, one can hardly see the distinct aim of the Liga.[10)] However, in the constitution of Liga the aim was broadly pointed out as: "to reach and to realize the Islamic society in harmony with God's commands and the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad".[11)] Moreover, the purpose of the Liga are described as follows:[12)]

1. To plan a joint platform for the aim of benefiting the Indonesian Islamic ummat in all fields of life.
2. To gather the Indonesian Islamic organizations to work together in accordance with platforms confirmed.
3. To support the Indonesian Islamic organizations in speeding their progress for reaching their aims.

4. To organize mass-actions of the Islamic movements whenever needed.
5. To maintain contact and cooperation between Indonesian Islamic ummat and all Islamic ummat in the world.
6. To organize Indonesian Islamic Congresses or such meetings, on national as well as international levels.

By the establishment of the Liga Muslimin, the strength of the Islamic ummat was thereby already divided into two conflicting blocs, one bloc gathered around the Liga Muslimin Indonesia, and the other bloc centered in the Masjumi. By so doing, as is pointed out by Benda, "the impressive Islamic allience, with roots going back to the first Muslim federation M.I.A.I. of 1937 and to the Japanese created Masjumi of late 1942, came to an end".[13)]

The Liga Muslimin, however, scarcely engaged in any notable political activities in the course of the Wilopo Cabinet period. The obvious reasons for this were that the Wilopo Government was a coalition between Masjumi and P.N.I., while the Liga as a federation of minor Islamic parties had no important role in the government. The Liga was only represented in it by Anwar Tjokroaminoto as Minister of Social Affairs, who previously entered the Cabinet with the ticket from P.S.I.I. Also, it should be mentioned that, the loss of Wahid Hasjim, the top figure and strong man of N.U. as well as the promoter and chairman of the Liga --as the result of a fatal accident in April 1953--, created a considerable shock and stagnation in

the Liga. Such a loss was more felt within N.U., because obviously it was he who was the prime mover and responsible for the secession of the N.U. from Masjumi and its becoming a political party, then promptly took the initiative to create the Liga Muslimin. Moreover, it was he who, from among the few N.U. leaders, had talent as an organizer, and in many cases aan be considered as on a par with Western-eduaated intellectuals, although his knowledge was almost entirely obtained through pondok, self-study, and organizational experiences since his early youth.[14)]

Nevertheless, the role of the Liga was then promptly becoming obviuus after the coalition between Masjumi and P.N.I. in one cabinet became more and more difficult. The political crisis that led to the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet, which was clearly felt after the "October 17 Affair", was by itself a manifestation of the "growing polarization of extremes".[15)] As Van der Kroef says, "All preceding cabinets excepts that of Natsir had rested upon the principle of collabosation between the Masjumi and the P.N.I., the two largest political parties . Attempts to continue this principle now proved unworkable".[16)]

The first efforts that was made by co-formateurs Muhammad Rum, Minister of Interior in the recently dissolved cabinet, from Masjumi, and Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, P.N.I. prominent leftwinger, were to bring the P.N.I. and Masjumi together back in one cabinet. These efforts were evidently fruitless. The rift that separated the two blocs could no longer be bridged. In the meantime it was even highly questionable why such ..

such persons as Rum and Mangunsarkoro should be appointed as cabinet *formateurs*, while both were obviously exponents of the extremely uncompromizing elements.[17] For the P.N.I., Rum was already considered as a man who was directly responsible for the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet, because of his political policy in tackling the problem of land-settlement in East Sumatra, which had tragically ended with the bloody Tandjung Morawa Affair. The discontent of the Rum's appointment among the P.N.I. circle was so much so that the P.N.I. organ: "*Merdeka*" eventually questioned: "Was it the intention of Masjumi, by appointing Rum as *formateur* to make the effort fail, so that Hatta can ultimately be pulled into the political arena?" [18] On the other hand, Mangunsarkoro, in the eyes of Masjumi, was a figure who was completely unacceptable because of his political outlook, which was so radical and leaned to the left. In watching the cat and dog play between these two parties thepro-Masjumi "*Pemandangan*" then editorially describes:

> "...By bringing the partners Mangunsarkoro-Rum to the fore, it could only be meant to forcefully push aside possibility of further cooperation to the corner, so that the decision of 'yes' or 'no' would not require so much diplomacy, for there would be no bargain needed, especially if both parties would readily display their consequential attitude." 19)

The problems that had so far become the tangled ones that the two parties were always in disagreement were:[20]

1. *The Sah Francisco Treaty with Japan*: This treaty was signed by Soebardjo from Masjumi when he was Minister of External Affairs in the Sukiman Cabinet. This treaty was widely denounced by

Communists and P.N.I. Leftwingers as an American imperialist scheme. And by their cooperation in parliament this treaty was never ratified. "Masjumi", explains Van der Kroef, "is on the whole favorably inclined towards ratification, though its spokesmen have also urged that Japan be made to pay reparation for the damage done during the occupation".[21)]

2. The nationalization of the oilfields in North Sumatera: The P.N.I. wanted the oilfields owned by the B.P.M. to be speedily nationalized and run by the government. The Masjumi, on the other hand, wished that the B.P.M. be allowed to continue to run them, "if only as a token of encouragement to foreign investors to sink their capital in Indonesia's future economic development".[22)]

3. The opening of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow: The Masjumi objected and felt that the time was not yet ripe to hurriedly open diplomatic relations with Russia, for it feared that "an exchange of ambassadors might lead to an influx of Communist elements and an even greater influence of anti Masjumi forces on the national scene".[23)] The P.N.I., arguing on the basis of the active and independent foreign policy of Indonesia, wanted that an Indonesian Embassy should be opened as soon as possible in Moscow.

4. The land-resettlement in East Sumatra: The problem of land resettlement in East Sumatra, which in the meantime had become so acute because of the showdown of the P.K.I. and its labor movements in the support of P.N.I.'s claim, then came to its climax by the resignation of the whole cabinet. The difference of ideas between the two was not only "just a matter of political tactics", as is

emphasized by Van der Kroef, "but it strikes at the roots of the whole future economic organization of the country".[24)] The need of Indonesia for foreign investment, and the attitude shown by the P.N.I. , and the Leftists, to nationalize all foreign enterprises were seen by Masjumi as antagonistic and endangering the future of Indonesian economic prospects. The Masjumi, in other words, wanted the present program of land-resettlement, which was laid down by the former P.N.I.'s Minister of Interior, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, to be continued. In executing the program, Mohammad Rum, the then Minister of Interior, took the middle-way policy of giving one third of the land held by squatters to themselves --and this was agreed to by the land owners-- while the rest to be given back to the estates. But the P.N.I. , with full support from P.K.I. and Sobsi, did not want to see this program realized, and, instead, persistently urged the formation of a new committee to redraft the program of land-resettlement - as was brought to the parliament through the Sidik Kertapati (B.T.I., Barisan Tani Indonesia) motion. It was even never concealed that they preferred to drop all the issues, so that the peasants who squatted on the lands might stay undisturbed. This, however, resulted the clash. And the accident which was widely called the "death tractors of Tandjung Morawa" unavoidably occurred. Four of the peasants, who, curiously enough, were Chinese peasants illegally entered East Sumatra from Malaya were fatally shot by the police who guarded the tractoring, while 17 others were injured.[24)] They were incited to go to the field by the Sobsi and P.K.I. to

prevent the exeeution of the government scheme. The Tandjung Morawa Affair therefore was generally accepted as the immediate cause that led to the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet. Rum in this case was blamed by his opponents as the man who was directly responsible for the affair. On the other hand the Tandjung Morawa Affair had also meant the strengthening of the tie between P.N.I. and P.K.I. and the break between P.N.I. and Masjumi.

After Rum and Mangunsarkoro returned their mandate, the President successively appointed Mukarto Notowidagdo, former Minister of External Affairs from P.N.I., and Burhanuddin Harahap, chairman of the Masjumi faction in the Parliament. None of them were successful in forming a cabinet which did "obtain sufficient backing in the Parliament"- as was called for by the mandate of the President to each cabinet *formateur*. This, however, could only be formed by putting the P.N.I. and the Masjumi together in the same cabinet, since each had equal number of votes in the Parliament.[25]

Eventually, the failures that were faced by the cabinet *formateurs* from the two big parties induced the President to turn his interest to the next largest party in the Parliament: P.I.R. (*Persatuan Indonesia Raya*),[26] which possessed 18 seats. Wongsonegoro, as the general chairman of this party, was appointed to form a cabinet with the same mandate. He, who was the fifth in line appointed as the cabinet *formateur* since Wilopo returned his mandate on June 3, 1953, ultimately fulfilled the mandate but without the Masjumi in the cabinet. The new cabinet was a coalition between the P.N.I. and minor parties

and Mr. Alis Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian ambassador then to Washington, became the new Premier.

For small parties, like P.I.R., P.K.I., P.R.N. (Partai Rakjat Nasional), N. U., Partai Buruh, P.S.I.I., and Murba, which each had relatively considerable votes in the Parliament, preferred to sit together with the P.N.I. in the cabinet rather than with the Masjumi. Because they were aware of the strength of the Masjumi and were very much afraid of the possibility of loss in the coming General Elections. The P.I.R., particularly, which was given the honor of forming the cabinet by the President, already had an antipathy towards the Masjumi. The P.I.R. was not represented in the Wilopo Cabinet, and as it was well remembered that the resignation of its two members from the Natsir Cabinet in 1951 was one of the major causes of its fall.[27] As Van der Kroef says, "It was this common fear of the Masjumi which ultimately provided the basis for the new cabinet."[28]

If this was again related to the position gained by the Liga Muslimin, particularly the N.U. and the P.S.I.I., in the arena of the conflict between the P.N.I. vis a vis the Masjumi--which temporarily ended with the foundation of the Ali-Wongso Cabinet--it was clearly indicated that the Liga had almost suddenly ~~gotten~~ won its market. By holding its trump-card as the Islamic parties which by all means 'should' be represented in the cabinet, the Liga ultimately succeeded in securing not less than five portfolios in the new cabinet. Two portfolios obtained by the P.S.I.I., with Muhammad Hassan as Minister of Public Works, and Dr. Lie Kiat Teng alias Muhammad Ali as Minister

of Health.[29] Three portfolios were obtained by the N.U. with Zainul Arifin as second Deputy Prime Minister, Muhammad Hanafiah as Minister of Agrarian Affairs, and K. H. M. Masjkur as Minister of Religious Affairs.[30]

For the Liga it was obviously a great success, even more successful than P.N.I. and P.I.R. compared to their respective vote percentage in the Parliament. In this connection and in commenting on the creation of the Ali-Wongso Cabinet, daily Mimbar Indonesia editorially says:[31]

"One of the most interesting feature in this newly formed cabinet is that the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. having only 12 seats together in the Parliament were given five portfolios (in the cabinet).

"According to the sources that came to our ears, the intention of the formateur in giving the five seats to the P.S.I.I. and N. U. was to give the impression to the people that both are to balance and take place the position of Masjumi in this new cabinet. We, however, consider this as an unfair manipulation as far as the people are concerned, for the role of the two parties can not be equalled to that of the Masjumi.

"As for the Masjumi, it can be said that the Masjumi represents the great majority of the Islamic ummat in Indonesia. Because the Masjumi at least covers five important religious organizations in Indonesia: Muhammadijah, Persatuan Islam, Djamijatul Washlijah, Pusa and Al Irsjad.

"This is not so with the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. Even in the

Parliament the Masjumi has the largest of membership, much more than the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. combined. In fact we dontt have any objection if the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. would like to join this Ali Cabinet, but don't use tactics and manouvres implying that they already obtained consent from other Islamic organizations to represent them in the Cabinet.

"If the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. really feel equal to the Masjumi, they should be able to demand the positions that were demanded by the Masjumi, such as Premiership, External Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and Economics. Now the positions that are demanded by the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. are merely second and third class portfolios.

"We therefore strongly regret that the formateur together with the P.S.I.I. and the N.U. were not ashamed to carry out the political manipulations used to reach their aim, although such actions were against the political moral.

Aside from the criticisms that were voiced by the Masjumi, and

aside from giving any value judgment on the attitude taken by the N.U. and the P.S.I.I., one also ought to take into account--or at least to understand--the practical politics confronted to the N.U. and the P.S.I.I., at that time. They, the N.U. and the P.S.I.I., felt obliged to maintain Muslim representatives in the Cabinet and to support this Cabinet in order to obtain sufficient quorum in Parliament. Conversely, the Ali-Wongso Cabinet must have N.U. and P.S.I.I. support in order to even be realized. And such a profitable position was fully realized by the N.U.-P.S.I.I. For them, that the representation of the Muslim group in the government which will conduct the General Elections was a must. This was at least to prevent that the interest of Islamic ummat will not be so deprived. Secondly, in the effort to face the coming General Elections, they considered that it will be more advantageous being government parties rather than opposition parties. While on the other hand, in the political strife in Indonesia where the two big parties were equal in strength, the small parties would naturally come third in playing their role in the balance of power. By adding its weight to either scale of the two powers the balance of strength can be changed. And such a position was possessed more by the N.U. plus P.S.I.I. as Islamic political parties outside the Masjumi. Was it then surprising if seen from this practical point of view, that in such a right time they used their political position effectively?

Again, bitter experiences felt by the N.U. and P.S.I.I. during the time of their amalgamation with the "Masjumi" in the Masjumi, caused their

being dissuasive in engaging any cooperation with the Masjumi, and in matters of practical politics, they even leaned to and preferred to be friendly with the Masjumi's rivals. From this scope the participation of the Liga in this Cabinet was, therefore, not only to gather beneficial positions and to emulate any effort that would bring them to the success in the coming elections, but also to eagerly show to the public, particularly to the Masjumi itself, that it was not only the Masjumi that was clever in politics but they also were capable and had a right to partake in politics, to represent the people's right not represented in the Masjumi.

In connection with the formation of the Ali-Wongso Cabinet it was already obvious that people could no longer avoid considering the factors related to the General Elections which had several times been postponed, and whose regulations had already been prepared for by the Wilopo government although in the meantime this government was being confronted with various political complications which were at any time able to endanger its life.

The General Elections' regulations were accepted by the Parliament on April 1, 1953, signed three days later by the President and promulgated by the Ministry of Justice on April 7.[33)] In order to be able to have a picture of the character and the method of elections in Indonesia, it is necessary to quote here a few passages of Herbert Feith's The Indonesian Elections of 1955,[34)] which says

"... The new law provided for direct elections. Experience in the

Jogjakarta elections of 1951-1952, had combined to persuade the Wilopo Cabinet to reverse the policy of earlier Governments for elections on the indirect systems. Furthermore the elections were to be double elections. For a number of complicated political and constitutional reasons, the earlier idea that a Working Parliament should be chosen by and from an elected Constitutional Assembly, was abandoned in favor of the holding of elections for two separate bodies, Parliament as well as a Constitutional Assembly.

"The system of proportional representation was adopted with next to no objection. The law divided the country into 16 electoral districts, one of them being West Irian. Each area was allotted seats on the basis of the number of its citizen-residents with provision however for each area to have the right to minimum representation, six seats in the Constitutional Assembly and three in Parliament. Within each electoral district seats would be distributed to parties and other candidate bodies in proportion to the number of votes they had received. Remaining votes could be pooled either between different parties within an electoral district (if these had previously given notice of a vote pooling agreement between them) or amalgamated by one party at the national level.

"The electoral machinery would be the joint responsibility of the Ministersof Justice and the Interior, but wide powers were given to the multy-party Central Electoral Committee (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia) which was entrusted with the executive task of organizing and regulating the elections. Multy-party electoral committees would function also at

the level of the local district, the kabupaten (regency) and the ketjamatan (sub-district). But at the kabupaten and the ketjamatan levels there would be a link with the pamongpradja (civil service) corps, the general administration functioning as part of the Ministry of the Interior, inasmuch as the bupati or regency head would be the chairman of the Kabupaten Electoral Committee and the tjamat or sub district head the chairman of the ketjamatan Ballot Committee. Below the ketjamatan level there would be Village Committees for the Registration of Voters under the chairmanship of the village head and, later, Polling Station Committees. These too would where possible be multy-party in composition.

"Parties, organizations, 'voters' association,' and individuals would be eligible as candidates but each candidate list had to be supported by the signatures of registered voters, 200 signatures for the first candidate of a list and 25 for every other candidates. There were no limitations on the right of members of electoral committees to be candidates. Each candidate body would submit an election symbol. The illiterate person would vote by piercing the square of the symbol of his choice on the ballot paper. The literate person would be free to do this, or, alternatively, to vote for an individual within a candidate list by writing the individual's name ontthe paper." It should be added that to acquire a seat for the Constituent Assembly 150,000 votes are needed, and for the Parliament are twice as many (300,000).

The double character of the election which successively voted for

representatives of the Parliament as well as the Constituent Assembly would by itself also mean a double interest of the people of not only how to obtain an elected parliament which would reflect the voice and the desire of the people, but at the same time also of thinking about the future form and foundations of the state that fit to their desire. Or, in other word, whether the state philosophy would be adjusted to the Islamic ideas, the religion which is predominantly embraced by the people, or retains the ideas of Pantjasila which has already been the provisional foundation of the Republic of Indonesia.

The character of the problem thus far would lead not only to political and power polarization but also to ideological divisions pregnant among political literates at that time. In short there were two conflicting ideological powers existing, one wished to establish a state based on Islam in Indonesia, and the other wished to maintain the Pantjasila as the ideological basis of Indonesia. The disputes concerning Pantjasila versus Islam had already come to the political surface at the time when the Election Act was still under discussion in the Parliament. To this the President's speeches during his inspection tours to many parts of the country were widely regarded as the adding of fuel to the political flame.

In his speech in Amuntai, South Kalimantan, where Islam is a strong bastion, Bung Karno was confronted by a question described in one of the placards: "Indonesia a National State or an Islamic State?" which he answered: "The State we want is a national state consisting of all

Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai islands and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia will not want to be part of the Republic."[35]

It would only be natural if such a direct answer was spontaneously reacted by the Islamic groups, especially within the circle of younger fundamentalist groups, which considered that the President by that speech had acted unconstitutionally, undemocratically and beneficial only to one side of the two conflicting groups. The first man who came to the fore to give his reaction was Muhammad Isa Anshary, the then general chairman of the Masjumi of West Java, who during the election campaigns for his party came out as a 'wild tiger' frightening the enemies of the Masjumi--and yet it was because of this that was generally considered as one of the major causes of the failure of the Masjumi in Java (especially in Central and East Java) as to his blatant attack against the political enemies, which in turn strengthened them. After Isa Anshary, the N.U.,[36] the G.P.I.I., Front <u>Muballigh</u> Islam of North Sumatra, Perti, and almost all Islamic organizations, came out objecting to the President's speeches and asking him to withdraw his remarks, which were strongly considered as partial, and obstructive as far as the struggle of Islamic <u>ummat</u> is concerned.

"The G.P.I.I. stated that the President had exceeded his constitutional limitations, that his speech had sown seeds of separatism, and

that it represented a taking of sides by the head of the State with groups opposed to the ideology of Islam. The N.U., in a similar statement, expressed strong opposition to the idea that an Islamic government should be thought incapable of preserving national unity. The Front Muballigh Islam presented the view that although the Pantjasila was not in conflict with Islam, it also did not fulfill all the requirements of Islamic teachings."[37)]

Nevertheless, despite the countermeasures taken by the Islamic groups, the President never intended to withdraw his speeches; so that these speeches were then recognized to be expressions of his political outlook. It was his political desire that all people without exception should have equal rights and duties and that therefore the Pantjasila is the ideal 'bowl' (wadah) which is able to furnish all the ideologies and Weltanschauung of the people. Pantjasila, according to him, is not based on 'majocracy'--as he hinted was the Islamic force in Indonesia--but a universal system or state philosophy for the entire people and the entire ideologies.[38)]

In his subsequent visits to areas in Sumatera, he reiterated his 'Amuntai speech,' and as was to be expected, in Atjeh, the region where Islam has already penetrated deep into people's life, his speech was met with great disappointment, while in Tapahuli, where a great many of the people are Christians, on the other hand, his speech was highly praised and supported.

The problem of the Pantjasila State vis a vis the Islamic State has

since then developed into national antagonism, which evidently led to the ideological split in the society -- between the group which firmly backed the idea of pantjasila, and the Muslim group which strove for the establishment of an Islamic State based on the Quran and Hadith. This ideological tension was considered by a great number of people to be detrimental to the national unity and was even predicted by some that it was not impossible that a civil war would break out.

The active participation of the President in propagating the Pantjasila ideology was truly felt by the P.N.I. to be a moral support. The P.N.I., furthermore, even exerted it as an effective appeal to the masses, that is, for example, by saying that the Pantjasila ideology which was being striven for had been blessed by the President; and as to the P.N.I. itself, it was created by Bung Karno, thus the party of our President to whom we should pay our obedience.

For the Masjumi, reminded with the experience during the revolution where the voice of the ulama can be actively trumpeted for the call for the people to march to battle, it took the initiative to summon the ulama and religious propagators throughout Indonesia and asked their fatwa of: 'What would be the attitude of the Islamic ummat in facing the coming elections?' And secondly, 'What is the idjtihad of the ulama in regard to the desired state ideology, which should be striven for by the whole ummat?

The second question, in addition to seeking the ulama's backing through their idjtihad, was also meant as a psychological weapon to compete

--and to defeat--the influence of Sukarno's speeches, and that by knocking at the door of ummat's heart and belief they were expected to fully support the demand of Islamic parties, viz., a state which is based on Islam.

A Congress of Ulama and Islamic propagators (Kongres Alim-Ulama dan Muballigh Islam) which was attended by no less than 217 ulama and muballighs from all over Indonesia was then held in Medan from April 11 to 15, 1953. The Congress eventually produced a fatwa and a number of resolutions relating to the state ideology which will be striven for.

The fatwa runs: "It is incumbent upon every Indonesian citizen who embraces Islam, women as well as men, and who possesses the right for vote, to go to the polls and elect only the candidates who would fight for the realization of Islamic teaching and law in the state. And all adult Muslims, both adult men and women, are obliged to give every kind of support and sacrifice for the victory of Islam in the coming elections."[39]

As to the form and foundation of the state which is wanted to be the form and foundation of the future Indonesian State, the Congress decided: "that the State is based on Islam; its ordinance based on the Quran and Hadith, its form is republican; and the head of the state should be a citizen who is a Muslim."[40]

It would be obvious that such a strategy, which was warmly received by the groups fighting for the Islamic ideology in Indonesia, was on the other hand interpreted by the pantjasila group--including the P.K.I.--as a serious danger. And this, moreover, became more acute by the

challenging speeches made by the extreme rightists circled around Isa Anshary. In a mass meeting commemorating the mi'radj of the Prophet Muhammad, held in the Sport Field in Djakarta, coinciding with the same quality of ceremony in the Presidential palace, Isa Anshary says, among other things:

> "In Indonesia at the present time there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic and aren't. The central question is whether the state is to be based on God's laws or not. Let there be a demarcation line between the Islamic and the non-Islamic groups, let us be rid of those who are half and half. The Quran was totalitarian. The Islamic State, as established by Muhammad himself ensured generous protection of the religious rights of Christians and Jews, but it gave no protection to hypocrite Moslems."[41)]

The insinuating speech of Anshary saying that "the Islamic State gave no protection to hypocrite Muslims, was interpreted by the audience as an arrow quickly aimed at the personality of Bung Karno and his followers. And the applause was spontaneously heard from them as the sign of approval. The warm and impressive atmosphere of that meeting, with the flaming speech of Isa Anshary--the speech appeal of Bung Karno can only be competed by the small statured Isa Anshary in Indonesia--was on the whole contradictory to the cool and highly officialized atmosphere in the palace, where Sukarno's speech met with cold and unenthusiastic response.[42)]

Judging from the current political situation at that time one could easily come to the conclusion that the move launched by the Isa Anshary group--which run simultaneously with various reactions against the President's "Amuntai speech," from the Islamic organizations and groups,

and, also, intensified by the ulama's support with their fatwa in Medan Congress--was successfully adding to the worries of the P.N.I. and the President as to the superiority of strength of the Masjumi. It was logical, therefore, that the show of strength displayed by the Masjumi cum suis at that time would give the impression to the public that the Masjumi would come out with great success in the coming General Elections. This was clearly pictured by the press analyses at that time. As to the Masjumi itself, it was its desire that the elections should be carried out as soon as possible.

In view of these (political) facts the P.N.I. was fully recognized that at such an unfavorable time it would be impossible to gain the victory. The only way this should be done was to try to delay the elections, and meanwhile try to gather new strength for, in due time, the victory. And for this, any possible cooperation with the Masjumi should be avoided. Every effort should be made so that a new government would be set up without the inclusion of the Masjumi and its followers. And for this, the P.N.I. needs new partners, especially parties which were clearly in enmity with the Masjumi, not the least the N.U. and P.S.I.I.

Contrary to its attitude towards the Masjumi, the P.N.I. was very amicable towards N.U. and P.S.I.I. notwithstanding that P.N.I consciously realized that ideologically the N.U. and P.S.I.I. were congenial with the Masjumi, in the sense that they all wanted to have an Islamic State (Daulah Islamiyah) in Indonesia. One of the major reasons why the P.N.I. and the Liga could go together was that they both had the same political

enemy that is, the Masjumi.

As with the P.N.I., which was always competing with the Masjumi for political hegemony on the national level, so also the Liga saw that the Masjumi was its number one rival among the ummat. Such controversies as occurred between the Liga vis a vis the Masjumi, were then effectively exploited by the P.N.I. to weaken the position of the Masjumi, by way of supporting the Liga and including it in the cabinet. It was the P.N.I.'s intention, accordingly, to see that the strength of the Masjumi could be channeled into the N.U. In other words, the existence of a number of similarities in outlook between the N.U. and the P.N.I., in the sense that both are anti-Western, xenophobia, and conservative, will therefore be more advantageous for the P.N.I. to see that the N.U. to be catapulted into the political arena and had the Masjumi ousted.[43)]

Here, in the drama that came out as a rigorous duel between the two giants (Masjumi and P.N.I.),,which were competing for the political as well as ideological hegemonies, the position of the N.U. as a "small party" was revealed.

As for the N.U. itself, as has already been pointed out, such an advantageous position was consciously understood by the N.U. The necessity for the cabinet formateur and the P.N.I. that compelled them to include the Islamic parties--other than the Masjumi--in the cabinet, as an evidence to the public that this cabinet was backed and represented in it by the Islamic ummat,[44)] on one side, and on the other the represaille of the N. U. that has been so deep towards the Masjumi, were

both indeed the major factors that induced the N.U. to sit together with the parties which were at odds with the Masjumi in the first Ali Cabinet. And by realizing these factors, the key to explain the reasons of the N.U.'s electoral success has in fact been discovered. With this key in the hand it would be appropriate, therefore, if in the following steps an effort to uncover the methods applied by the N.U. in its election campaign, both for the parliament as well as for the Constituent Assembly, should be made. For this at any rate can be considered as an immediated cause of its electoral success. While, furthermore, the political advantages obtained by the N.U. as the man-in-between acting as the balance of power between the two contending forces, viz., the Masjumi versus the P.N.I. and P.K.I., should also be observed.

As for the subsequent analysis, an attempt will be made to excavate the causes of its success in the cultural, sociological as well as religious fields.

FOOTNOTES :

1. Cf., K.H.M.Dachlan, "N.U. dan Perdjuangannja", Risalah Politik, no. 2, Djakarta, 1954.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. The N.U. besides being a political party, it also maintains its character as a social, educational, religious and charitable organization. Thus in addition to various departments within the party --such as Bagian Ma'arif (Education), Bagian Da'wah (Propaganda and Public Relations), Bagian Mabarrat (Social and Charitable affairs), Bagian Perekonomian (Economic activities), Ladjnah Pemilihan Umum (LAPUNU) (Election Committee), and so on, N.U. has several daughter organizations, such as Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama (women), Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (youth), Ikatan Peladjar N.U. (I.P.N.U., students), Kepanduan Ansor (boy scout), Ikatan Bekas Pedjuang Islam (IKABEPI, veterans), Pertanian N.U. (PERTANU, peasants and farmers), Sarikat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia (SARBUMUSI, workers), Fatayat (girls), etc.

3a. See, John O.Sutter, Indonesianisasi. Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1959. Vol. III, pp. 943-44. The company which is called Kongsi Pelajaran MUSI (Muslimin Indonesia), was established in Oct., 1953. The President director of the company was the Chairman of N.U., K.H.M.Dachlan. Before the 1954 pilgrimage, Minister of Religious Affairs Masjkur (N.U.) awarded a contract to "Musi" to carry 6450 pilgrims.

4. See, C.Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behaviour in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Consideration", Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, 2, Jan., 1956. Infra, ch. V.
5. It should also be noted here that Liga Muslimin Indonesia in addition to having full member organizations, it has also daughter organizations which are only active in regions. These are: Darul Da'wah wal Irsjad centered in Pare-Pare (Sulawesi), and Perserikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia in Makassar. Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (P.P.T.I.) of Dr. Sjech Hadji Djalaluddin was reported to join the Liga through the amalgamation with the N.U. This report, however, was later denied. See Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia, 1954, p. 413.
6. G.McT.Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 209-10; J.M.Van der Kroef, "The role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics", The Western Political Quarterly, XI, 1, March, 1958, pp. 43, sqq.
7. Kahin, ibid., p. 209.
8. Ibid., pp. 210-11.
9. Concerning the principles, statute, and platforms of Perti, see Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia, 1954, pp. 427-440.
10. See, Liga Muslimin Indonesia: Piagam, Anggaran Dasar, Anggaran Rumahtangga dan Tafsir Asasi, Dewan Liga, 1952. Also, Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, p.575. The Charter of the Liga was jointly signed by H.Siradjuddin Abbas, H.Abdul Wahid Hasjim, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, who respectively represented the three member parties, Perti, N.U., and P.S.I.I. Wahid Hasjim was appointed as the General Chairman, Abikusno as first Chairman, and Siradjuddin Abbas as second

Chairman. On Oct. 2, 1952, the Statute of the Liga was promulgated, and on Dec. 15, the'Manifesto' of the Liga was issued, declaring the position and goal of the Indonesian Muslim ummat and the Liga's obligation to maintain and reach the goal. (See, Abubakar, Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, p. 577).

11. Ibid., Piagam, and Abubakar, p. 564. Also, Dachlan, op.cit., p.2.
12. Ibid., Piagam, ... ; Abubakar, p. 565. As to the press comments on the birth of the Liga, see , i.e., Moh.Yamin , edit.art. in daily Mimbar Indonesia, Spet.1, 1952.
13. H.J.Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation", Pacific Affairs, XXVIII, 4, Dec., 1955, p. 361.
14. The biography of Wahid Hasjim was written by H.Abubakar,under the auspices of a Panitya Buku Peringatan K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim formed and financed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The book was published in 1957 under the title, "Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim dan Kar angan Tersiar.
15. J.M.van der Kroef, "Communism and Islam in Indonesia", India Quarterly, X, 4, Oct.-Dec., 1954, p. 331. The same article was also found in his, Indonesia in the Modern World, II, Bandung, Masa Baru, 1956, under the heading, "The Present Political Crisis".
16. Ibid. "...with the exception of the first four months of office of the Cabinet of the Communist Sjarifuddin (July 1947 to January 1948) the Masjumi has been represented in every Government since the 17 August 1945 declaration of independence, at least as far as the original Republic of Indonesia is concerned", n. p.331.

17. Harian Pemandangan (pro-Masjumi daily), quot. , Sekitar Pembentukan Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo, Kronik Kementerian Penerangan no. 13, Djakarta, 1953, p. 39.
18. Sekitar..., ibid., p. 37. The P.N.I.'s criticism was based on the Masjumi's notion that Hatta should be asked to form a presidential cabinet to overcome the political as well as economic crises in the country. This, for the P.N.I., would only mean to weaken its position in the strife for power.
19. Pemandangan, ibid., p. 39.
20. Cf., Harian Abadi (pro Masjumi daily), Djakarta, June, 1953. The following descriptions are also based on, Van der Kroef, Communism and Islam, op.cit., pp. 331-32. See also, J.Brown, "Political Forces in Indonesia", Eastern World, Nov., 1953; Kronik no.13, p. 38.
21. Van der Kroef, ibid., p. 332.
22. Ibid., p. 331.
23. Ibid., p. 328.
24. Ibid.
25a. According to J.Brown, those who were fatally shot were five; op.cit.
25. P.N.I. and Masjumi had respectively 42 and 44 seats in the Provisional Parliament, while the considerable minor parties had respectively as follows: P.I.R.(Persatuan Indonesia Raya), 18 seats; P.K.I. (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 17 seats; P.S.I.(Partai Sosialis Indonesia), 14 seats; P.R.N. (Partai Rakjat Nasional), 13 seats; N.U., 8 seats; Partai Katolik, 8 seats; Partai Buruh, 6 seats; P.S.I.I., 4 seats; and Partai Murba, 4 seats.

26. Sekitar Pembentukan Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo, op.cit., p. 186.

26a. P.S.I., Partai Katolik, and Parkindo, however, did not join neither support the cabinet. As to the formation of the Cabinet, its programs, and biographies of its members, see Kami Memperkenalkan, Kementerian Penerangan, Djakarta, 1954. Akso, Kronik no. 13, p. 221.

27. Van der Kroef, op.cit., p. 332.

28. Ibid.

29. Kepartaian, 1954, p. 385; Kronik no. 13, p. 221.

30. Ibid., Kepartaian, p. 426; Kronik, p. 221.

31. Mimbar Indonesia, August 1, 1953. Cf., Jusuf Wibisono, "Kabinet Baru Kita", Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), VII, August 8, 1953.

32. Dachlan, "N.U. dan Perdjuangannja", Risalah Politik, no. 2, op.cit., p.2.

33. See, Lembaran Negara, 1953; Bulletin Kementerian Penerangan, 1953; Rustam St.Palindih, Undang2 dan Peraturan Pemilihan Umum untuk Anggota Konstituante dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat , Djakarta, 1954.

34. Pp. 3-4.

35. Antara, Jan. 29, 1953; Herbert Feith, Wilopo Cabinet, p. 159.

36. Wahid Hasjim, according to daily Pemandangan, March 20, 1953, denied the reports that N.U. joined the protest. The letter sent by the N.U. to the President was "purely a notice to warn him that there are groups which are trying to oust the President and take him away fram the people". The letter also advised the President "not to plunge into the pond of political currents and take the

side in the ideological conflicts between the Islamic and non Islamic groups".

37. Herbert Feith, Wilopo Cabinet, p. 160.

38. The Pantjasila ideology was originally a speech (without text) delivered by Sukarno in a meeting of Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence), shortly before the Japanese surrendered. It was later published as Lahirnja Pantjasila, and translated into various languages. The English translation came out as The Birth of Pantjasila, issued by the Min.of Information, Djakarta. Concerning the analyses of Pantjasila, see, Sajuti Melik, Demokrasi Pantjasila dan Perdjuangan Ideologis Didalamnja, Jogja, Pesat, 1953; Kahin, Nationalism, pp.122-27; Van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, II, pp. ; Ruslan Abdulgani, Ideologie dan Negara, Kem.Pen., 1954; Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, I, 1958.

39. Pedoman Perdjuangan Masjumi, P.P.Masjumi Bg.Keuangan, Djakarta, p.100.

40. Ibid., pp. 101 sqq.

41. Feith, Wilopo Cabinet, p. 161. The account was said to be the result of the personal observation of the author. Cf., Isa Anshary, "Garis Pokok Perdjuangan Masjumi", Suara Partai Masjumi, VIII, 3, March, 1953.

42. Ibid.

43. The P.N.I.'s tactics in eliminating any possible cooperation with the Masjumi was already obvious during the crisis of the Wilopo Cabinet, especially after the happening of bloody Tandjung Morawa

affair, where the P.N.I. coalesced with the P.K.I. in the parliament to force the cabinet resigned.

44. See *supra*, pp. 48-49.

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III. Towards the 1955 General Elections; N.U.'s appeals to the masses during the campaign period.

It is not so easy to say when the elction campaign really began.[1] As has already been pointed out, even while Parliament was still debating the Law on the General Elections, disputes and polemics over the possible future form and structure of the State had already begun outside its walls. The desire for a new, elected, parliament permeated the masses, expressing itself through speeches, mass meetings, the press, and in private conversations. The existing provisional parliament was made the scapegoat for the waxing of political tensions; the fact that the representatives had never been chosen by the people but were appointed was blamed for these tensions. These weaknesses were believed to have infected the government machineries. Cabinet crises, one cabinet falling and another arising, then falling again; dismissals and appointments of officials, on all levels and in all areas, merely on the basis of who happened to be at the controls at the time; abuse of authority and widespread corruption, and so on, all these were seen by the people as logical consequences of undemocratic government and a parliament which was both temporary and unelected. No wonder therefore that the only cry that resounded was: Hold the election soon! Give the people the chance to speak out! The General Elections were thus regarded by the people as an open sesame which would abolish the political strains of the time.[2]

This sentiment, among other causes, became the prime motive of the historical "October 17 Affair", during which thousands of

demonstrators marched to the Parliament demanding that it be solved and thence to the Presidential Palace to ask the President to dissolve the Parliament and substitute one elected by the people, since it did not act in the interest of the people and was not representing their real voice.[3)] The October 17 Affair, which was interpreted by the Wilopo Cabinet as nothing but an exigent signal to hasten the preparations for an election law and for the carrying out the election itself, can in a way be considered as the starting point of the election campaign, although it was not officially promulgated until April 4, 1953. This law became known as Law no. 7, 1953.[4)]

Thereafter people believed that the General Elections would soon be held. As a result, the critisism, demands, and cynical suspicions which had prevailed, simmered down.[5)]

But hope was dissipated by a change of government. Although the succeeding government, headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo of the P.N.I., promised in article 2 of its platform: "to hold general elections for the Constituent Assembly and Parliament as soon as possible", it explained in front of the Parliament on August 25, 1953,[6)] that the clause "as soon as possible" meant sixteen months, beginning on January 1, 1954 - in other words, no less than twenty one months after the creating of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. This made people wonder whether the government intended to endure throughout this long period, and to be the first to have so long a life.

From the reaction of the opposition leader, Muhammad Natsir, of Masjumi, for example, one can easily see how disappointed those

groups were who wished to have the General Elections held as soon as possible. This general chairman of the Masjumi pointed out, among other things, that it was obvious that the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet would utilize this long period to strengthen its own power and to eliminate all power of the opposition.[7)]

Up until May 31, 1954, a whole year had passed since the promulgation of the election law, and still the election campaign was still more or less in its first stage. Each party appeared with mass rallies, lectures and slogans, putting their promises and ideologies "on sale". Many of the larger parties on this stage still emphasized the national situation in their campaigns, arguing about the form and structure of the future state for which they were striving, debating the political problems of the capital, bringing into debate the various domestic and foreign problems where the government was diametrically opposed to the opposition. It was not until this date that the Central Committee for the Indonesian Election (Panitya Pemilihan Umum Indonesia) approved the symbol of each party, group, and individual running for election. This launched the battle of the symblos. From now on, in addition to the presentation of ideologies, promises and allurements, the people were instructed on how to punch the right symbol. Campaign tactics now frequently turned to interpreting the "philosophy" of the symbol, pointing out that theirs signified a good omen, and through their symbol explaining their basic ideology and objectives. At the same time it was insinuated that the symbols of rival groups or candidates

signified bad omens or similarly underrated them.

This second stage of the election campaign was the decisive one. It is not surprising that the parties tried with their whole strength to reach the hearts of the voters and draw them to deciding for their party.

The plan of the Ali Cabinet to stay in power until the elections failed, however. It returned its mandate on June 27, 1955, after its failure to surmount the Army crisis culminating in the indident of the installing of the new Army Chiefsof Staff.[8)] The Ali Cabinet was replaced by the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, a coalition between Masjumi and non-Communist parties; P.N.I. becoming now the opposition party, backed by the P.K.I. and other left-wing parties. The General Elections (for the parliament) was held only 7 weeks later (September 29, 1955).

Even although the Ali Cabinet did not last until the holding of the elections, the two year period of its existence was really the time of election preparation, on the part both of the government and of the political parties. This, to some extent provides us with an answer to the question of whether this period can be regarded as the decisive one in the question of whether a party would gain or lose seats in the General Elections. For one could hardly hope for any significant change, so far as party influence in the grassroots is concerned, within a few weeks after the Burhanuddin regime came into power. Not only was the time span too short to make it possible to wipe out the picture that had been painted for them, but the

effect of the considerable improvements which were realized in some aspects of the government and the economy was marred by a number of failures in other aspects. "With drastic import restrictions", Feith for example pointed out, "this cabinet succeeded in imitating a sharp fall in prices, particularly of textiles, which affected every part of the country. The gold price, commonly accepted index of the value of money, fell by 12.9 % between June 30th and September 26th. (But) the P.N.I. and Communist opposition was subsequently able to point out shortages of salt and rice and oil occuring in the last weeks before September 29th".[9)]

As to the question of why the N.U. was again prepared to join this cabinet, in opposition to its old allies -the P.N.I. and the leftist parties, who now formed the Opposition-, it is not difficult to see that this cannot be separated from the question of lose-and-gain in the coming General Elections, which faced it within a few weeks' time. However one thing should be noted here, that during the process of the formation of the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, the N.U. played the role of mediator between the Masjumi and the P.N.I., urging them to sit down at the same table in the new cabinet and leave the P.K.I. and its comrades in the Opposition. From its experience in the Ali Cabinet, the N.U. had apparently become convinced that the P.K.I.'s strength was growing. In its official statement issued shortly after the creation of the Burhanuddin Cabinet, the N.U. declared that "... the N.U. regrets that the P.N.I. was not included in this cabinet, especially as the N.U. had tried to use its good

offices to bring both P.N.I. and Masjumi into agreement". "The N.U. has realized, however," the statement continued, "that these two parties can no longer be reconciled".[10)]

Based on the aforementioned facts, the following analysis will attempt to clarify the position, the tactics, and the appeal of the N.U. for the people in its election campaign, which nota bene must be observed with particular emphasis on its position as a government party in the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet as well as in the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet. In order to be able to examine this problem in all its ramifications, we shall divide the following analysis into three major aspects:

1. Certain aspects of the actions taken by the government parties, including the N.U. party intimately connected with the efforts of facing the General Elections.
2. Subsequent actions taken to secure the consequencies of their previous actions; and the roles played by the President, and by the other parties.
3. The platform of the N.U.'s election campaign and its appeal to the masses.

I

At the time when the election act was issued,the Wilopo Cabinet, as has been observed,was already disintegrated. The political controversies between the P.N.I. and the Masjumi had become so complex so that they could no longer be resolved. While the P.N.I. had been working in coalition with the Masjumi in the Cabinet, its leftwingers in Parliament had coalesced with the P.K.I. and the opposition parties to bring down the Cabinet.[11] Effects of this political tension were felt in the efforts to organize the body which was to execute the election. Although the Roem - Lukman (Ministers of Interior and Justice,respectively) ad hoc Committee had so far been able to lay some of the building stones for the Central Committee of the Indonesian Election (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia) -- i.e. by erecting two preparatory Sub-Committees : Sub-Committee I was responsible for providing the juridical implementation of the election, such as government regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah), instructions and directions ; and Sub-Committee II was responsible for providing the material needs of the Election -- the Central Committee itself,however, could not be established.[12] According to Act no 7, the Central Committee acted as the executive extra governmental body to provide and be directly responsible for the preparation, guidance and execution of the Election.

On April 28, the cabinet set up the personnel of the P.P.I., consisting of a non-party leader, Mr Assaat (former acting-President of the Jogja Republic) as chairman, and representative from 8 parties, namely those which were participating the Wilopo Cabinet.[13] The

The Committee could not be installed, however , since the P.N.I. did not send its representative. The P.N.I. seemed to object to the personnel of the committee, demanding that the chairmanship should be given to the P.N.I. The P.N.I. actually preferred to leave this problem unsettled until the new cabinet should be set up. Indeed, it was the intention of the P.N.I. that the next cabinet would be ruled by the P.N.I.

It turned out that what had been hoped for the P.N.I. was realized in the new cabinet. By ignoring the reactions that came from the opposition groups, the new Cabinet succeeded in forming the P.P.I without providing a single seat for Masjumi or other opposition parties.

The P.P.I. was officially installed by the President on November 28, with S.Hadikusumo from P.N.I. as its chairman. It need not be a cause for wonder that the loosing parties then spontaneously raised a protest. But the attitude of the Ali Cabinet, whose scheme had been well planned before hand, was no more than :'the dog barks, the caravan goes on'. And the Cabinet stuck to its contention that the personnel appointed to this committee was not chosen as representatives of their groups or parties but as individuals. The President, however, when he was visited by Dr. Sukiman - who took the Masjumi's protest to him - promissed that the Masjumi would be guaranteed seats in the regional committees.[14)]

But what happened then? The P.N.I.'s scheme apparently did not stop here. The Regional Committee of Djakarta - Raya, which had been approved by the former Mayor, Sjamsu Ridjal from Masjumi, was dissolved

by Sudiro, the new Mayor from P.N.I., and replaced by the new committee, leaving the Masjumi again outside.[15] As a reaction to this, the Masjumi organized a Demonstration on February 13,1954, where some 75,000 of its members and sympathizers turned out and raised the protest to the government, in case the Ministers of Interior and of Justice, urging that Masjumi and the opposition parties also be represented in the the P.P.I. and the Djakarta - Raya Regional Committee. In a mass rally held by the demonstrators, the militant right-wing leader of the Masjumi Isa Anshary stated "..The actions taken by the present government to eliminate those who are not from the government parties are no more than evidence of their greediness to monopolize the election vic - tory ; such actions are manipulative, unfair , and currupt ".[16] After asking why the Ali - Wongso cabinet was so afraid of the Masjumi, he blazingly aroused the spirit of the Muslim ummat to follow in the steps of their co - religionists who had sacrificed their lives for their country , and let them realized who are the real enemies and who are the true friends.[17]

What sort of attitude was displayed by N.U. as a government party in this matter ? The N.U.'s attitude seemed to be :"Silence is golden !" ; for the N.U. realized that its rights were never deprived. The N.U., after all, had its representatives in the P.P.I. and in many regional election committees. The most important thing for the N.U. to do at this time was to consolidate its positions in the

regions[18], to make every preparation for the election campaign, and, paralleling the government's actions along bureaucratic lines, to strengthen its position in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, wherein key positions -within this Ministry- were already safe in the hands of the N.U. As we have seen, one of the causes of the N.U.'s quitting Masjumi was that the N.U. was not willing to turn over this portfolio to the Masjumi, or, say, Muhammadijah. The N.U. had realized from the beginning that this Ministry was so important that, if possible, it must be retained, even if this meant severing relations with Masjumi. N.U.'s actions in supplanting the Masjumi members in this ministry were not without bitter contention from the latter. Within three months of the Ali period, for example, three heads of the <u>Djawatan Agama</u> (Bureau for Religious Affairs) -in Central Sumatera, West Java and South Sulawesi- were successively transferred and replaced by N.U. members.[19] And the more local offices go down, the more the N.U. men were put in. The formal reasons which were usually given were: "Routine and consolidatory actions needed in the government's civil servant policy, in accordance with the overall government program to smooth the wheels of government".

If we consider the ramifications of the Ministry of Religious Affairs down into the provinces, <u>kabupatens</u>, and <u>ketjamatans</u> throughout Indonesia, with its various bureaus and offices --such as <u>Djawatan Agama</u> (Bureau for Religious Affairs), <u>Djawatan Penerangan Agama</u> (Bureau for Religious Information), <u>Djawatan Pendidikan Agama</u>

(Bureau for Religious Instruction), Djawatan Pengadilan Agama (Bureau Religious Justice), N.T.R. (Nikah, Talaq, Rudjuk) Offices, Kas Mesdjid (Mosque Funds), and various schools directed by and under the supervision of the Ministry [19a)] -- it becomes evident that the Ministry needs many religious scholars, kijahis, or ulama, who, if not from the Masjumi, must come from the N.U. It is worthy of mention here that, according to statistics of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there were some 10,000 ulama throughout Indonesia, 2,000 of whom, at least, were employed in various offices of the Ministry.[20)] If this fact is concomitantly related to the other fact , that is, the traditional functions of ulama in villages and among the people, it is then understandable that such a Ministry has been the target for the strivings of both the Masjumi and the N.U. For the N.U., realizing that its future fate greatly depended on success or failure in the election, and that every effort should be directed to the victory, it would be rational, therefore, if the N.U. in the Ali Cabinet and in such a critical time facing the General Elections, must and by any means use its influence and authority to get as many positions as it could in this ministry. As a proof of how important this ministry is, it is notatu dignum to refer here to the statement made by R.Mohammad Kafrawi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, to the Abadi, in which he states that 37 out of 257 members elected for the Parliament in 1955 were men from the Kementerian Agama. From these, 21 were from N.U., 15 from Masjumi, and only 1 from P.N.I. [21)]

Furthermore, a discussion of how the government acted in the fields of government bureaucracy, politics, finance, and economics, should be mentioned here, for all this cannot be separated from and was even closely connected with preparations for the elections. Within wider scope we shall see how the leading government party, P.N.I., especially, exerted itself in engineering the government schemes, by consolidating its power in them, which were all focused on the one point, *viz.*, to gain the election victory and paralize the common enemies, namely Masjumi and P.S.I.[22)]

The P.N.I. as a party, which is categorized by Van der Kroef as "*noblesse de la robe*"[23)], fully realized that the centrum of its power lies in the hands of the *prijaji*, who "comprise not just the scions of ancient princely dynasties, but also regional and local chiefs with whom district of village headship has been hereditary for generations".[24)] Or if it is widened, the appeal of the P.N.I. was aimed at "petty officials and junior civil servants, at nationalist intellectuals 'burning with a desire to govern', at modern minded younger aristocrats in the provinces who had entered the professions and at the small segment of entrepreneurs and businessmen whose secularism did not allow them to join Islamic groups".[25)] Thus it was quite understandable that the P.N.I.'s efforts were, on the first step, aimed at bringing these groups into its orbit in the shortest possible time. "There can be little question", Van der Kroef further states, "that the P.N.I. dominated

cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953-1955) employed all legal and a number of highly questionable, if not illegal, means to bring the pamong-pradja hierarchy, be it on the departmental, provincial or village level, into the P. N. I. camp. To this end some cabinet members used all the influence of their offices. Higher officials in the provinces, not in sympathy with the P. N. I., were summarily transferred, to be replaced by party stalwarts.[26] Funds were withheld or were slow in forthcoming to regions administered by non- or anti-P.N.I. officials. Impromptu inspection visits, veiled threats and, on occasion, open intimidation alternated with more subtle promises of preferment to those who hitched their wagons to the P.N.I.'s star. Concealed bribes were used, as well as all other sorts of the uniquely Indonesian perintah alus ("gentle pressure"), the highly formalized means of persuasion, based on feudal rules of etiquette, which have kept public administration in Indonesia a going concern for centuries." "With the consolidation of their hold on the civil service," Van der Kroef then concluded "there can likewise be little question that the Sastroamidjojo Cabinet made efforts to have members of the pamong-pradja 'instruct' the citizenry in the proper choices in the elections. The operation of a secret fund in the Information Ministry bears testimony to the P.N.I.'s efforts to utilize the prestige of traditional nobility and village headmen among the people to further its partisan interests."[27]

On the other hand, the government's actions in the economic and financial fields, propagated for the liquidation of the colonial economy

and the establishment of a national economy, were seen by the opposition groups as efforts which were difficult to distinguish from the government groups schemes to usurp government money for election campaign funds. The most bitter reactions of the opposition were caused by the economic policy of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo.[28] This was known as the pengobralan lisensi istimewa--the misspending of government money received from special licenses given to traders who were members or sympathizers of the government parties. Debates over the economic policy of Iskaq were started in Parliament. The outcome was the Tjikwan proposals, which rejected Iskaq's policy.[29]

The main problems discussed involved: [30]

a. The establishment of a national economy and the liquidation of colonial economy.

b. The protection and guidance of national enterprises: co-operatives, firms, industries, small-scale crafts, etc.

c. The distribution and use of foreign exchange allocated for import.

d. Subsidy for the development of national banks.

e. Change of personnel in the Kementerian Perekonomian (Ministry of Economics).

ad.a. According to the sponsor of the proposal, the government has never given any specific definition of the term ekonomi nasional, or drawn up any scheme, even in a rough outline, to be used as a manual for the liquidation of the remnants of the colonial economy. The practices of the government are, in fact, not based on understanding and a well-planned program; the result has been more confusion and complications.

ad. b. The efforts made in this field are not only considered attempts to realize the goal mentioned in art. 38 of the provisional constitution, but also steps toward the realization of a sound national economy.

It is therefore appropriate, and even imperative, to support national enterprises. However, in doing this, the government apparently did not have any calculated program which reflected a broad understanding of the economic problems. The regulations so far issued by the Ministry had resulted in stagnation, not progress.

ad. c. Statistics for the supply of foreign exchange for import for previous years, as well as those for the present year (1954), show the supply of foreign exchange for 1954 to be far below that of previous years. While for the fiscal year of 1952 the supply of foreign exchange for import was 12 milliard rupiahs and for 1953 7.2 milliard rupiahs, in 1954 the supply is only 5.9 milliard rupiahs, due to the financial difficulties of the State.

"Based on these factual realities," stated Tjikwan in explaining his motion in front of Parliament," one would come to the conclusion that because of such a small supply, compared to previous years, the government would carefully and effectively divide it according to needs and urgency, so that the daily requirements of the people for imports are not affected, and the national importers could be given opportunities of functioning on the basis of equality in accordance with the ability and the capability of each of them to give service."[31)] But what

happened in practice was that the distribution of foreign exchange for import was made not according to equal rights on the basis of proportionate ability, but was done by favoritism, or pilih-kasih, by giving special licenses to the importers who possessed cards of the government parties. It was interesting to know that quite a few of these appeared overnight as importers, without apparently having any real enterprise; these the Indonesians call pengusaha aktentas. A study of the expenditure of the government foreign exchange for March 1954, for example, reveals that 200 million rupiahs were distributed to a hundred importers who obtained the "special licences."[32)]

ad. d. The fact that the government has been paying attention to the development of national banks was readily appreciable, for the problems of banking touch the veins of the economic organism. Yet the solicitous way the government behaved to a Bank Umum Nasional, apparently owned by the leaders of the P.N.I., by giving a subsidy of no less than 40 million rupiahs--an extraordinarily high amount in comparison to the amounts given to other private national banks--was truly amazing.[33)]

ad. e. Changes, replacements and appointments, which were being practiced in the circle of Kementerian Perekonomian, particularly, and which were by and large aimed at paving the way for the schemes already prepared by Minister Iskaq, in facing the elections, were, not the least, another weak spots attacked by the opposition.

Although the Tjikwan c.s. motion[34)] had unveiled some of the secret schemes that were being conducted by the cabinet and by Minister Iskaq in the economic and financial fields, the motion itself, as had been

admitted by the co-sponsors of the motion themselves, and the opposition parties at large, could not be carried out through the traditional procedures in parliament; for the acceptance of the motion would not only affect the resignation of Iskaq, but also an unavoidable cabinet crisis, of which the P.N.I. and other government parties *in toto* were so afraid. It was fear of such consequences that caused them eventually to repudiate all criticisms and accusations of the opposition, in spite of the fact that many had been accused and had not denied the accusations. The fall of the cabinet at such a critical and decisive time for the government parties would be political suicide, and hopes for election success would be crushed.

By the defeat of this motion, by a vote of 101 to 60, in Parliament, the government had, in fact, gained a breathing space. The solid accord of the government parties in defending their policy through parliamentary strife would actually lead them to the continuance of their economic policy under the banner of striving for the benefit of national enterprises and establishing a national economy. However, the so-called *Indonesianisasi* policy of the economic program of the Ali government was soon confronted with the reverse effects, which led to the diminution of the foreign exchange supply. This caused the decrease of import valuta, especially raw and half fabricated materials needed for home industries. All this eventually led to industrial stagnation and unemployment. By the decrease of the export quota the government was forced to print more and more money, which brought about inflation. The danger of inflation

was becoming more acute after the continuous trend of inflation during the year 1954 was followed by a very serious proportion in the first half of 1955. This was further worsened by various budgetary manipulations, by corruption in the government bureaucracy, and the importation of luxury goods, especially cars, radios, and cosmetics.[35]

The economic difficulties experienced by this government were naturally exploited by the opposition parties for election campaign purposes.

The P.K.I.'s attitude to these cases is curious. Men would think that because of the steady increase of unemployment, the high market-price of daily staples--as well as their scarcity--and the increasing difficulty of workers' and peasants' lives, the P.K.I. would react, or at least complain, to the government by means of strikes, demonstrations, protests, etc., as it did with the previous governments. However, such presuppositions were evidently wrong; for no matter how difficult the living conditions experienced by the workers and peasants were, the P.K.I. remained loyal and supported the economic policy of the government. During the Ali government period the P.K.I. therefore never complained, nor organized any strike, demonstration, or the like, for the improvement of workers'--peasants'--life. This, the P.K.I.'s seemingly strange attitude was not really strange, and was in fact quite understandable. For no matter how critical the economic situation created by the economic policy of the government, to reject the latter would only mean strengthening the opposition's standpoint and at the

same time weakening the government's position. In other words, should the P.K.I. ever dare to raise any protest it could easily be interpreted as a challenge to government prestige, and the consequence might be to bring to an end its alliance with the government parties. Thus it would only drive the P.K.I. into a corner at this critical election time.

In order to rescue its prestige after the economic failure, the government tried to avoid the problem by cursing foreign imperialism and capitalism, stirring up sentiment over Irian Barat, and abolishing the Round Table Agreement, which was believed to be the source of the whole economic dilemma of Indonesia. The government further advocated summoning all Asian-African nations to a conference at Bandung, which was held in April, 1955. The political goal, so far as the internal political platform is concerned, could easily be interpreted as an attempt to influence the people to vote for the government parties in the general elections.[36)]

It is not as easy, however, to determine how much the N.U. was involved in such affairs, except that the N.U. was convinced that it would be much more secure on the government side, no matter who was actually holding the reins. "That we have interest as to the continuance of this Cabinet until the holding of the General Elections has been clear and understood," one of the pamphlets issued by the Central Board of the N.U.'s Election Campaign Committee stated, "for the participation of the N.U. party in a cabinet which is preparing for the General Election will certainly give us a tremendous benefit, especially for the gaining of the election victory."[36a)]

Nevertheless, if we recall that none of the strategic positions in the economic and financial sectors of the government bureaucracy were held by the N.U. --all were monopolized by the P.N.I.-- it may be presumed that the N.U. did not play an important role in this case. To quote the statement of K.H.M.Dahlan, the general chairman of the N.U., in one of his articles, entitled: "The N.U. and its Struggle":[37]

> "... We admit that nowadays there are many of us who feel disappointed in the N.U. for not exerting its chance in this cabinet. Such a feeling is based on the fact that the N.U. has not shared any advantage in the economic or in other fields, as are now enjoyed by other parties which back the government. It is true that it is very interesting to see it in a glance. But they forgot that the N.U. as a Muslim party always puts its Islamic emphasis on its ideological struggle rather than on material struggle."

Some other government actions which can be regarded as direct or indirect means of curbing the activities of the opposition by manipulating the government machineries, can be added, such as:

a. Prohibition of broadcasting news, announcements and speeches through radios which are concerned with the opposition voice and which are of advantage to their position.[38]

b. Censoring of religious sermons through radios which have relations with the Islamic or religious ordinances inducing the spirit of <u>jihad</u> of Muslims to be uncompromisingly opposed to the <u>musjrik</u> and <u>munafik</u>.[39]

c. Censoring of newspapers and magazines which belonged to the opposition parties, and the stoppage of several opposition newspapers to be circulated in <u>S.O.B.</u>'s camps by order of Defence Minister Iwa Kusumasumantri.[40]

d. Endorsement of the Attorney General's warning whose intentions can be clearly seen from the text itself:[41]

1. To prohibit speeches and sermons concerned with politics in mosques and churches.

2. To prohibit the discussion of politics in suraus and pesantrens where religious instructions are given.

3. To prevent and prosecute, if necessary, any one who violates art. 156 K.U.H.P. (those who express their feeling of hatred towards any group of people in Indonesia).

e. Monopolization of seats in the election committees in regions by the government parties.

f. etc.

II

A question which it is significant to raise here is: would not the aforementioned government actions, which in a way can be classed as malfunctions of its authority for party purposes, and the like, affect the people's opinion of the government, resulting in a great disadvantage for the government group during the election campaign?

This question should be answered with great deliberation, for it will automatically bring us to various other problems which jointly determined the issues of the Elections. Firstly, it should be examined how far the political whirlwind in the capital blew spirally down to regions and villages. In other words, were all the things which happened in the capital necessarily understood and followed by the people in regional levels, in ketjamatans and desas? Secondly, what kind of measures were taken by the government and its parties to cover their policies classified as political manipulations--for the sake of winning the elections? Thirdly, what was the attitude of the President, and what was his role during the Ali-Cabinet period and during the Burhanuddin Cabinet period up to the holding of the elections? And fourthly, what tactics did P.K.I. employ to utilize the situation?

First, when we examine the extent of the influence of political parties, emanating from the center to the regions and villages, before the elections, that is, between 1945 and 1953, we will become aware of two phases, one prior to the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949, and the other following the recognition of sovereignty.[42]

In the first phase, when the Indonesian people were involved in their revolution for independence against the Dutch, the political parties were tools of the revolution, employed to coordinate the scattered strength of the people in facing cooperatively the common enemy. This was expressed in Declaration no. X, November 1945, of the Vice President, where the existence of political parties in the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia was proof to the world that Indonesia was a democratic country, reflecting the living desire of the people.

Contentions between parties were not unknown, but these occurred mainly at the top among political leaders. Among the people themselves, contentions between parties rarely came to be serious problem, for all of these potential dangers were at that time covered up by the common realization of the necessity of fighting together against the Dutch. In regard to this, Feith writes:

> "Concerned to rally the peasantry to active support of the Republican cause, they worked to extend their influence in the villages. There was little competition between them there; the tendency was rather for large areas to become spheres of influence of particular parties. Consequently there was little attempt made to establish formal organizational machinery at the level of the village. Effective party membership remained a category largely unknown at the village level despite the vigorous activity of the Marxist parties there and despite the developed organizational structure which the Masjumi (the largest Islamic party) had in Java from the time of the Japanese Occupation. But it is undeniable that the impact of political parties was felt at this level."[43]

During the second phase, when the struggle against the common enemy had ended, another great struggle for power began on the national level. The activities of political parties on the lower levels were

therefore decreased, and the tendency was to become more and more an aristocratic political play. "Concerned to use their resources so as to achieve maximum success at the national level," says Feith, "they concentrated on expanding their influence among the most powerful social groups. So party competition existed in cities, in the larger residency and _kabupaten_ towns, on plantations and mines, and in areas where there were large numbers of revolutionary veterans. It rarely existed in _kawedanan_ (district) or _ketjamatan_ (sub district) townships, much less in villages."[44)]

During the next period, the time immediately preceding the General Elections, the political parties once more turned their attention to the people in the villages and gathered support from them. It was obvious that each realized that the party or parties which would be able to conquer the heart of people and draw as many votes as possible from them would certainly come out as winner in the Elections--and the door to power would then be opened.

This analysis would lead us to the rational conclusion that as the elections approached and in the period when political parties were in competition to gain as much influence as possible among the people, the people would know a great deal about the current political issues in the capital, or at least in levels above _ketjamatans_ and _kabupatens_. This would be automatically true if we do not consider the second question, that is: How did the government and the government parties try to cover up their manipulations?

Earlier in this chapter an attempt was made to disclose, to some extent, the various kinds of political as well as economic manipulations. But it must be noted here that such manipulations--viz., political mutations; replacements of those who were not in sympathy with the government, and the like; the censoring of opposition voices through effective channels such as the Department of Information, the radio, newspapers, and magazines; criminal sanctions, which seemed to be imposed only on one side of the people; the monopolization of seats in the election committees, in the center as well as in the regions; and so on--were also aimed at keeping the people from knowing about the political manouvres being carried on by the government and government parties which were to be classified as the abuses of legal authorities for election purposes. For this purpose, it was intended that the opposition voices, which were consciously aimed at disclosing the government's mistakes, be shut up; thus it was only the official government voice that should be heard, so as to impress the people that the government was doing everything for their good.

Furthermore, in order to be able to direct the people's interest from listening to criticisms launched by the opposition, the government made a number of efforts to create targets that could be used as rallying points. Thus various problems which remained unsolved in Indonesia, such as the problem of West Irian, which was still in the hands of the Dutch; the problem of the national economy, which was practically still in the hands of foreign capitalists; the problem of home security, where

the extremists, and so on, were used by the government as rallying points to draw the masses to stand firmly under the government position. And the radical attitude shown by the government in these cases did not, as a matter of fact, fail to elicit great sympathy from the people. It was even more effective because such means were animated by various ways of propaganda: posters, rallies and demagogical speeches to re-arouse the revolutionary sentiment of the people.

As for the problem of "returning Irian Barat to the embrace of Indonesia," the government endeavoured to seek as much support as possible from the masses by holding mass rallies, encouraging the formation of an Irian Barat Legion, whose members were recruited from volunteers, and supporting various other committees for the struggle for Irian Barat. In regard to foreign capital still in operation in Indonesia, the government gnashed its teeth many a time, threatening to nationalize it should the conditions imposed upon it not be obeyed. As to the actions against the armed guerrilla extremists in West Java, in Atjeh, in South Sulawesi, in West Kalimantan, and so on, the government issued a "Komando Terachir"[45]--final command--which was meant as iron tool to crush the extremists if they did not surrender to the Republic. To make the propaganda more effective, it was even hinted that the opposition group were frequently connected with those who still wished to see Indonesia once again become a colony under foreign imperialism, with those who were always defending the interests of foreign capitalists, and with those who actively supported the insurgents.

It was no loger a secret that President Sukarno, tacitly or more specifically, supported the Ali Cabinet, but did not support the succeeding Burhanuddin Cabinet. During the Ali period it was even difficult to distinguish between the voice of the government and the voice of Bung Karno as President, even though, in accordance with the then prevailing provisional Constitution a President was not head of the executive power, but merely a symbol of Indonesian unity.[46)] It was not only when it came to Pantjasila campaigns that the President failed to show neutrality as the man who was supposed to stand above all the conflicting ideologies. In various propaganda attacks against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and foreign-inspired armed rebellions he frequently hinted that the opposition was having relations with such elements.

It may be remembered that in a speech made by the President in Palembang, when he officially unveiled the monument for Indonesian Heros, on November 9, 1954, he boldly warned that "there were certain prominent leaders who were actively involved in foreign-inspired manouvres designed to bring about the fall of the present Cabinet and who in this connection had received bribes amounting to millions of rupiah."[47)]

When the opposition leader, Mohammad Natsir, was asked by the Keng Po correspondent in Surabaya for his reaction against the President's warning, Natsir stated that "the effect of the President's warning in his speech at Palembang concerning the activities of those who would

sell the country to foreign imperialists was particularly annoying because he did not mention to which group he was referring. The dishonest tendency of such a warning, coming from the Head of State would only worsens a situation which was already bad, and it is feared, irresistably cause recriminations and enmity over who are considered to be the traitors to their country. It will therefore be much easier for those who support this cabinet to point their finger at the opposition groups." Natsir further said, "... the speech of the President, which was evidently so vague was pitifully misplaced, should it be meant as a means of improving the already bad situation. It would be different if the speech of the President was made not as a warning but a pinpointed announcement which can be regarded as a gebaar (gesture) to overcome the internal political controversies, to which the society is believed to readily respect. This would be appropriate to the function and position of the President as the symbol of the State's unity, which is concrete and not vague."[48)]

The President, unmoved by this charge, tried to concentrate his efforts on rallying the masses around the target of the return of Irian Barat. He frequently visited the outer islands and tirelessly repeated the call to national unity for Irian Barat. "More than once," Kees says, "President Sukarno has urged collaboration between Muslims, Nationalists, and Communists. In December, 1954, he made a passionate appeal to all parties, irrespective of their differing ideologies, to form a "National People's Congress" for the sole purpose of "fighting

together for the return of West Irian to Indonesian territory." Some parties heeded the President's appeal, but a number of moderate parties kept aloof, with the result that the People's Congress quickly came under Communist influence."[49]

The relation between the President and the opposition, Masjumi, which was becoming more and more strained, differed radically from that between him and N.U. It is true that at the time when the Amuntai affair was still at its height, N.U. was even more vigorous in criticizing the President. N.U. at that time compactly stood together with Masjumi and other Muslim organizations in supporting the idea of an Islamic State. But it suddenly changed when N.U. accepted seats in the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo. N.U. voices 'broadcasting' against Panjasila quickly faded away and took up instead a new melody of "kerdja-sama Islam Nasional" (Muslim-Nationalist Cooperation). The demand for an Islamic State was gradually set aside, and parallel with the efforts made by Sukarno and nationalist parties in propagating the idea of Pantjasila, N.U. was pushed ahead to lead the move of the kerdja-sama Islam-Nasional. This move was actually already begun when the President sent his welcoming greeting to the newly born "Duta-Masjarakat" daily newspaper, the official organ of the N.U., emphatically expressing the hope that this newspaper would take command of this kerdja-sama.[50]

Relations between the President and N.U. were running so smoothly that once the Minister of Religious Affairs summoned the ulama to a conference in Tjipanas, sometime in March, 1954, and jovially gave the

President the title, "Waliyul Amri Dlaruri bis Shaukah."[51)]

In regard to N.U.'s attitude towards groups and movements outside of Islam at the brink of the Elections, it seemed to be markedly different from that of Masjumi. If Masjumi consciously drew a straight dividing line between the groups which were fighting for an Islamic State and those which were fighting against it, the N.U. did the reverse. It tried to erase or at least tried to make the dividing line vague, by, so to speak, bridging it with the initiative of launching a Kerdja-Sama Islam Nasional scheme. In this context it is significant to mention the interview made by K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah to the Communist daily, Harian Rakjat, in which he stated that N.U. did not reject cooperation with anyone or any group so long as "it does not harm the Islamic Religion." "We are Muslims," he says, "but we are Indonesian Muslims. In other words, we are Indonesians who believe in Islam; therefore we are not only concerned with Islam. This is the middle road in the situation now facing us. We, therefore, so far as the constitutional issues go, can agree to a National State where the spirit of Islam is breathed in it. In fact, what we need is a Negara Islam Nasional--a state with a national and an Islamic character."[52)]

The establishment of the Front Anti Komunis (F.A.K.) and the Front Anti Marhaenis (F.A.M.), which were advocated by the extreme right wingers of the Masjumi, encircling around Isa Anshary and Sjarif Usman, was openly condemned by N.U. Even the supreme N.U. leader, Kijahi Wahhab Hasbullah, himself said in his criticism of those fronts that,

"N.U. itself has suffered from the F.A.K. and F.A.M. They are not representative; they are even more harmful to the general struggle of Muslim ummat." "F.A.K. and F.A.M.", he concluded, "are movements which employ irresponsible means."[52)a]

From our descriptions, of the various means used by government groups, mainly P.N.I. and P.K.I., to weaken the position of the opposition parties especially Masjumi, and, on the other side the strong rebuttals launched by the opposition against the government groups, including the President himself, one should not be astonished if it is concluded here that the net result was a flow towards N.U.--and towards those who had successfully convinced the people that their party was the one which was longing for peace, welfare, and the like. The bewilderment of those who saw the bitter clash between men in power and the oppositions, or, from the other angle, between groups of '<u>Negara Islam</u>' and '<u>Negara Pantjasila</u>', could be regarded as an important psychological factor which induced people to seek shelter in those parties which claimed to be the peace-loving parties; such the N.U. seemed to be. It would therefore be appropriate now to investigate the kinds of appeal being made by N.U. A quick glance at the position of P.K.I. at brink of the Elections should, however, be made first.

With P.K.I., although the Madiun tragedy had been for it a knock-out blow, the tragedy itself was not the thing which cannot be remedied. "The foundations of Communism laid in the first years of the revolutionary proved to be unshaken by the events of 1948,"[53)] says Kees. Whatever

ways the Masjumi and the Socialist Party (P.S.I.) used in trying to refresh the people's mind with the tragic affairs of the Madiun revolt even going so far as to demand that that date be a day of mourning, the appeals of P.K.I. in the following years, especially after it had experienced a major organizational reconstruction at the beginning of 1951, and after the appearance of Aidit and others of the younger generations, however, were evidently able to confuse the minds of a great number of people about the Madiun revolt.

In order to be able to view the activities of P.K.I. in the years after the Madiun affair, a quotation of Kees' article in Indonesia in 1956, is hereby given:

"In the following years the P.K.I. repeated its tactics of the first years of the revolution. Once again the P.K.I. leaders posed as ultra nationalists. Just as earlier they attacked 'Dutch colonialism,' which they said still formed a threat to Indonesia's independence. Their most important slogans were 'cancellation of the Round Table Conference agreements' and 'liberation of West Irian (New Guinea).'

"Thanks to these tactics the leaders were soon able to restore the party to its former position and even to increase its influence. The presence of a few members of the first cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroadmidjojo at the fifth P.K.I. congress held in March 1954 in Jakarta, and the fact that President Sukarno sent personal wishes for success on the same occasion, signified nothing less than an official rehabilitation of the party.

"In the meantime the P.K.I. had offered its support to Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo's first Cabinet in 1953, which accepted it. The P.K.I. profited not a little from this. It enabled it not only to continue its activities unobstructed, but at the same time allowed it to accentuate its 'nationalist' character by pointing to its collaboration with the P.N.I. To remove doubt as to its patriotism the P.K.I. leaders promised, moreover, to give their unconditional support to Dr. Sukarno in case of the election of a new president.

"Thanks to the collaboration of the P.K.I. with the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, the party was able to strengthen its position in the period preceding the elections of 1955 to a considerable degree. It enjoyed the complete cooperation of the administration in the election campaign. Thus the election list submitted by it under the heading "P.I.I. and Independents" was accepted by the Central Elections Commission, which consisted exclusively of representatives of the government parties. This approval was later withdrawn, it is true, at the insistence of the Nahdlatul Ulama in particular, which was represented in the Cabinet, but the P.K.I. had already reaped its profit from it. The names of the "Independents," fellow travellers of the P.K.I., among whom were included some prominent figures, remained on the communist electoral list after the words "and independents" had been eliminated.

"Considering the above, it does not seem too much to say that the marked success of the P.K.I. in the recent elections was partly due to the support which the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet accepted from

the party."[53)a]

III

Before we come closer to understanding the principles which guided N.U.'s election campaign and the latter's appeal to the masses, it is first necessary to answer the following question: Where does the realm of N.U.'s influence actually lie?

From the previous discussion, the position of P.N.I. and of P.K.I. among the people has been discovered. The P.N.I. directed its appeal in the first place towards the prijayi or pamongpradja class; and then utilized this to "purchase" the votes of those who can be grouped into the abangan class, that is, the proletariat and the peasants.

The P.K.I. has, from the beginning, based its struggle on the promotion of a higher standard of life for workers, landless peasants, and marhaens who are said by the P.K.I. to be "the prey" of the squeeze of foreign as well as national capitalists, imperialists, bourgeois-aristocrats, and hadji-renteniers. The realm of its influence thus lies in the abangan class. However, the appearl of P.K.I. seemed unable to penetrate the santri class, who consciously or unconsciously, still consider that the religious and the traditional ethics and culture inherited from its forefathers are contrary to or uncongenial with communist teachings. For their godless part they are branded by the P.K.I. as bordjuis-kapitalis nasional.

Thus the only room practically left empty is the santri class. Now it would only be logical to draw the assumption that this class has been the contested class for the religious parties: N. U. and Masjumi. The already existing social stratifications in Java therefore seemed compatible with the above assumed political stratifications. In contrast to Masjumi, whose influence was scattered throughout Indonesia, the three other big parties were, practically speaking, successful in only two small but crowded election districts, namely Central and East Java. This is obvious from the election results: from 8.434.653 votes obtained by P.N.I. for Parliament, 5.270.637 were from Central and East Java; this represents 65% of the total votes. From these two regions, the P.K.I. obtained 4.625.710 or 74.9% of the total votes (6.176.914); while N.U., for both regions, obtained 5.142.860, or 73.9% of the total votes (6.955.141). If the whole of Java, including West Java and Djakarta Raya, be considered as one unit, the percentage for each party is as follows: P.N.I. obtained 85.97%; P.K.I., 88.6%; and N. U., 85.6%. (See Table.) The percentage of Java's population to the whole population of Indonesia is no more than 66.2%. (According to the statistics compiled by the Central Election Committee in 1954, the population in Java was 51.737.552; and the whole population of Indonesia was 77.987.879).[54)]

It is now obvious from these figures that these last three big parties are actually Java centered parties, or, in other words, the parties which had a major influence only in Java. It would be reasonable, therefore, to focus our interest first of all on this specific area, that is

Table *)

The number of votes, and the percentage of the total vote, obtained by the four largest parties in the four electoral districts of Java, and in the eleven electoral districts taken together outside Java.

Districts	P.N.I.		N.U.		Masjumi		P.K.I.	
East Java	2,251,069	22.8	3,370,554	34.1	1,109,742	11.2	2,299,602	23.2
Central Java	3,019,568	33.5	1,772,306	19.6	902,387	10.0	2,326,108	25.8
West Java	1,541,927	22.1	673,552	9.6	1,844,442	26.4	755,634	10.8
Djakarta Raya	152,031	19.6	120,667	15.7	200,460	26.0	96,363	12.0
Total outside Java	1,470,058		1,018,062		3,846,855		699,207	
Total Indonesia	8,434,653	22.3	6,955,141	18.4	7,903,886	20.9	6,176,914	16.4

*) Derived from Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, and statistics issued by the Ministry of Information, March 1, 1956.

by examining the reciprocal relations between social stratifications and cultural backgrounds interwoven in the life of people in Java and the results of the General Elections.

To raise the question of why these parties, and in this context especially the N. U. party, did not succeed in getting a considerable number of votes in regions outside of Java does not require serious investigation. For, so far as the N.U. is concerned, the organization was, since before the war, confined to Java; and its expansion to regions outside Java--except to South Kalimantan--was begun only after it became a political party, or to be more specific, during the time of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, which paralleled the period of the election campaign.

As to the two other parties, despite the fact that in some particular regions outside of Java P.N.I. and P.K.I. had relatively strong influence, namely, because certain specific characteristics of these parties are well-matched with the ingredients of local cultural and traditional elements--the general picture was that the two were foreign to regions outside Java, where religious belief is known to be more fanatic, and more or less suspicious of anything which flavours of "Djawa". And recent political developments in Indonesia have caused these regions to fear 'a possible repetition of the Madjapahit-Gadjah Mada period'.

It is now clear from the above that the foundation and the realm of influence of N.U. lies in the *santri* class. Of course, further explanations should be made as to how to draw the dividing line between N.U. and

Masjumi. To draw a clear lihe of demarcation between the two realms of influence is, as a matter of fact, not only difficult but also rather impossible. We can at least point out some peculiar characteristics respecting the two. The N.U., to begin with, tends more or less to have more influence among the santris, who still stick strongly to the orthodox mazhab-based religious outlook. They are against any religious reform or anti-ijtihad; and against elements coming from the outside world, especially from the West. They respect the local culture, so long as it has no immediate connection with religious principles. Santris in this category consisting, in general, of kijahis and religious pesantren style teachers who are quite often at the same time petty village landlords. And they are usually surrounded by santri students, who obediently seek knowledge from them, living together in pondoks and madrasahs. As compensation for the unpaid teaching of the kijahis, it is quite common to see that the students voluntarily go to work in kijahis' rice fields, factories, home industries, and the like.

The second category of the santri consists of those who can be classified as persons who readily accept new ideas and reforms so far as religious interpretations go, in the sense that they are no longer willing to just follow the mazhab patterns of thinking, but wish to employ their own ijtihad. They can also see advantages which could be derived from the West, especially if they re related to technology, modern systems, and methodology of thinking, and so on. Thus they are not opposed, a-priori, to elements pertaining to worldly life, so long as they are not

immediately incompatible with their basic religious ideologies. These persons usually (or are supposed to) give their support to Masjumi. Functionally, they usually consist of religious teachers in the second category, who are, directly or indirectly, sympathetic to modern Islamic movements, such as Muhammadijah, Persatuan Islam, and the like. They also comprise traders and pedlars in towns and villages, as well as manufacturers of batik, kretek, textiles and handicrafts. Then they are also others found among the intellectuals whose orientation is toward Islam. The latter are usually children of traders and entrepreneurs, whose fathers could afford to send them to school; to a lesser extent, they may be children of penghulus, who, because of their fathers' connection with the kratons, were privileged to enter government schools.[55)]

The fact that the santris in the first category are more numerous than the santris in the second category, if we are to accept a common sociological assumption, can by itself also be taken as a consideration when we examine why the N.U. was potentially, and later also actually, more powerful than the Masjumi in Central and in East Java.[56)]

As to the question: to what extent did the appeal of N.U. or the santri group permeate the abangan group, it is also not easy to give a completely satisfactory analysis. One thing, however, which is clear from the previous orientation is that it was they, the abangan who have been the objects of the contest between the three major parties, viz., P.N.I., P.K.I., and N.U. In other words, they became the goal of the contest and they, in turn, therefore became the people of 'embarras

de choix'.

The weapons used and the lures offered to them have, incidentally, been observed. The P.N.I. armed itself with a sort of bureaucratic magic power in the hands of the pamong pradja; this was coupled with a delicate 'printah alus'.[57)] The P.K.I. came to them with a basket of promises of rice and land, and acted as the party for the defense of djembel's rights and of the promotion of their standard of living. And the N.U.? The N.U. is a santri party, a party of kijahis and religious teachers, and also a party of landowners and entrepreneurs.

Sidjembel, for ages has been living continuously in a desperate condition; if he cannot be tempted with printah alus and various promises and allurements, he will then go to look for an escape. The ceaseless dark and cloudy picture of his future which he sees always hanging in front of him, sooner or later will induce him to run away, far away from this world. The hope for anything in this world has faded away and the illusion of obtaining a bit of pleasure was gone. But to go to the other world there is only one way; and the key is in the hand of the kijahi. He then went to the embrace of the kijahi, to surrender totally his fate and his destiny, and live under the blessing of the kijahi. And had the kijahi never called him, sidjembel would have come by himself. Now it is the kijahi himself who comes spontaneously to sidjembel. He tells him things that are now going on in this world, the overwhelming tyrannies, corruptions, wars, moral degradations and so on. Sidjembel is afraid, and the kijahi opens his door. Hadrihi sabili! This is my way! The

way of safety, the way that takes you to surga, God's never-ending paradise. Those who vie with one another to get pleasure and wealth in this world will vanish, sooner or later; for God does not like those who are greedy, selfish and misanthropic. Only those who are longing for the Hereafter, to meet their God, who will be protected by God!

As a landlord or employer, the kijahi approaches sidjembel in a different manner. The methods used were to some extent similar to those used by capitalists in other countries. The worry about losing their job and the insidious pressures imposed by landlords and employers made the sidjembels, whose economic fate depends almost entirely on the former, content to give their landlords or entrepreneurs, or masters.

To which extent these premises can be applied here remains to be examined in the next chapter. For, there by bringing the issues to a broader cultural, sociological, as well as religious analysis, and by relating one causa to the others, the origins of the N.U.'s electoral success can be more clearly understood. The temporary analysis that is just being undertaken here is useful to define the border of the realm of N.U.'s influence so that in this way, further attention can be focused on that realm. And in this way also it will provide the means of examining principles and methods of N.U.'s campaign and its appeal to the masses. The approach here is at the same time aimed at discovering the techniques and tactics of N.U.'s campaign.

IV

For the sake of convenience, the following issue will be divided into two main questions:

a. How did N.U. organize its power to face and prepare for the General Elections?

b. What were the principles, methods, and tactics used by N.U., and what made them distinguishable from the others?

Ad a. As was the case with all parties and organizations which entered the race, N.U. also furnished itself with a committee which provided everything for the election, including the drawing of/campaign plans, methods, and strategy. The Committee, which was called Ladjnah Pemilihan Umum N.U. (LAPUNU), was vertically organized from the center down to the villages. It was officially set up on May 16, 1953, this was a little more than a month after the promulgation of the Election Act by the Government, by a mandate issued by the Supreme Board of the N.U. Party.[58] Chairmen and members of the Lapunu at headquarters, as well as in the regions and villages, were appointed and made responsible to the respective N.U. Party boards. It was therefore understood that the Lapunu was not autonomous, but an ad hoc committee of the N.U. Party Boards, at headquarters, as well as in the regions. However, in conducting its functions, it followed a decentralization system, whereby the Lapunu in each stage had broad freedom of activity not necessarily depending upon the superior bodies of the committee, or on the party itself. By virtue of this the Pengurus Besar (Supreme Board) of the U.C. Party and the Central Committee of Lapunu limited themselves only to general supervision and guidance;

while everything with local characteristics were arranged and conducted by the committees concerned by giving more stress and interest to local problems.[59] In order to be able to have direct contact and coordination with the Central Board of the party, a number of members of the central board were included in the Lapunu.

Ad b. Such an organizational framework of the Committee, based on sympathy, practicality, and flexibility, was seen by N.U. as favourable and suitable to the nature and organizational characteristics of N.U. In this way the N.U. Party not only did not have to spend so much money to finance the campaign and this committee, but also, due to the nature of its campaign, which rested almost entirely on local peculiarities, it could move easily, smoothly, and effectively. This should be strongly emphasized here, since the origin of its electoral success, which was enigmatic to many, was partly and even to a great extent hidden here. The public's traditional way of judging--that the parties which would be able to attract tens of thousands of people to mass rallies, hang millions of placards, election symbols, and pamphlets on streets, walls, houses, trees, and so on, and spend millions of rupiahs for other progaganda means, would be bound to win the election--cannot be applied to the N.U., whose campaign methods had their peculiar characteristics adaptable to its own nature.

The N.U., above all, seemed very comprehensive, paying a great deal of attention to understanding the likes and dislikes of people it encountered and trying to approach them in ways favorable to them. It is

the writer's opinion that this was made possible through the long experience of village kijahis and muballighs, who have long mingled with the villagers. The kijahis therefore have a very keen knowledge of the faculties, mentalities, and characters of villagers, To be able to examine how far this opinion matched the facts, a few quotations from the Election Guide issued by the Information Department of Lapunu are given here:[60)]

7. The intensive struggle for votes culminated in the election itself.

   a. No matter how great is the number of those who have already registered and promised to vote for us, this is no guarantee for our success since these people can at any time change their mind, lured by the more attractive campaigns offered by others.

   b. The fact that our party workers are well known is in itself no guarantee that the people will vote for us. It must clearly be understood that the majority of our people still consist of political illiterates who can easily be pulled here and there.

8. The methods we are now employing in this fight can and may not be equalized with those of others:

   a. We have our own methods, because the people who are the target of our campaign have their own mazzijah ~~(mentality).~~ (characteristics)

   b. We should not just blindly follow the methods employed in other countries.

c. In conclusion: We should initiate ways congenial to the situation surrounding the people who are the target of our campaign, at the same time watching the methods employed by our rivals.

As to religious matters, the attitude of N.U. was:[61)]

9. In conducting the campaign we should follow the religious path:

   a. Our society still has a strong belief in religion, although, it is admitted, the belief is waning among a great many.

   b. Those who become confused, amid so many attractions, in choosing the right party will eventually turn to the religious way.

   c. Our hope of obtaining as many votes as possible rests therefore on sub b above.

   d. There is no need to be worried about the colossal, colorful campaigns being launched by other parties.

The N.U.'s attitude towards other groups was described as:[62)]

10. The aggressive talks in campaigns are disadvantageous.

   a. In campaigns we should eliminate entirely aggressive talks against any group.

   b. It would be highly advisable if our message is concentrated only on introducing our party, its goals, its struggles, its meaning, and its function in society.

   c. In facing attacks from the outside, our speeches, if it be urgent, should only clarify the problems and, at the most, be based on 'self-defense'.

d. The facts speak for themselves, after one of the Muslim parties (the Masjumi? - the writer) attacked our <u>ulama</u> (read the N.U.), many of its members withdrew and joined the N.U. partym which was under attack.

e. The party implied above is now beginning to change its tactics. All Muslim parties, including N.U., it says, are 'true brothers'. The tactics of aggression is now forced to turn completely around, for such tactic has been found to be disadvantageous.

For the quotation given above, we at least are able to grasp some of the characteristics of N.U.'s campaign methods. What we really need now is to further examine the implications of the methods themselves. Although in point 8 of the Guide some light has been shed upon the campaign methods employed by the N.U., a deliberate examination remains to be undertaken.

If the methods of N.U.'s campaign are to be classified, we find four categories:[63)]

1. <u>Kampanje bi'l-qauli</u> (oral campaign), that is, by holding <u>tablighs</u> (religious sermons), mass rallies, whispering campaigns, and the like.
2. <u>Kampanje bi'l-fi'li</u> (service campaign), that is, by doing something manual for the purpose of gaining influence; for instance, by intentionally doing services for the public, by way of distributing staples badly needed by the villagers, by visiting patients and sick persons, by organizing mutual aid (gotong-rojong) to repair

repair irrigation gorges, commonly owned *desa* properties, and the like.

3. *Kampanje bi'l quwwah*, that is by virtue of exerting authorities, dignities and powers in the government bureaucracies, religious institutions, and so on.

4. *Kampanje beranting* (chain campaigns), that is by regimenting N.U. members into groups. Armed with sufficient instructions from above, each group extends its wings, engaging in whispering campaign, canvassing, solicitation, and numerous ways that could enhance support for the party.

The first method, that is, the oral campaign, was usually concentrated on *tablighs*, pengadjian, regular or teamed religious causeries and courses, Friday sermons in mosques, and the like, which all seemed only a matter of routine for the N.U. *kijahis*, without their having to spend too much effort in the holding of them. In these *tablighs* and the like the emphasis was always on issues of religion and the Hereafter, while only here and there was the campaign purpose slipped in. It was said, for example, that the General Elections were *fardhu'ain* (personally obligatory) for every Muslim *ummah*, man and woman, having the right to vote, and therefore it is a sin not to participate.

In order to be able to have some picture of how the N.U. extended its appeal to the masses, under the scope of the first method of campaign, the following are some examples, cited from campaign speeches delivered by the prominent N.U. leaders:

a. K. H. Abdulwahhab Hasbullag, Rais Aam (Supreme Head) of the Department of Shuriah (Advisory and Legislative Council of the N.U. Party) in one of his tabligh in ~~Masdjid Raya~~ The Great mosque of Amuntai (South Kalimantan) on January 11, 1955, in urging the audience to elect the right party, said,

"Among the nationalist, Marxist, and religious parties--parties with nationalism, Marxism, and Islam as their respective ideologies--the nationalist parties are superior to Marxist parties; while Islamic parties are again superior to the former."

He then proceeded to his own term of rationalization, that 'among the Islamic parties, such as N.U., Masjumi, P.S.I.I., Perti, and P.P.T.I. (Partai Politik Tarekat Islam), N.U. stands above all. For the N.U. is driving along the road of ahlusaunnah wa'l djama'ah while the others, or other nationalist parties, are parties lacking madzhab teachings."[64)]

b. In a mass-meeting, held by the N.U. Sampang-branch (Madura), on August 26, 1955, Sj. Al. Muhalon, a N.U. leader from Bondowoso "directly and candidly suggested that whoever votes for N.U.--punches N.U.'s election symbol--is guaranteed entrance to paradise," reports the Surabaya Post.[65)]

c. Kijahi H. Anwar Musaddad, executive member of N.U.'s Central Board, in his talk in South Sumatra, says: "If you punch the election symbol of N.U. in the coming elections, it means that you have fulfilled your religious obligation, and by so doing

you have proved your obedience to God the Almighty, and your deed will be considered as jihad fi sabilillah". He said further that he had prayed to God beside the Ka'bah when he joined the "official" Hadji pilgrimage of President Sukarno to Mecca, and asked God to help the ahlissunnah wal djama'ah to gain their victory in the election. And he also said, "I felt very proud of having the wonderful opportunity to join the President's mission, but I shall be even more proud if I can join the Prophet Muhammad's caravan in the Hereafter".[67)]

From the examples given above it is now clear how the N.U. pulled the wires in its efforts to differentiate itself from non-Muslim parties and from Muslim parties as well. As to other Muslim parties, the N.U. presented itself as the leading group of ahlissunnah wal djama'ah, whose definition is given by the N.U. as follows:[68)]

a. The ahlissunnah wal djama'ah are those who in theological belief (mu'taqad) follow the School of Imam al Maturidi and Imam Abu al Hasan al Ash'ari, as it is understood in the Ilmu Tawhid (dogmatic theology) or Sifat Dua Puluh (twenty qualities of God), or Mu'taqad Lima Puluh (fifty convictions).

b. And there are those who in fiqh law one of the four schools of mazhabs Since those who follow this idea embrace the great majority of Muslims throughout the world, they are therefore called the Al Jama'ah group. Thus, in conclusion, those whose beliefs and jurisprudencial contexts are as mentioned are called ahlissunnah wal djama'ah.

As to Masjumi, N.U. differentiates itself as follows:

6. "The N.U. differs from the Masjumi in its frank affiliation with madẓhab teaching which has right from the beginning been described in its statute. It is quite probable that a great number of Masjumi members individually favor madzhab schools; and yet, so far as Masjumi as a party goes, this is not mandatory. In Masjumi's constitution no clause mentions this. Only later, after it began to realize that in order to gain popular support from the ummat it must acknowledge their religious convictions, did Masjumi, through a decision taken by the Madjlis Sjura (Advisory Council) in the Surabaya Congress in 1954, issue a declaration that the Masjumi Party respects the mazhab. The word "respect" for us--for the N.U.--does not contain the meaning of "embracing" the mazhab principle."[69)]

As to the non-Muslim parties, as was pointed out by K.H.A. Hasbullah in Amuntai, the N.U. distinguishes between parties of nationalistic background and parties of communistic-Marxist background.

7. Concerning the Partai Nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.), with its ideological conviction referred to as "nasionalisme-marhaenisme, it is emphasized that the party can not accept the inclusion of religious matters into civil law, for religion is a personal matter. Church is to be separated from State.

8. Concerning the Partai Komunis Indonesia (P.K.I.) and those parties with the same ideological background, based on the Historical

Materialism of Karl Marx, they aim at a complete divorce from all religions, for they are based on the belief of <u>Ilhad</u> (atheism). This conviction was candidly acknowledged by Premier Chou En Lai from Communist China in his speech at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, April 18-24, 1955, when he said:

> "We Communists are non-religious people and we do not believe in God. Nevertheless, we respect those who are religious and therefore we expect that religionists will also respect us."[70)]

By drawing clear lines dividing N.U. from other parties, non-Islamic as well as Islamic, it would seem that N.U. was trying to show the people that it is not just a party which follows some stream of ideology and conviction, but a party which has its own mentality, its own philosophy, and above all, it is a party which is the closest to the majority of the Muslim <u>ummat</u>, congenial to their way of thinking, and, not the least, the party which is striving for their benefit. Or, in the words formulated by N.U. itself:

> 9. "... When the people have had a clear explanation of the fundamental difference between the foundations and goals of the four parties mentioned, they will come to their own conclusion as to which party is the best and to which they will entrust the fate of the nation and our country now and for the future."[71)]

The second method, that is <u>kampanje bil fi'li</u>, was conducted very

effectively, more so than the others, by the N.U. Energies which were expended by other parties for the organization of mass rallies, and the preparation of high-sounding slogans, election symbols, and other propaganda, were used by N.U. mainly for this kind of method. It is readily understood, therefore, that various daughter organizations of N.U.--such as organizations which focused on youth (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor), women (Muslimat N.U.), students (Ikatan Peladjar N.U. - I.P.N.U.), scouts (Pandu Ansor), peasants (Pertanu, Pertanian N.U.), workers (Sarbumusi, Sarikat Buruh Muslimis Indonesia), veterans (Ikabepi, (Ikatan Bekas Pedjuang Islam), and, of course, kijahis--the religious scholars themselves--were highly effective in launching N.U.'s campaign programs. Each of them was assigned segments of programs which were applicable to their own nature and field. The fact that boy scouts, student, and youth organizations in this kind of campaign were performing very important roles was undeniable. The same is also true with the women's wing, which acted behind the scenes, in a concealed, delicate, but very effective way. This was evidently due to the fact that the N.U. had, from the beginning, recognized that the forgotten women of Indonesia who in fact have equal political rights with men, were to play an important part in this election. Moreover, it is also they whose total number of voters was obviously higher than men, either because of their superiority in numbers or because of the fact that, more so than men, they are commonl already married at a much earlier age, down below the niveau of voting age for single persons. Point 16 of the Campaign Guide, for example, mentions the role of women in the canvass as follows:[72]

16. The women's wing has, as a matter of fact, a very heavy and important task, which, if it is conducted seriously, will yield tremendous and effective results.

   a. Women have more of an opportunity than do men, especially in spreading the _fluister campagne_ (whispering campaign) among neighbors.

   b. Men and husbands should effectively direct women and wives in using this influence along ethico- religious lines.

   c. Women in the afternoons or after finishing their housework--in the villages especially--like to visit neighbors and chat about any problem at random. This is the nicest time for them to "pass their needle through." The talk should be gently led to the problem of "Who do you intend to give your vote to in the coming elections?"

   d. It would also be no less effective if the _induk-semang_, the ladies of the house, would exert their influence to lead their helpers (servants, _budjang_, _babu_) and family members to give their support to the Party.

The third method, that is _kampanje bi'l quwwah_, was directed especially towards exerting influence in government circles--particularly within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Parallel to methods manipulated by the P.N.I. _via_ its '_printah alus_' tactics to civil servants (_pamong-pradja_), N.U. also did practically the same thing, especially in regions where the _Lurahs_ or _Tjamats_ were members of 'fellow-travellers' of the N.U. Party. The effects of this method are, however, more recognizable within

the Kementrian Agama (Ministry of Religious Affairs), where, as has already been observed, the N.U. has a deep-rooted influence.

The fourth method, that is, kampanje beranting (chain canvass system) was practically the same as the second, kampanje bil fi'li, except that it was more disciplined and more regimentally directed.

It is not easy to determine which of the four methods was assigned the highest priority by N.U. As to the N.U. itself, it adapted its methods to the objects it faced. It would be more likely for the N.U. that the deeper it went into the villages the more effective its campaigns yield the success. Because of the various methods and tactics exerted by this party, the writer is apt to conclude that it was the N.U., among the many parties entering the election race, which understood how to apply the machinery of Western democracy to Indonesian society. It was this party which quickly recognized the strengths as well as the weaknesses of so alien a system of government and State, and therefore logically employed this knowledge to the to-be-or-not-to-be struggle of the election. Those who considered that their strength rested in sizeable regiments of intellectuals and elite lined up behind the parties did not realize that this was no guarantee of their success. The Western type of democracy is based on the myth Vox Populi Vox Dei, and, therefore, those who succeeded in flocking more populi would logically have a guarantee of success. And this is precisely what the N.U. did. Its long experience in living amidst the grassroot people and the methods it employed went along together.

V

After having a close look at the methods of campaign employed by N.U., the next question will be: What makes them different fromtthe others?

The differences, if they can be summarized here, are as follows:

1. The N.U., from the beginning, gravitated in its campaign towards the grass-roots in the villages. To them the N.U. clearly distinguished itself from other parties and ideologies--Islamic as well as non-Islamic--and stressed the peculiarity and singularity of its goals, struggles, and merits. As to its campaign on national and provincial levels, N. U. aimed at a propagation of the "golden mean" ideology and itself was said to be the synthesis of the various contradicting elements of Indonesian life. This djalan-tengah ideology was believed to be the solution of Indonesia's national life, not to mention its congeniality with the mentality and spirit of the people.

   The readiness of N.U. to join cabinets of nationalist and Marxist flavors, its mild and flexible attitudes towards the President, the nationalist and Communist parties, and its continuous propaganda of a Kerdja-Sama Islam-Nasional (cooperation of Islam and Nationalism), are all then understandable through this scope.

   Other parties--especially P.N.I., P.K.I., and Masjumi--in one respect gave a great deal of stress, especially in the beginning, to the campaign on national and regional levels, and their tactics therefore greatly determined and directed from above, i.e., from their Central Committees. In the ideological wars between these parties,

the nationalist and Marxist parties were able to bury their differences in defending the Pantja-sila ideology, and jointly faced the common enemy, Masjumi, whose ideal was to establish a state, or a society, based on Islam. As a reaction, the Masjumi, which was branded as equivalent to the Darul Islam movement, a collaborator and agent of foreign capitalists and imperialists, and so on, labeled the P.K.I. and its followers as kafir (unbelievers), a national, and an agent of Moscow imperialism and the P.N.I. as munafik (hypocrites) for being opposed to the idea of imposing Islamic teachings on state and society.

2. Whatever the methods used by N.U. in its campaign, all were carried out with religious appeal. If other parties audaciously gave so many promises to the people, such as improvement of the people's living standard, the distribution of lands, houses, and foods, and the like, the only promise given by the N.U. was a better life in the Hereafter and a nice place in paradise for whoever voted for N.U.

3. In addition to the religious appeal, and the "golden mean" appeal on the national lèvel, the popular appeal on the grass-root level was truly a determining factor. Before it stepped down to the people it classified them, and then treated them each according to their nature, habits, and spiritual backgrounds. It never focused on them from just one angle, but from many different angles. As a whole it might seem contradictory; one statement, in one place and to one group of people, might, in the same voice, contradict another statement in another place and to another group of people. Although to the santris

the N.U. spoke about things purely Islamic, to the abangans, for example, "... that we are Indonesian Muslims, but our Islam is Indonesian Islam," was a popular phrase frequently hinted to satisfy those whose Islam is, practically speaking, only nominal. This was again made justifiable in accordance with the N.U.'s ethical--tasawwuf--the conviction that Islam recognizes four steps towards the perfect end, sarengat, tarekat, hakekat and makripat (shari'ah, tariqah, haqiqah, ma'rifah).

This kind of all embracing tactic of N.U. was almost diametrically opposed to the Masjumi's or P.K.I.'s tactic, for example. Both Masjumi's and P.K.I.'s outlook were uncompromising and fundamental. It would be improbable for the Masjumi, for example, to draw support from the least Islamic abangans, or from those whose political convictions tended towards Marxism and Nationalism-Marhaenism.

4. As to P.N.I., N.U. in a way shared with it a xenophobic outlook towards anything coming from the outside. Different though the motives might be, both were opposed to Westernism. For the N.U., reformism, modernism, and Westernism are elements which are detrimental to its doctrinal-religious beliefs. For the P.N.I., Westernism is the evil child of capitalism and imperialism, which is also detrimental to the national culture and heritage of Indonesia.

5. In general it may be said that the parties' principal appeals can be divided as follows: P.N.I. to the prijaji-pamong-pradjas, N.U. and Masjumi to the santris, and P.K.I. to the abangans. The abangans, as

was said to be the people of embarras des choix, were also object of P.N.I.'s and N.U.-Masjumi's appeals. Thus the picture can be drawn as follows:

FOOTNOTES :

1. See, Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, p. 7.
2. Such an assumption was denied by many Indonesian leaders. Moh.Natsir for example once said that "elections would be no magic open sesame", but, by elections,he hoped, "...would give a real picture of political strengths and, by bringing about greater stability, purify and strengthen democracy". (Hikmah, April 11, 1953; Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, p. 143).
3. As to the causes, newspaper comments, and analyses, of the Oct.17 Affair, see, Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952, Dokumentasi no. 1, Jan. 1953, Kementerian Penerangan, Djakarta. See also, J.M.van der Kroef, "The Present Political Crisis", Indonesia in the Modern World, II, ch. 9; and, Herbert Feith,"The Storm in the Army", The Wilopo Cabinet, ibid., pp. 103-39.
4. Rustam St.Palindih, Pemilihan Umum, p. 11.
5. Cf., Feith, The Indonesian Elections, op.cit., p. 7.
6. See, Ichtisar Parlemen, no. 146, pp. 776 sqq., 1953; Suara Partai Masjumi, IX, no. 1, Jan. 1954.
7. Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta, II, p. 34; J.M.van der Kroef, op.cit, p. 335.
8. Abadi, June 28, 1955. See also, Djawaban Pemerintah Kabinet Burhanuddin Babak Pertama, Kem.Pen., Djakarta, pp. 45, sqq.
9. The Indonesian Elections, op.cit., p. 12.
10. Harian Rakjat, August 11, 1955; Duta Masjarakat, August 11, 1955.
11. See, Van der Kroef, op.cit., ch. 9.

12. Analisa Pemilihan Umum Indonesia, unpublished manuscript, Kementerian Penerangan, 1956, (under the courtesy of Herbert Feith).

13. Ibid.

14. Suara Partai Masjumi, no2/3, Febr./March, 1954, p. 13.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. K.H.M.Dachlan, the then General Chairman of N.U. Party, says,

> "One thing that we have to be proud of our party -and praise be to God-, is that the expansion of our party to various regions and sections throughout the country is so surprising. This really gives us a relief to continue our struggle. The N.U. Party is more known by the people, and they in turn, also show their willingness to cooperate with us. Not only new branches and sections are being established, but also their knowledge of organization and their understanding in politics are improved." ("N.U. dan Perdjuangannja", Risalah Politik, no. 2, pp. 8-9).

19. Tamar Djaya, "Meneropong Sekwartal Kabinet Ali Wongso", Suara Partai Masjumi, no. 12, Dec., 1953, p. 7.

20. Stencil no. B/131/55, Kementerian Agama R.I.

19a. On the organization, administration, and personnel of the Kementerian Agama, see, Pedoman Pendjabat Kantor2 Agama, 2 vols., Kementerian Agama bg.D, Djakarta, 1955.

21. Harian Abadi, April 3, 1956.

22. See, "Ada Apa2 Didalam P.N.I.?", Hikmah, VII, no. 12, March 20, 1954.

23. J.M.van der Kroef,"Indonesia's First National Election", I, The American Journal of Economic and Sociology, vol.16, no. 3, April, 1957, p. 238.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 242.

26. See, "Djaminan Hukum Pegawai Negeri Terantjam Terus", Hikmah, VII, no. 13, March 27, 1954.

27. Van der Kroef, op.cit., p. 243. Cf., Tamar Djaya, "Sekwartal Kabinet Ali", Suara Partai Masjumi, Dec., 1953.

28. Shortly after the formation of the new cabinet (Burhanuddin Cabinet) he fled abroad. He was charged of abusing his position as Minister of Economic Affairs by giving licences to his party men, and supported the P.N.I. financially for the campaign purposes. When Ali again took the government, he came back home, but interestingly he was left untouched. Sometime early this year (1960) he was caught, convicted and put to jail.

29. Ichtisar Parlemen, no. 37, 1954, pp. 274-80; Ibid., no. 202, 1172-74, 1179-1182.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., no. 37, p. 278. The "Mosi Tjik Wan" was fully supported by the whole opposition fractions in the Parliament.

32. Ibid.

33. "The P.A.Bank Umum Nasional, of Djakarta was the first bank of significance to be founded exclusively by a political party", John O.Sutter points out. "Its President was Soewirjo, First Deputy General Chairman of the P.N.I.; its Vice President was Dr. Ong Eng Die; the Chairman of its Board of Directors was Mr.Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, and the other four directors were P.N.I. members mostly prominent in business, namely, Dr.A.K.Gani, Dr.Soeharto,

Notohamiprodjo, and Mohammad Said". "...The Next year Iskaq and Ong resigned from their positions and sold their stockon appointment as Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Finance, respectively, in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, soon after which Soewirjo was appointed President of the Bank Industri Negara. Despite the loss of these key men as officers, the bank continued to thrive under President Parmin Martokusumo (from the B.R.I.). In late 1953, Minister Iskaq after consultation with Minister Ong, ordered the Government's Jajasan Persediaan Bahan Perindustrian (J.P.B.P.-- Industrial Material Supplies Fund), which had acquired sizeable profits from its monopoly on imports of cambrics and cloves for the batik and kretek cigarette industries, to deposit Rp.6 million in the Bank Umum Nasioanl. Soon afterwards the Jajasan Administrasi dan Organisasi (successor organization to the A.I.O.) was instructed to deposit Rp. 4 million in the Bank Umum Nasional. Then on March 2, 1954, on instructions of Minister of Finance Ong Rp 20 million of funds under the control of his ministry in the Bank Indonesia were deposited with the Bank Umum Nasional". Indonesianisasi, III, pp. 997-1001.

34. On the economic analysis of Mosi Tjik Wan, see, John O.Sutter, ibid., pp. 1060-75.

35. Feith, The Indonesian Elections, op.cit., pp. 11-12.

36. Ibid., p. 12.

36a. "Siaran no 35, Febr. 14, 1955", Risalah Lapunu, no. 1, p. 31.

37. Risalah Politik, no. 2, p. 9.

38. See, Tamar Djaya, "Sekwartal Kabinet Ali", Hikmah, VII, 12, p. 6.

39. Such a sensored article was photocopied by Hikmah, VII, 12, Jan. 1954.

40. Among the censored newspapers were Harian Abadi, Djakarta (Masjumi), Pedoman, Djakarta (Socialist), Sumber, (pro P.S.I.), Indonesia Raya (pro Masjumi and P.S.I.). On this occasion, Mr.Tan Po Goan from P.S.I. raised a motion in the Parliament but was defeated by 41 to 76. See, Ichtisar Parlemen, no. 206, 1953, p. 1199. M.Yunan Nasution from Masjumi also raised similar question to the Parliament on the prohibition of a special number of Aliran Islam (pro Masjumi periodical), Bandung, which contained the history of coup d'etat affair of P.K.I. in Madiun.

41. Ichtisar Parlemen, no. 133, 1953, p. 693. Seksi E in the Parliament unanimously rejected the Attorney General's notice. See, Ictisar Parliament, no. 131, 1953, p. 688.

42. Herbert Feith, Elections, p. 7

43. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

44. Ibid., p. 8.

45. The idea of "Komando Terachir" was first raised by Mr.Wongsonegoro, First Deputy Premier, which was then accepted as the Security policy of the Ali Government. To understand the attitude of opposition group on this matter, see,"Dengan Komando Terachir Merantjah Kedalam Rawa", an art. of Moh.Natsir in his Capita Selecta, II, (Pendis, Djakarta, 1957), pp. 246, sqq.

46. B.Kees for example says, "He (President Sukarno) was also often criticized, especially in the period preceding the elections, by the moderate parties for his unconcealed or covert support of the

P.N.I., which was not in agreement with his position as head of the State above party politics". "Observation on the Political Situation in Indonesia", Indonesia in 1956, ed. by B.H.M.Vlekke, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague, 1953, p.13.

47. Ibid., p.12.
48. Capita Selecta, III; op.cit., p. 295; Keng Po, Djakarta, Nov. 12, 1954.
49. B.Kees, op.cit., p. 12.
50. This kerdja-sama seemed only confined between N.U. and nationalist parties and President Sukarno. Because the relation between other Muslim parties outside the Liga and the nationalist plus communist parties remained at odd.
51. Literally means a ruler by necessity owing to his de facto power.
52. Harian Rakjat,

52a. Ibid.

53. Kees, op.cit., p.34.

53a. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

54. Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections, p. 62.
55. In the Dutch colonial time, besides ranks and positions of parents, another category was th minimum annual income of them. Thus quite a few of traders' and middle class children could go to government schools.
56. See, infra, ch. IV.
57. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia's First National Election", op.cit., p.243.
58. Issued on May 16, 1953, with the party decree no. 1468/Tanf./V-53. See, "Siaran Lapunu", no. 1, June 1, 1953, in Risalah Lapunu, no.1,

p.2. In the beginning the Committee (LAPUNU), consisting of: Chairman, R.T.Surjaningpradja; Vice Chairman, H.A.S.Bachmid; First Secretary, H.Idham Chalid; Second Secretary, H.Munir Abisudja'. Up to Jan. 19, 1955, the Commitee was often reshuffled. The last and complete formation of the Committee, was as follows: Advisors, K.H.A.Wahhab Chasbullah and Mr.R.Soenarjo; Technical Advisor, R.T. Surjaningpradja; First and Second Chairmans, H.Idham Chalid and H.Munir Abisudja'; General Secretary, A.Chamid Widjaja; Financial Advisor, H.Hasmuni; Treasurer, Abdullatif Dimjati; Members, H.A.S. Bachmid, H.Sjaifuddin Zuhri, K.H.Sjukri Gazali, Mr.Imran Rosjadi, A.Ruslan, Z.Arifin Tanamas, Nj.Mahmudah Mawardi, Nj.Alfiah Sjukri, Moh.Amin Iskandar, Bachtiar Affandi; Section I, Information, A. Chamid Widjaja, Nj.Mahmudah Mawardi, Bachtiar Affandi; Section II, Investigation and Tactics, R.T.Surjaningpradja; Jurisdiction, Mr. Imran Rosjadi; Section III, Supply, H.Hasmuni, A.Ruslan, Z.A.Tanamas; Section IV, Training, H.Sjaifuddin Zuhri, Mr.Imron Rasjadi; Section V, Women, Nj.Mahmudah Mawardi, Nj.Alfiah Sjukri. (Siaran no.32, February 9, 1955).

59. Siaran Lapunu, no. 8, Nov. 27, 1953.

60. Risalah Lapunu, no. 2, p. 5.

61. Ibid., p.5.

62. Ibid.

63. Cf., Risalah Lapunu, no. 21, p. 19.

64. Antara, February 12, 1955.

65. Surabaja Post, August 31, 1955.

66. Ibid., Sept. 24, 1955.

67. _Duta Masjarakat_, Sept. 27, 1955.

68. "Pedoman Kampanje P.U. untuk Konstituante", _Risalah Politik_, no. 5, p. 8.

69. _Ibid._, p. 9

70. _Ibid._

71. _Ibid._, p. 10.

72. _Ibid._

IV. "The Santri Cult" as the Foundation of N.U.

From the previous analyses, in a cursory manner there have resulted several classifications of the society in Java which, in general, is still called an Islamic society (nominally more than 90 percent of the Javanese are considered to be Muslims). These are the abangan, santri, and prijaji groups. These classifications are, from one angle, the result of "differences in their religious outlook on life, ethical preferences, and political ideologies." While from another angle they also exist because of the differences of social and economic structure of these variants respectively, which according to Geertz are centered around three nuclei: the village (abangan), the market--in the wide sense of taking in internal trade and trade relations with other islands (santri)--and the government bureaucracy (prijaji).[1)]

"The Javanese village," explains Geertz, "is as old as the Javanese, for it is likely that the first Malayo-Polynesian peoples to come to the island were already in possession of knowledge of agriculture. The evolution of the Javanese village to its present form has been at each state regulated and expressed by a more or less unified religious system itself, of course, evolving too. In the days before the Hindus, who began to come to the island around 400 A.D. or before, it seems likely that the sort of "animism" common still to many of the pagan tribes of Malaysia comprised the whole of the religious tradition; but this tradition has proved, over the course of the centuries, remarkably able to absorb into one syncretized whole elements from both Hinduism and Islam,

which followed it in the fifteenth century. Thus today the village religious system commonly consists of a balanced integration of animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements, a basic Javanese syncretism which is the island's true folk tradition, the basic substratum of its civilization."[2)]

The coming of Islam to Djawa, moreover, produced a new class of society, one which had been earliest attracted to this religion, and had made efforts to become the center of its spiritual and mundane life. Thus, not only were they more conscientious and more faithful in performing the basic teachings of this religion, such as are contained in the five principles of Islam: *sjahadat*, *sembahjang*, *puasa*, *zakat*, and the pilgrimage to Mekka, but they also became the foundation and at the same time the direction of its social, political and cultural life. In them we find the promoters and propagators of religion, who from the beginning has played the most important role in the history of Islam in Indonesia. Moreover, as Benda has said--the history of Islam in Indonesia is the history of the expansion of *santri* culture and its influence on religious, social, and political life in Indonesia.[3)]

The question of why the santri group has a more urban quality and is especially found in the merchant class--and to a certain extent certainly also among the well-to-do peasants (small landowners) in the villages--would probably be answered by reexamining the history of the entrance of Islam into Djawa, which begins from the coast.[4)] But, aside from these historical factors, one thing is also clear, that is, it was this middle class which in the period before the coming of

Islam was less influenced by Hindu culture and was also not attached to an animistic belief or other native beliefs. The merchant traits which had already become part of their blood and flesh produced dynamic traits, the ability to adapt themselves quickly to changes, the capability of receiving something new from the outside, and in certain matters a pragmatic trait. The meeting of these traits with the same traits among the Islamic merchants who came, and Islam itself, automatically joins in settling the answer to this question.

The third group is the prijaji group, who in the explanation of Geertz, "originally referred only to the hereditary aristocracy which the Dutch pried loose from the kings of the vanquished states and turned into an appointive, salaried civil service. This white collar elite, its ultimate roots in the Hindu-Javanese court of pre-colonial times, conserved and cultivated a highly refined court etiquette, a very complex art of dance, drama, music, and poetry, and a Hindu-Buddhist mysticism. They stressed neither the animistic element in the over-all Javanese syncretism as did the abangans, nor the Islamic as did the santris, but the Hinduistic."[5)]

Between these three variants there are automatically groups which stand on the borders, which are difficult to classify in a sure category. Between the prijaji and santri stands the penghulu group.[6)] Between the santri and abangan stand the peasants and small merchants in the villages (santri-abangan) who, compared with the people of the desa (abangan), are in general more well-to-do and businesslike and

less tied to old beliefs, but are also less puritanical and less aggressive compared to the urban santri.

The rise of the penghulu group must be reexamined in relation to the time of the entrance of Djawa's kings into Islam, when they, in matters connected with the Islamic shari'at had to depend on the ulama.[7] The penghulu, therefore, are those to whom were handed over the responsibility in religious questions in the domain of the kraton; this was usually limited to questions of matrimony, religious celebrations, and to a degree also legal matters where the penghulu sat as a member of the kraton court of justice.

With the coming into being of the ulama group, which was raised to the upper level and became the apparatus of prijaji rule, two features of the ulama can automatically be seen. First, it was they who became the instrument of government (penghulu); second, it was they who were not tied to the government, but sought influence among the people by setting up langgars and pesantrens and staking their names and positions on their skill at religious questions--especially in knowledge of the Quran, Hadith, and Fiqh. The first, to a certain degree belonging to the prijaji class, although because of the spiritual background, cannot be completely separated from the second; while the second, furthermore, became the nucleus of the santri culture.[8]

In giving rough sketches of the social stratifications which grew up on Java further analysis does not intend to go deeply into the cultural background of each of these substrata one by one and also

will not try to carry it onto the comparative level.[9] However, the following analysis will go into some particular aspects of santri culture, which became the trail, the breeding ground, for Islamic movements and institutions in Indonesia. With this, it is hoped that now the reasons for the success of the N.U. party, which in previous sections have been looked at on the political plane, will be revealed on the sociological, cultural and religious plane. Now, the aspects which are aimed at here are the ideological and structural aspects of santri culture. In passing, several variations and controversial elements which became factions in it will be pin-pointed so that, in this way, a clear picture will be given of the side from which N.U. arose and of what differentiates it from other Islamic movements and parties.

Up to the middle of the last century the character of Islam in Indonesia was really almost the same all over. Cultural and social mobilization of society moved very slowly. Its evolution was static, not dynamic. The only variation that could be seen was that where Hindu culture was less influential Islam was stronger and was able to penetrate the area of social life farther, e.g. in Atjeh, Minangkabau, and in Banten. On the contrary, where Hindu culture was still strongly influential Islam tended to seek a compromise, and compromise often means the readiness to create syntheses with other cultural factors which came earlier. The result was a syncretic Islam which was mixed with the other culture. This fact can be more obviously found on Djawa.

Besides this, the mystical elements still constitute essential

elements. Up to a certain time pantheistic and heretical mysticism certainly still had a wide influence, but finally it was gradually replaced by a *sufi* and orthodox mysticism.[10)] Yet this does not imply that thefirst disappeared completely. Thus, besides the orders of *Kadirijah*, *Naksabandi*, *Rifai*, *Sjatari*, and so on, people also enjoyed the orthodox mystical teaching of Al Ghazali, etc., so that it is not surprising that a translation of his book, *al Ihya*, into Malay was known almost two centuries ago and recently appeared in new verses in Indonesian.[11)] This means that mystical teaching or *sufi* mysticism gradually got to go alongside of the religious *sjariat*. The mysticism of Al Ghazali is a synthesis of basic doctrines, religious *sjariat* and sufism.

In Islamic law, the Indonesian Muslims follow the school of Sjafi'i, one of the four schools of law in Sunnite Islam.

Although the *Sji'ah* sect is not officially in Indonesia,its teachings are not unknown there. The belief in the coming of the Ratu Adil or Imam Mahdi, exaggerated homage to the Prophet Muhammad teachings about *Nur Muhammad*, reading of *barzandji*[11a)] and other adulations on *Hari Maulud*, stories of *mi'radj* and miracles of the prophets, etc.), and the commemoration of 10 Ashura, which is connected with the story of Hasan and Husin, by various ceremonies, such as the *tabuk* celebration found on the coast of West Sumatera, are all influences of Sji'ah teachings.[12)] These Sji'ah teachings slipped into Indonesia again carried by these *Sufi* teachings.

The opening of the sea route to Mecca and connections with other Arab countries in the middle of the last century, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, produced new changes and the entrance of new principles into the body of Indonesian Islam. On one side the mystical teachings which already existed received new material from the mystical teachings which had grown up widely in Mecca. Up to the Wahhabi invasion in the 1920's, Mecca can be considered one of the centers of mystical sufistic teachings of the Islamic world. On returning to their homeland a number of them--especially those who had the opportunity to live there and study religious teachings or enter mystic orders--set up pondoks, pesantrens, or langgars in their villages where they trained the pupils (santri) in studying the Quran and theology or mysticism also. The pondoks, which were the center of gravity of the latter teaching, usually formed a mystic order with limited students.[13)]

How important Mecca was for the changed and renovation of religion in Indonesia can clearly be seen from the picture drawn by Snouck Hurgronje in closing his book, Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century:

> "... here lies the heart of the religious life of the East Indian Archipelago, and numerous arteries pump from thence fresh blood in ever accelerating tempo to the entire body of the Moslim populace of Indonesia. Here the threads of all mystic societies of the Jawah run together, from thence they draw the literature used in their religious schools, here, through the mediation of friends and relatives settled down, they take part in pan-Islamic life and effort."[14)]

The influence of the reformist movement centered in Egypt

(Jamaluddin al Afghani and Muhammad Abduh), Mecca (puritanical Wahhabism), and to a certain extent also India (Lahore, Qadian, Aligharh) finally also crept into Indonesia and by themselves quickened the development of new processes in Indonesian Islam. All this was accidentally accompanied by internal political developments, both due to the results produced by various colonial policies of the Dutch government (ethical policy, etc.) and the impetus from outside, from the developments in Japan, China, India and Asia in general. The period between the two world wars can be said to be the period of the raging of these two currents--Islamic reformism and national development--which in achieving a common direction became a movement of national development of the entire Indonesian people, which finally reached a climax in the proclamation to the entire world of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945.

As was in the original place of the reformist movement, in Indonesia it also takes in various aspects of a renovating platform: religious, social, cultural, and political.[15] In religion, it attacks "the formalism of Islamic orthodoxy embodied in the santri civilization of rural Indonesia, as well as the animistic and Hindu-Buddhist 'impurities' of village Islam, by insisting on a religion purified from scholasticism and mysticism and yet compatible with every-day life."[16] Socially it attacks, "the pre-Islamic Indonesian institutions, embodied in the adat and the prijaji civilization, which had traditionally obstructed the expansion of a true Muslim way of life."[17] Culturally, "Indonesian reformists sought to stem the tide of Westernization by

identifying Islam with Indonesian-centered separateness, opposed to the passive surrender to Western-Christian no less than secular values and norms." "(But) unlike the ulama, they moved to counter ideological Westernization by the Western weapons of organization."[18] And politically, "Indonesian reformism was, by its very nature, bound to come into conflict with the colonial status quo itself."[19]

It is clear that the action and revolution in thinking which was so radical, which was at the same time launched against the orthodox ulama[20] group, the adat group, the Westernized elite group, and the Dutch government itself was not left behind, would cause an equally violent reaction. Thus it is not surprising that one of these went so far as to seek the help of the others to face the "attacks" of the reformists.[21] The formation of N.U., as has been explained above, was just to produce an answer and reaction of the ulama group to the actions of the reformist group which wanted to 'change the character of Islam which had been handed down from generation to generation'.

This conflict between the reformist group and the ulama group has no meaning if looked at from the angle of organization differences and strength of perseverance on the missionary level. Because from these two points of view N.U. is nothing more than a missionary organization and movement which is organized in a modern way, which in its major lines does not differ from the modern movements of Muhammadijah, P.S.I.I., Persatuan Islam, and others. It also must not be looked for on the socio-economic level, because both of these sorts of movements were born

in the middle class. Their difference is only that the conservative group gets its backing from the well-to-do hadjis in the villages, while the reformists get their primary backing from urban traders and white-collar people. But this is gradually being lessened by the further and further quickening of social mobility which is narrowing the separation between rural and urban Islam.[22)]

These differences only come out if we attempt to dig into the area of spiritual characteristics, i.e. the doctrinal-ideological field and their way of thinking (Weltanschauung), so that in this respect we have the right to place the titles "modern" or "old-fashioned" on each one. The further analysis will attempt to bring out the consequences of various basic ideological-doctrinal differences and the way of thinking of these two groups.[23)]

a. Predestination versus Free-will.

These two groups do not differ in the opinion that the path of human life in this world is fixed by the qada and qadar of God. Before anything was created the Lord fixed his creatures' movements and fate, which would happen in the days to come in this world (Qada); while after this, while they are going on, the Lord also controls their movements (Qadar). In this principle their opinions do not differ because the belief in qada and qadar is one of the basic beliefs which differentiates a Muslim from a non-Muslim. But in the matter of interpreting the meaning of this Divine determinism and applying it to life and behaviour in this world, and then its connection and relation to

the kasib, effort, and acquisition of the individual in pursuing his life, and free choice, they part company, or at least differences in their positions can be seen. From another angle it can be said that the effects of this principle on one's way of life differ.

The conservative group tends to think that life in this world is a sort of compulsion and that the differences in the levels of human life, rich and poor, low and high, happy and unhappy, must not be sought in the amount of effort put forth by each man, but is merely due to the will of God, since nothing that happens is outside the desire and taqdir of God. This is the sense in which the amount of effort does not change the destiny of the individual. As for our being ordered to work and exert ourselves by the Lord it is because the rule of God is like that. Mankind is commanded to do good and to avoid all evil. Anyone who does good will gain the reward of heaven; anyone who does evil will gain the reward of hell. Therefore every action which is performed tends to have a basis of "reward and punishment";[24)] there is no consideration of whether the work will bring profit or not. Besides this, their conviction is that life in this world is only a transition and that the real life will be in the hereafter. Because of this all effort in this world is to be done in order to gain the awards and blessing of the God as much as possible.

The modern group tends to give the interpretation that qada and qadar are actually in the hands of God but is it not so that besides this the Lord has given us a set of life's tools in order to fix the

paths of our life ourselves? We were given eyes in order to see, a brain in order to think, senses in order to reason, and desire in order to choose, etc., with the intention that all these instruments would be used as well as possible. The question arises of whether since these instruments are not used it is God who must be blamed? The modernists answer no, that each human being must be responsible for his own actions. It has become our obligation--an obligation which must come from our conscience alone, not something which is felt as a command--to make this qada and qadar an opportunity to work and exert ourselves as much as possible in order to achieve good in this world and in the hereafter; not because we hope for gain and fear loss. Now, if after this, failure occurs, this is called taqdir, since it is simply beyond human ability and powers.

Muhammad Abduh, in answering the charge and opinion of the West that the decline of the Islamic community at the present time is caused by the fact that the Islamic community always surrenders to the taqdir and Divine Will, is compelled to answer in two ways: in the sense that besides confirming these charges which actually are found in the practices of the majority of the Islamic community, he also denies this as strongly as possible by saying that individual conscience in freedom of action and responsibility toward everything one does is what is called taqdir. Abduh says:[25]

> "He is conscious of his voluntary actions, he weighs the consequences of them by his will, then performs them by a certain power within himself. All this the man of sound reason and

senses knows without proof and without a teacher to instruct him. At the same time, he learns by experience that there is in the universe a Power greater than his own. Yet this recognition should not cause him to ignore his ability to control his own actions and direct the exercise of his natural powers. For the divine law is based upon this truth, and by means of it only can responsibilities be rightly imposed. He who denies any part of this, has denied the locus of faith in his own souls, which is his reason, which God has honoured by addressing to it His commands and prohibitions."[26)]

From the differences of these two viewpoints about fate and self-determination arises the second differences, i.e.:

b. Quantitative versus qualitative or totalistic versus narrowed religion.

Again, this difference must not be looked at from the angle of the importance of religious sense in relation to other aspects of life since both groups have the same opinion, that Islamic doctrine is the fundamental basis for all action in various aspects of life and in this matter "there is no simple rendering unto Caesar." "In that sense" Geertz explains, "all *santris* are totalistic--in contrast to *abangans* and *prijajis*, for whom religion is only one part of life with its own specific patterns and purposes and more or less equal in prestige with other parts which, in turn, do not need to be justified in any explicitly religious terms. But for the *santris* this latter is just what is involved here: how is the secular life to be justified in terms of the religious?"[27)]

The conservative group tends towards the answer that Islam is already equipped to regulate everything: political, social, economic,

cultural, etc. Several moments Before Muhammad died, i.e. during the Hadji Wida', the Lord finished providing him with all Islamic teachings and the Lord also approved of them.[28] And Muhammad has not said in vain that "Islam is high; there is nothing above it".[29] With this it is as if a conclusion was reached that we donnot have to imitate or take anything from elsewhere.

The teaching of qanaah (contentment) is more ingrained in this group. Anything foreign to its religious foundations should be avoided. As a result, it is not surprising that the ulama of N.U., especially before the war, forbade Muslims to dress like Westerners, to wear a western style hat, to wear a tie and trousers, or for women to wear a Western dress or gown, etc. Says one of the N.U. leaders, "...N.U. has a cautious attitude toward modernism; N.U. rejects any progress (tamaddun) which is in conflict with Islam and the N.U. as much as possible does not use modernism which is not in accordance with Islam".[30]

The modern group, on the contrary, tends toward the interpretation that it is only the bases that are needed, while the detailed problem can be regulated by oneself without having to turn to religious arguments. Therefore, in their operations in the area of worldliness there is the tendency to narrow religious conceptions, and only to aplly them to fundamental problems. So that there appears a readiness to allow the free development of various secular institutions with the only

provision that they do not conflict with the bases of religious teaching. In everyday life there appears the readiness to accept any new thing from the outside. Because of this, it is not surprising that they can quickly adapt themselves to new developments; and the stream of Westernization, as long as it does not conflict with religious bases, is strictly advantageous.

As an illustration, in order to clarify the viewpoint of the conservative group, a statement which was found in "Berita N.O." no. 19-20, 1938, is quoted below. It criticizes the way of thinking of the modern group:[32)]

"As a result of the amazing thing of this world, the Islamic movement in Indonesia is now confused. Its direction is difficult to follow. The stimulus comes from the West, via our intellectuals, to raise the position of women; 'our people' -the leaders of the Islamic movement- raise women on high. All of Indonesia is in frenzy to exalt the status of women, because Islam, they say, is a religion which gives very high status to women. Women are praised, extolled, out of all proportion, and they forget that men are in fact above women. They forget that women should be accompanied by their mahram (family) when they travel, especially at night,

"There also comes the impetus from the West to be up to date. The entire Islamic movement gets busy right away 'setting up shops' to modernize Allah's laws, to make them fit the times! Usury, provided that the amounts involved are small, is permitted. Vrije-omgang (free social intercourse), provided that it is under supervision, is permitted; The Friday sermons, as several

magazines have suggested via the intellectuals, should not mention heaven, hell, or khashyah, etc., but must be up to date, must discuss the destiny of the people, the economy of the people. If by chance there is an election of the local council the Friday sermon must discuss the need to elect Mr.Subriha as a member of the Gemeenteraad and the necessity of defeating Mr.Saltino, etc. The leaders of Islam do not know how to differentiate among irshad, nasihah, maw'izah, ta'lim, etc., and do not realize that in fact the Friday sermon belongs to the category of maw'izah, so that 'the heart becomes fearful because of it, and tears flow because of it'. Such a maw'izah can no longer be found in the typical 1938 sermon.

"No wonder 'our people' are always ready to debate with those of us who can say Qala al Imam al Ghazali (Imam al Ghazali said...), qala al Shafi'i (Al Shafi'i said...) , etc., whereas they bend in devotion when they hear, for example, "the words of Imam Mussolini", "in the opinion of Shaikh Kipling", "...But Al'ālim al 'allāmah Ir.Soekarno has burst through taqlid", "Therefore the decree of Shaikhuna wa maulana Stalin...", etc., all the while saying that they uphold...Islam!

"No wonder 'our people' no longer know tasawwuf, keramat, wusul, suluk, etc., because their heads are full of materialistic ideas. And yet it is said they are the leaders of Islam!

"It has become the style of our times for youth to be busy learning and teaching the abc's of a foreign language, but they do not master and give precedence to learning and teaching alif-ba-ta, nahwu, sarf, ma'ani, bayan, badi', etc., and yet, they say, they advance the Islamic front,

front, Islamic religion, Islamic civilization, etc. This sort of 'diligence' goes to such a surprising degree that we recently found 'our people' reciting the Hadith Rasul in Dutch, which was then interpreted in Indonesian! We don't know whether it was because they know the Hadith from a Dutch book, another proof of where 'our people' take their knowledge from and to what a point the 'stupidity' of Islamic leaders concerning their religious knowledge has gone, or whether it is due to their 'diligence' in being up to date!!!"

In their political conceptions the modern group does not see the necessity for the quick proclamation of an Islamic state.[33] For the important thing is not the name but its contents. First an Islamic society, then an Islamic state will follow automatically. Therefore what is important is quality not quantity.[34] On the other hand the conservative group tends towards: an Islamic state first; its contents can be filled in later.

"N.U., although forced to work under the present secular state, there being no alternative, but to rebel (as right wing Moslems seeking and Islamic State have indeed done in West Java, in South Celebes, and sporadically in North Sumatra), feels that the theocracy should be declared immediately, whereupon reform of the government will follow as a natural consequence of the mere application of the superior political and legal theories of Islam."[35]

The first and second differences together thus produce the third difference.

c. Dogmatic scholasticism versus pragmatic rationalism.

If it is asked: why is this? the conservative group will answer: because that is what the Quran or Hadith or ijma' say. The truth of Islamic teachings need not be brought to trial, ~~bila kaifa.~~ They do not become mouldy in the rain, do not burst in the heat. But what is said by this truth follows the interpretation of the ulama, since only the ulama (kijahi) have the right of interpretation (it is believed). This conception is traditional--such that this truth does not change according to the times and conditions--and it is passed down from one ulama to the other, to his pupils and his followers.

Therefore, if we follow the reports of the N.U. Congresses on religious questions, the deliberation does not actually have the character of discussion and critical study but rather points to the old books and turns them over and over, looking for what the qaul ulama Sjafi'i so and so said about the problem under discussion. It is interesting that all the answers to the questions raised closed with such words as "taken from such and such a book, the writing of ulama so and so, page such and such; or, to make an analogy (qijas) on the saying (qaul) of ulama so and so, in his book such and such, page such and such. To give a clear picture of what is being discussed here, several problems and the conclusions reached are quoted below. They are from the reports of the N.U. Congresses.

I. In the 10th N.U. Congress, held in 1935 at Solo,[36] several delegates brought up questions like the following:

1) Fifth question:[37]

What is the judgment of a woman who gives a sermon in front of a gropp of men? Is it permitted or not?

Answer

The Congress decides that a woman preaches in front of a group of men is forbidden, except if there is no munkar sjar'an, as when she covers her nakedness so that the sjar'an is satisfied and she is safe from slander. The explanation is taken from the book Ihya', section 2, page 125, and the book Mathar 'ala sittina masalah, page 114, and Fatawi Kubra, section 1, page 203.

2) Fourth question:[38]

What is the judgment on tonil al ma'ruf (the popular theater) and the judgment on people who act in this theater? Is this activity permitted or not?

Answer

The Congress decides that the theater is an exhibiton place. Therefore when the appearance of the thing is evil (munkar sjar'an), as the ketoprak, or wajang orang, or bangsawan, and the like, then it is forbidden. The explanation is from the books of Muslim logists.

3) Sixth question:[39]

What is the judment on listening to the radio, and on a man who owns a radio? Is it permitted or not?

Answer

The Congress decides that the judgment on listening to the radio voice is the same as listening to the real voice. Therefore, regarding this, there are five judgments (that are haram, wadjib, makruh, sunnah, and djawaz). It is the same with owning or buying this instrument. Taken from and based on the decision of Al Sjaikh Bahith Mufti al Dijar al Misriyah. Contained in al Hidayah al Islamiyah, Djumadil Awwal, 1352, page 623.

II. At the 13th Congress held at Menes (West Java)[40] in 1938, the following problems, among others, were debated (or asked about?):

1) 32nd question[41]:

What is the judgment of fully or perfectly photogarphing animals, humans, or athers? Is it haram qath'an because it is included in taswir? Is it djaiz qath'an because it is included in habs al zhill? Is there a khilaf al mu'tabar in the fiqh, and moreover, is this djaiz or khilaf only in photographing on glass(?), or does it include transferring it to paper?

Answer

Photographing fully as mentioned in the question (photographing on glass to transfer it to paper) is forbidden and and there is no khilaf al mu'tabar. The explanation is from Kitab al Nahdlah al Islahiyah, page 264. The text upon which the judgment is based reads as follows...

2) 25th question[41]:

Is the judgment of a man who does not use the idjma' and

the qiyas but only the Quran and Hadith valid? And this man admits to adhering to the three mazhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali?

Answer

The judgment of a man who does not use the idjma' and qiyas is not valid. The explanation is from Kitab Asna al Mathalib, section 4, page 283. The text upon which the judgment is based reads as follows...

3) 30th question:[42]

What is the judment on a man who says that Djam'iyah Nahdlatul Ulama does not follow the path of ahlissunnah and the community because the name Djam'iyah Nahdlatul Ulama is muhdathah -- is not found at the time of Rasulullah? Is the above mentioned man condemned to leave the Muslim community, to become an unbeliever?

Answer

This man is mukhthi' (wrong) in this matter, but he is still within the Muslim community. Because Djam'iyah N.U. is djam'iyah ahlissunnah wal djama'ah, as is mentioned in the statute of the movement, and the name Nahdlatul Ulama is only istilahi (conventional), where there is no serious argument in discussing conventional terms.

III. At the 14th Congress held at Magelang (Central Java) in 1939[43], some of the questions raised are as follows:

1) 27th question:

Why must every Muslim hold fast to one of the four mazhabs, while all four of them truly hold the istinbath (deduction) to the Hadith and Quran?

Answer

Every Muslim is obliged to hold fast to one of the four mazhab in order to watch out not to talfiq or ignore the mazhab (تلاعب أو تتبع الرخص). Explanation from Baghyah al Mustarshidin, section 2, page 9: ...; and from Al Mizan li Al Sja'rant, section 1, page 320:...

2) 29th question

What is the judgment on insuring one's life, as often happens nowadays, i.e. to pay a monthly subscription for ... years and when the person (participant) dies before a fixed time his estate receives from the life insurance money in an amount agreed on at the beginning?

Answer

Insuring one's life is forbidden because it is included in qumar. Explanation from Nur al Islam, first volume, no. 6, page 367; and from Risalah al Shaikh Bahith, Mufti al Dijar al Misrijah, page 367, mentioned:...

IV. At the 20th Congress held at Surabaja in September 1954 the following questions, among others, were discussed:

1) 2nd question [44]

The President (Head of State) is the Walijul-Amri Dharuri bish-shaukah, as was decided on by the Konperensi Alim Ulama with the Minister of Religion at Tjipanas. Does the N.U. Congress at Surabaja confirm or deny this? We request a dalil al sharih

(an authoritative explanation).

Answer

The Congress agrees with and confirms the Conference of Alim Ulama at Tjipanas(2-7 March, 1954). The matter of Waliyul Amri Dlaruri bish-shaukah and its expanded arguments are explained by Kitab Ihya', section 1, page 147.

2) 3rd question

What is the judgment on announcing the first day of Ramadlan or the first day of Shawwal for the Hisab or for people who believe in the opinion of their hisab. Is it permitted or not? Because a great deal of those who believe in it dare to announce them before the announcement of the Ministry of Religion.

Answer

Since this problem contains several questions the Congress responds with several answers:

a. It is not found in the Hadith and athar that Rasulullah and his companions suggest the fixing of the fast and 'Id with hisab, while the first who permit the fast with hisab was Mathraf, teacher of Imam al Bukhari.

b. To announce the beginning of the month of Ramadlan and Shawwal based on hisab with pamphlets, etc., so that the people become confused, while the above mentioned announcement precedes the

government announcement; therefore the Congress is of the opinion that it is not permitted because :

1) daf'an lil mafsadah (to prevent the occurrence of damage or harm)

2) iftiyat to the government (to lower the prestige of the government).

c. The Congress believes that it is necessary to request the government to forbid the announcement as such.

3) 4th question

What is the judgment on Islamic propaganda by means of the theater? Is it permitted or not?

Answer

The Congress decided that the Islamic propaganda in the theater which contains munkar shar'an is not permitted. Based on the qaidah which runs as follows ...

From the above quoted examples and, we may say, from almost all the decisions of the Sjuriah , as may be read in the Reports of the Congresses, it can be seen that the N.U. in Indonesia is not brave enough to take directly from original sources, namely Quran and Hadith, and then to make their own interpretation and decisions. It is as if the only thing they do is to play over the record of the mazhabite ulama and listen to what they have said about the problem under discusion. In other words, they only take secondary sources, namely the interpretations and commentaries which have been given by the mazhabite ulama. The reason for this must certainly be looked for in the fact that N.U. is a mazhab (Shafi'ite) organization and accepts bases of judgment other than the Quran and Hadith,

that are the Idjma' and Qiyas of the ulama. Such a disposition was clearly seen from the official answer given to a question raised by the delegate from Krue at the Menes Congress, which says that "the judgment of a man who does not use idjma' and qiyas is not valid".[45]

The scholastic and traditonalistic bases of the conservative group are violently opposed by the modern group. It is not because they do not want to admit the existence of the third and the fourth rules of judgment --i.e. idjma' and qiyas-- but it is the erroneous use of these bases of judgment that they oppose. First, must only the ulama be allowed to use them, so that the ulama, as it were, become the official interpreters of the religious teachings, somewhat as in the Christian religion? And must they then be divided into factions, i.e. mazhabs? Since the Shafi'i mazhab became the sandaram (fountain) is it logical that it (Shafi'ite mazhab) is the best, while the others are beneath it? Second, as for the validity of the idjma' and qiyas, as it likely that judgments reached five to ten centuries ago can still be in accord with the present times and conditions, and therefore do they not need to be reexamined? Third, the investigation of judgments which tend to be narrow and concerned with details tends to make us forget us forget the idea and spirit contained in them, and gives the ulama the opportunity to speak sophistically. Since their judgments have such a flexible character and show no consistency on any one point --such as, the position of women in the Hadith,[46] which in one nas, in a certain connection, is said to be lower than man's, in another nas is said

to be on the same level, and in still another nas is to be higher--the ulama tend in the direction of sophism. This is especially so since the compass of judgemant if the Fiqh does not only move between the alternatives allowed-not allowed, commanded-forbidden, but moves in the five directions of the compass needle (al ahkam al khamsah), namely wadjib, sunnah, djaiz, makruh, and haram. Flexibility and freedom of movement in fixing this basis of judgment has been used by the ulama in order not to walk a straight line but to tend toward what has been called speculative, even opportunistic, behavior. Attitudes such as these are reflected in N.U.'s attitudes in the field of politics, as has been seen in the prededing section.

In the grievances expressed by the modern group it is clear that they want a purification and simplication in Islam, such as was intended by Muhammad Abduh when he said:

> "The only hope for a revival of Islam lies in the recovery of the essentials of that religion, the minimum of beliefs without which Islam would not be Islam, the Islam which all could recognize as such, and upon which all could unite".47)

And these intentions can only be reached by not tying oneself to the existing mazhabs, which because of the 'seriousness' of the mazhab ulama have come to make Islam a complex and complicated teaching, so that one is not faced with the spirit and kernel of Islam itself but with the polemics and conflicts in understanding in minute matters of the Fiqh between one ulama and another.

The modern group, therefore, tends to seek the contents and kernel,

more so than what is involved in the petty polemical problems in the Fiqh, which has a quantitative character. They want the door to idjtihad (interpretation) opened up again so that that good but mouldy smelling house might get a fresh and satisfying breath of air again. People want to be given the freedom of interpretation and understanding, corresponding to the level of their education, the teachings of Islam, which can be scooped directly from their original sources, i.e. Quran and Hadith. More than that, they say that the function of the intelligence must be freed from the chains which have shackled it up till now. Intelligence must be ordered to work again to decidd what is good and what is bad. In examining anything one must be pragmatic and utilitarian as well as rational. The a priori attitude must be avoided. They say that goodness exists everywhere, in both the East and the West. As a result, one must be selective, take what is good from wherever it comes, and reject what is bad, even if it comes from inside oneself. "Unto Allah belong the East and the West, and whithersoever ye turn, there is Allah's countenance. Lo! Allah is all embracing, all knowing." (Quran, II, 115).

d. Syncretic versus puristic Islam:

It is not very odd to begin with the conclusion that both are inclined to be syncretic and both are also inclined to be puristic; but they differ in what areas these occur. The conservative group is inclined to be syncretic in the spiritual and cultural fields and puristic in the secular field. The modern group, on the other hand, tends

to be syncretic in the secular field and puristic in the religious field.

The emergence of modern understanding was just because of this. They want to see Islam purified and simplified; they want to take as much as possible from outside (the West). The conservative group opposes this renovation in the sense that they hold fast to existing religious teachings which have been handed down from generation to generation. Thus, they are of a syncretic character and yet reject concepts which come from the outside (xenophobia).

Mysticism is still something practiced in the conservative group while in the modern group it has been eliminated entirely. Custom and rituals are still things which are respected by the conservative group, while they are not liked so much by the modern group. Compared with other social substrata the conservative group is close to the prijaji group in the area of mysticism, while in the area of custom and rituals they are close to the abangan group. In comparing them, Geertz, for example, comes to the following conclusion:

> "The extreme kolot santri, despite the fact that he is often called "orthodoxy," is not actually the most Islamic of Javanese Moslems but the least. It is he who had made the minimum shift from the traditional religious system in which "animistic," Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic elements found a stable balance toward the situation where Islam and the world view associated with it have been fully taken up into the self, have been internalized in the individual psyche so that they actually control behavior rather than merely putting a gloss on it to hide the values which are really determining individual action."48)

While in another place Geertz says:

> "The modernist emphasizes the way of radical disassociation from that context and the purification of doctrine within a small group of religious leaders; the conservative tries to work out a half-way covenant with the reigning tradition which will both make his own transition easier and lessen the tension between himself and his neighbors who do not agree with him". 49)

From these discoveries and from the four basic differences which have been analyzed above, one can finally draw the conclusion as to the place and position of N.U. in Javanese society, and to what point these doctrinal-ideological and Weltanschauung factors contribute to clarifying the reasons for the N.U. victory. In conclusion it may be said that it is this character of santri culture followed by N.U., which is much closer to the character of the general folk culture of Javanese society, which answers the surprise of people who have seen N.U. come up with such a successful victory in the General Elections of 1955.

The remaining inquiry will revolve around structural and institutional aspects of santri culture. It will examine the function and position of the kijahi (ulama) as spiritual leaders of the people in village society and as the connecting link with the outside world. It will also examine the role of the langgar, pesantren and various santri institutions in forming the character of the santris and kijahis and their impact on the development of the spiritual life among the people in general.

FOOTNOTES :

1. Clifford Geertz, Modjokuto:Religion in Java, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Mass., 1958, p. x.
2. Ibid., p. X1.
3. H.J.Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 14.
4. See, B.Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, chs. 1-3; J.C.van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955; B.H.M.Vlekke, Nusantara, ch. 4; H.J.Benda, ibid., part I; and R.A.Kern, De Islam in Indonesia, The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1947.
5. Geertz, op.cit., pp. X111-X1V.
6. Cf., Benda, op.cit., pp. 15-16; 84-87.
7. R.A.Kern, "penghulu", Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam. Cf., Benda, ibid., p. 14.
8. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
9. This comparative study was made to a great detail by Clifford Geertz in his book, Modjokuto: Religion in Java, op.cit.
10. H.Kramer, Agama Islam, Badan Penerbit Kristen, Djakarta, 1952, pp. 244 sqq; H.Djajadiningrat, "Islam in Indonesia", in K.Morgan, Islam the Straight Path.
11. Djajadiningrat, ibid.; Kramer, ibid., p. 255.

11a. Barzandji is a homage for the prophet written in Arabic by a a native from Barzandj in Persia.

12. Hamka, Ajahku, Widjaja, Djakarta, 1950, pp. 11 sqq.
13. Benda, op.cit., p. 17.

14. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century, Leiden, 1931, p. 291.
15. See, Benda, op.cit., p.48.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Supra, p.   ; Benda, ibid., pp. 49-50.
21. Benda, ibid., p. 50.
22. Ibid., p. 51.
23. For more detailed analyses of these differences, see, C.Geertz, Modjokuto: Religion in Java, ch. 12, pp. 264-291.
24. Geertz mentions as "kuburan lan gandjaran" (grave and gift), ibid., p. 268.
25. One who follows the right line of taqdir.
26. Muhammad Abduh, Risalah al Tauhid, pp. 42-43, as quoted from C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 153.
27. Geertz, op.cit., p. 273.
28. Al Quran, "This day I have perfected your religion for you and completed My favor to you. I have chosen Islam to be your faith", surah V, verse 4. Tr. , The Koran, a new translation by N.J.Dawood, The Penguin Classics, 1956, p. 374.
29. Al Hadith, Al Islamu 'ala wala yu'la 'alaihi.
30. One of the qaidah (definition) of usul fiqh.
31. A speech delivered by K.H.Machfuzh Siddiq in the 14th Congress of

N.U. in Magelang; see, Verslag Kongres N.U. ke 14 di Magelang, p. 19.

32. Berita N.O., no. 19-20, 1938, Hoofdbestuur N.O.

33. This is also the general notion of Muslim intellectuals outside Masjumi and N.U. who consider that an Islamic State is equal to a theocratic State. For this discussion, see, Moh.Natsir, Some Observations Concerning the role of Islam in National and International Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Univ., 1954), Data Paper no. 16; speeches of Moh.Natsir and Zainal Abidin Ahmad in the Constituent Assembly, Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, I , pp.109-141; pp. 353-375.

34. Cf., Moh.Hatta, Islam, Democracy and Society, Indonesian Embassy, New Delhi, p.

35. Geertz, op.cit., p. 277.

36. Poetoesan Congres Nahdlatoel Oelama ka 10 di Solo Soerakarta, 1935, Hoofdbestuur N.O., 1935.

37. Ibid., p.13

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Berita Nahdlatoel Oelama, no.19-20, VII, August 15, 1938, "Congres nummer".

41. Ibid., p. 17. Cf., the 8th question raised in the XIV Congress in Magelang, Verslag Kongres, pp. 18-19.

41a. Ibid., p.15.

42. Ibid., p. 16.

43. Verslag Congres ke XIV dikota Magelang, Hoofdbestuur N.O., 1939.

44. This question was long an enigma for the Muslim *ummat* as to the exact meaning and the purpose of presenting such a title to the President.

45. *Supra*, the 25th question .

46. *Cf.*, the 6th question raised in the Solo Congress, as to the question on listening to radio.

47. C.C.Adams, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

48. Geertz, *op.cit.*, p. 288.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

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V. The role of the Kijahis and Santris as the spiritual holders of the rural life, and its meaning to the success of N. U.

Various factors which assured the victory of the N.U. in the General Elections have been discussed above. One of them is the part played by the Kijahis and the santris in the rural areas. The emphasis which was always gravitated on religious appeals, automatically caused the Kijahis to come forward and take an important part in the election campaign. This important role played by the Kijahis can only be compared if we think back to the times of the armed conflict against the Dutch in the first years of the recent revolution, when the religious leaders took the part of the moving force of the spirit of the masses and were the spiritual leaders in the front lines.[1]

The questions which will be raised here are: What kind of influence and power did they have? What was their position and functions in the society and particularly in the rural areas? The answer to these questions, it is hoped, will clarify the basic problems which are raised in this thesis, that is, by finding the reasons for the victories and the successes of the N.U. in the elections of 1955.

Before proceeding any further, several terms which will be used here must first be explained. The term santri, as used above, refers to a group of people in Java who profess the most serious devotion to Islam, observing the rituals of prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, etc. The other groups in Java are the abangan and the prijaji, who have a more

superficial attitude toward Islam. The conception of santri expressed here is the one which is common and generally held. The term santri however is also used in a narrower sense. It refers also to the students in the religious schools called pondok or pesantren. (In Madura the term for these schools is penjantren; in Pasundan, pondok; in Atjeh, rangkang meunasah and in Minangkabau, surau).[2] Thus, the pesantren is the place where the santri pursue religious studies. There they remain and there they obtain various types of spiritual, mental, and, to some extent, also physical education. Their teachers, who at the same time are their leaders, guardians and trainers, in the pesantren, are called Kijahis.

"Traditionally, and still to an extent today," says Geertz, "the santris live at the pondok in cloister-like dormitories, cook their own food, and wash their own clothes. They gain their sustenance by working in the fields of the Kijahis or other leading Moslems of the community, by craftwork such as cloth-dyeing, cigarette-making, and tailoring, and by contributions of rice and money from their families at home. The Kijahi is not paid, and the students pay no tuition; all the costs of the institution are borne by pious members of the ummat as part of the religious duties included under the zakat, the religious tax."[3] While Kern writes: "It is considered very reprehensible to give instruction in sacred learning for an agreed fee. Nevertheless, most of the teachers are well to do. Pious gifts are liberally given to them on account of the blessing they bring. The teacher is a most welcome guest at religious feasts, of which there are many in Javanese life. All appeal at all

times to his learning or for his intercession, gifts accompany these appeals. New arrivals among the students, if they can afford it, make their offering; sons of the better situated parents bring back presents when they go home, and poor students work in the teacher's fields."[4)]

The manner of studying in these pesantrens is not like in the ordinary schools. There the santris study freely. There are no particular rules to bind them. There are no divisions into classes, and no diploma is given. They can stay and study there for several days or for several years. Study for them is a religious duty. Therefore the diploma which they seek is not one which is to be received in this world from the hands of their teachers, but in the hereafter directly from the hands of the Lord. It thus has become customary for most santris to study not from one kijahi alone. They move from one teacher to another, from one pondok to another. A teacher usually specializes in one subject or several specific subjects, and another teacher in another subject. Many or a few teachers he visited during his school time was the fact that often counted as a measure to determine his reputation, if at some time he becomes a kijahi in turn. In order to show love and respect to a teacher, we find that a santri will not infrequently put the name of his teacher after his own, a sign that he is a pupil or a former pupil of that teacher.

It is not necessary that all santris become kijahis in turn. Many of them quickly enter society, engage in business, farming, become merchants, entrepreneurs, etc. But there will always be those who wish

to continue with their studies.

In addition to studying, these also teach; they become assistants to the Kijahi at the place where they study. When the time comes, they also open their own school, and the title of Kijahi is attached to them. The number of santri who come to study with him to a certain point can again be said to be the measure of whether or not he has a good reputation, whether his knowledge is valued or not. If a kijahi has a name, his school is attended not only by santris from the surrounding neighborhood, but also by santris from other areas, or even from other schools. It is not infrequent that we find a rivalry between one religious school and another. Sometimes this rivalry leads to races, sometimes it leads to hostility; a sign that their institutions are far from inert.

As a kijahi, he is not only stuck to his school alone. He is not a priest who has to devote all his time and his life to his pondok, and confines himself within its four walls. From the daily routine seen from his pondok it is obvious that his duty confines only to supervision and giving lectures to his pupils. While the affairs of every day life, from the supervision of the cleaning to the discipline and the safety of the school, is almost entirely handed over to the students collectively. Usually the santri who is the oldest and who has studied for the longest time in the school and to whom the kijahi entrusts the duty of being his representative (guru tua) whenever he is absent, is the one acts as the chief. And the committee (student board) which is responsible in the various aspects of life in the school is chosen alternately from among the santris.

Life in pesantren follows its own tempo. The activities of the pesantren usually begin even before dawn. It is interesting to follow the daily routine as Kern describes it:

"After the salat al Subh which the teacher himself conducts and which is followed by a dhikr, the lectures begin. The teacher takes the beginners one after the other and after their lesson they return to the pondok; here they go over what they have learned by themselves or with a more advanced student or with the head of the pondok until noon. The students then have their midday meal, the santri of each pondok forming one mess; this is practically speaking their only meal. All then go to chapel to the salat al zuhr. They are summoned to three further salat in the course of the day. The intervals between them are devoted to lectures and study. The more advanced students are taken together by the teacher; he reads the Arabic text, translates it and add any necessary notes of explanation. After the salat al'isja the day's work is over and the students retire for the night. Some santri may still be engaged on little tasks which may bring them in something, soon these also stop and quiet reigns over all.... Friday brings a variation in this monotonous round; all go to the nearest Friday mosque to attend the salat al djum'a. Harvest is also a busy time for the santri; they work in the rice fields or beg for zakat. Many santri go home in the month of the fast."[5)]

The life of the santri in general is most simple. Luxury is always considered an obstacle. Thus the teaching of the zuhud and the qanaah influences the life of the santri. In this connection one is reminded of the autobiography of an educated Indonesian, Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat,[6)] who, although he himself was a bangsawan (nobleman), nevertheless in his youth as a santri did not live differently from his fellow-santris. He, like the other santris, on certain days went around the village and market to beg for food and zakat (alms) in order to support himself while he is away cloistering in pondok. For the villagers, to give food and alms to the santri was a way to receive blessing. "Their begging is not considered a nuisance; they are assisted readily for they are acquiring sacred learning; to

give to them brings a blessing,"[7] says Kern.

Although life was simple in every respect and avoided luxury, it is not true that the santri were educated to disregard life in this world completely. For "menjantri" or to be a santri is not the same as to be a monk. There are two principles which are given importance in the pesantren life: first, the student must stand on his own two feet (individuality); second, the student is a member of society (solidarity). The first principle leads the student to be mature, thrifty and self-sufficient (qanaah), and industrious. The third fundamental maxim of Islam, to fast, develops the character trait of enduring suffering and being satisfied with what they have.[8] The fourth basic maxim, to give alms, from the other angle also means to grow the desire to be rich and thrifty. The fifth maxim, to go on pilgrimages to Mecca, is a craving which every santri wishes to satisfy. But it can be satisfied only if they are industrious and thrifty. These maxims are already cultivated as long as they are santri and immediately after they leave the religious school or finish their studies, they plunge into society, engage in business, farming, etc. They show themselves to be a group which is industrious and hardworking. The large number of farmer santri who have the means to fulfill the duty of a pilgrimage to Mecca is sufficient proof that they are an industrious, energetic and thrifty group, the seeds of which were planted in the religious schools. It can also be said from another point of view that the teachings of Islam and their business instincts influence and

strengthen each other. In his description of the traits of the santri Geertz writes:

> "Speaking concretely, the financial demands of the ever more attractive pilgrimage induced into the santri family a distinct emphasis on a value the Javanese call gemi. Gemi, which means obsessive thrift, was if anything disvalued by the abangan, who usually despised the santri as a solemn miser hoarding his money merely to gain useless prestige from having completed a fool's errand, but for the santri it was a central concern. For him it was a source of pride to work hard, dress simply, eat sparingly, and to avoid large ceremonial and festival expenditures. A man who by such means saved enough money to go to Mecca for a year or so at the age of fifty or sixty was immensely respected by the rural Moslem community."[9)]

The second principle is to live as a member of society. In pesantren the santri study together, live together and occupy the same quarters. There are no rule to bind them except the rules and discipline which they themselves enforce collectively. To live showing consideration for one another,--solidarity and fraternity--these are guiding principles in the pesantren life. Supervision such as we observe in boarding schools or in public schools is not to be found in pesantrans. If there usually is such a thing as discipline in the pesantrens, it is imposed on the part of the santri themselves, which, as has been mentioned above, takes the form of an alternately elected Student Board under the leadership of a senior santri. Their consciousness that they go to the pesantren not only with the intention to acquire religious knowledge but also to prepare themselves to be kijahis and leaders of the ummat in their future, nevertheless, generates the leadership trait in their soul. On certain days they get practice in debating and in the science of public speaking. Those who have real

talent and who are already adept at speaking or delivering religious lectures (pengadjian) are usually taken along by the kijahi when he goes from village to village to deliver his sermon or recite the scriptures, and before the kijahi gets up to speak the santri comes forward to take his part. The santri who is spirited and able to attract the attention of the audience is quickly liked by the people of the village. By these means he in turn, quickly or slowly, obtains his title of kijahi, a title not gained by a diploma, but by the consensus or bestowal of society itself.

These two traits are the characteristics of the life of the society of the santri, which in their essence have become apparent from the life of the kijahi. In themselves the kijahi find the characteristics of individuality (not individualism) that is to say, industriousness, thriftiness and diligence, and the characteristics of leadership. These two characteristics, if they are instilled in the lower classes, are either not possessed by them at all or only to a small degree. These characteristics are distant from the abangan's in general, whether on account of their poverty--caused by the centuries of colonial oppression: forced labor, rodi, mental oppression, etc., and the oppression from their own aristocracy--or whether on account of the heritage of their culture influenced by old beliefs (animism-Buddhism-Hinduism), which can be characterized as "suka nrima" (readily accepted whatever the fate will be). It will not be astonishing, therefore, if they, the abangans, for economic, social, and even for spiritual reasons,

had a feeling of inferiority and in many respects were under the influence of the *santri* class.

If we are conscious of this matter and remember again the hypothesis which was raised previously[10)]--namely, that the local struggles for influence among the principal political parties--the P.N.I., P.K.I., N.U., Masjumi--was in fact centered among the peasantry (the *abangan* class)--then it is appropriate if the further investigation of the concomitant circumstances is directed toward answering the following question: To what extent is the influence of the *santri* class felt among the peasantry? Or to turn the question around, to what extent is the peasantry dependent upon the *santri* class--especially the *kijahis* and the rich *hadjis*--in their economical, social, political and spiritual lives?

1) *Economic factors*:

With the gradual spread of the influence of Islam from the coastal regions of Java to the interior, to the villages, in the centuries gone by, came the gradual increase of the power of business-men over the economic life of the country people.[11)] As the merchants slowly spread into the interior, they used the religious schools as a place to stop in and stay over, just as the Hindu Buddhist priests had done before them. The religious schools had at first been Hindu-Buddhist monasteries but with the taking over of the Javanese kings, Java became Islamized, and the monasteries became the places for Islamic religious training, "a new wine in old bottles" in the words of Geertz. On account of this

habit the connections between the merchants and peddlers and the _santri_ became close. In fact not infrequently the _santri_ took part in the work of the merchant, thereby earning their living. Their trading nets were gradually expanded to remote villages. Everywhere in the markets there were new shops, selling goods imported from other areas, and bringing the agricultural products and handiwork of the village people for export to other areas in turn. _Pasar_ (market) and _pesantren_ now had the important function of being the channel by means of which the culture of the coast was spread, a culture which was aggressive, cosmopolitan and characterized by trade and having the air of the Levant. Those who were already established in the interior, besides steadily fastening their attention on wholesale business, slowly also began to turn their attention to farming, rice-growing, and handicrafts, for these matters were closely connected with economic life of the village. Because of the long experience in trade and the cunningness of these _santri_-merchants, together with the consequence of the agricultural system (_cultuur-systeem_, forced plantings) of the colonial government, the land was step by step gained by them. And the farmers of the village in large numbers became tenants on lands and rice fields formerly owned by themselves. After the rice growing season had finished they would seek employments in _santris'_ enterprises or in Dutch plantations. It can therefore be said that this _santri_ class had no competition in their influence on the economy of the countryside except for Arab and Chinese commission agents who were moving into the

villages. The first reason for this is the weakness of the peasantry itself; the second, is the attitude toward life on the part of the prijajis, who confined themselves solely to "alus" (fine)[12] matters. Business, agriculture, manufacture, etc., was taken by them to be "kasar" (coarse).[13] For this reason they originally were not attracted to these endeavors. The source of their livelihood was principally the civil service (pamong-pradjan). The manufacture of fine batik (batik alus or batik tulis) which they classify as artwork can be considered an exception to this which is generally agreed as their privilege. Usually this cloth was made by ladies of rank (putri2 prijaji) in their homes as an object for expressing their feeling of beauty. However, "with the development simpler and faster methods of production and the expansion of the market for batik beyond the court," as is explained by Geertz, "the santris more and more pushed their way into the industry, until today many of the largest concerns are santri-run; but the low level prijaji, somewhat accidentally in on the ground floor, managed to hold on to a certain part of the business."[14] Furthermore it must also be remembered that with a present-day governmental structure of socialistic (pantjasila?)--not liberal--tendency, the government has already become thoroughly involved in the economic management of the country, dipping into the fields of industry, agriculture, import-export internal commerce, transportation, etc., for which many a prijaji, who during the Dutch administration had been at an advantage of having the opportunity to attend schools provided for them, have been catapulted into a considerable economic administrative position. To these

advantages were also added the posts which they generally occupied: lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers, accountants, bookkeepers, clerks, etc., which from the economic point of view should also be counted.

However, if we again see the over-all picture of the national economy, which takes place about 30% to 35% of the whole economic strength in Java, the largest portion of it was in the hands of the _santri_. Thus, it is not surprising, in this connection, that the words _santri_, _hadji_ and _kijahi_ have taken on the meaning of _madjikan_ (employer), _wong sugih_ (rich man), or _kapitalis nasional_ in the every day language, whereas the peasantry class--workers, peasant-workers, and village peasants--is _rakjat djembel_ or _rakjat marhaen_ (the poor, the proletarians), to borrow the term created by President Sukarno.

Now, what is the influence of this on their social relations?

2) _Social, political and religious factors._

From the economic observation, above, it is clear that the _abangans_ were dependent upon the _santris_. This dependence manifested itself in the relations between workers and employers, peasants and landlords, purchasers and shop- and market-keepers, and borrowers and lenders. Such relations, which were evidently far from well-balanced would automatically affect their social relations as well. This question becomes more complex when we also realize that the _santris_ were those who controlled not only the economic life of the _abangans_,

but also had influence and function in the spiritual and religious lives as well as in politics and government.

In order to observe this point more closely it is necessary first to describe various social and religious institutions which are closely connected with the function of the <u>kijahis</u> as 'spiritual controllers' of the villagers. The role of <u>pesantren</u> as center for religious training of the <u>santri</u> has been considerably touched upon above. Here, however, before discussing the role of <u>langgar</u>, <u>mesdjid</u> and <u>pengulon</u>, and various social and religious institutions which are closely connected with them, it is necessary first to touch on the development of <u>pesantren</u> into <u>madrasah</u> and <u>sekolah</u> up to the establishment of Islamic institutes of higher learning (Islamic Colleges) as a product of the impact of various views and culture brought in from outside--such as Abduh's Islamic modernism and Western modernism. Thence, eventually, we will step towards the discovery of political role of the <u>kijahi</u> and <u>santri</u>, especially in the village level, which within the scope of this thesis is culminating on the holding the General Elections of 1955, as a barometer of the strength of various groups with political power in Indonesian society.

a. <u>Pesantren, madrasah, sekolah.</u>

The life of the <u>pesantren</u>, which went on calmly and solitarily in the long run, experienced pressure and impact from outside. That pressure and impact grew stronger, so that quickly or slowly the <u>pesantren</u> life underwent changes, both in spirit and form. In the first phase,

we have already seen the increased contact with Arabia and other Islamic nations of the Middle East which was made possible by the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1860's. Each year the number of djama'ah (pilgrims) who made the pilgrimage to Mecca grew larger, and among them were some who could remain there to study the knowledge of Islam. These persons, reinforced by the increasing number of Arab-Hadramaut immigrants who came to Indonesia, had strengthened the position of orthodoxy in Indonesia.[15] Their first target was the pesantrens. And from there, they launched reform movements for the elimination of the influences of bid'ah (innovations) and khurafat (superstitions), and mystical pantheistic--heretical currents which were not compatible with Islamic monotheism. Books of fiqh, especially from the school of Shafi'i, books of ilmu kalam, tafsir, and tasawwuf, which were imported (sometimes smuggled) from Arabia and Egypt, now became the basic texts in the pesantrens. And Arabic, therefore, became the language of pesantren. By means of the pilgrimages the influence even of Arab culture penetrated the pesantrens--i.e. Arab dress, the gambus, dances, qasidah, dates, and so forth, which in time became an element in the cult of the santri.[16]

The second phase began with the entry of modern ideas from Egypt (Djamaluddin Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh) in the beginning of the twentieth century. This pressure and impact felt in pesantren life was not only in its spirit, but also in its form. And this matter was further intensified by similar pressures from the influence of Westernism introduced by the implementation of the 'Ethical Policy' of the Dutch government.[17] In 1912 was founded the Sarekat Islam[18] and was formed as a

mass organization and a political movement. In the same year the Muhammadijah movement[19] was also set up in order to carry out the ideals of Abduh in Indonesia. These two movements brought about many changes, especially in the social and educational fields. The schools they founded no longer devoted themselves exclusively to religious teachings and Arabic, but included the subjects which were also taught in the government schools.

The schools they founded fall into two or three categories: the first imitated exactly the government schools or those founded by Christian missions, with the addition of vak agama (religious subjects) and Islamic ethics. The second was the school formerly called madrasah, in which the pupils were trained to become religious teachers (muallimin for boys, and muallimat for girls) and missionaries of Islam (muballighin), and various special schools for girls. In the madrasahs of Muhammadijah, vak agama were given about the same emphasis as vak umum (general subjects). As for the methods of studying, its buildings, its instruments, all followed the new methods which were seen in government schools. The Muhammadijah schools went from the primary level to senior high. And what is more, even in the period of Dutch colonial government, Muhammadijah planned to establish a Muhammadijah University, the plan of which was only realized after indepence. In addition to the Colleges already established, Muhammadijah now had various other 'B-I Courses', all of which were in harmony with the government's plan of instruction.[20]

The spread of the influence of Muhammadijah which clearly was the basic vehicle of the bringers of modernism in Islam, on the other hand, was felt by the pesantren group to be a direct attack on the foundation and the structure of their religious life. The opposition between these two blocs continued to mount until the end of the 1920's when it resulted in the birth of the Nahdlatul Ulama movement, which aimed at awakening the "sleeping ulama" to cooperate and organize in the face of the "dangers" which came from the modern group.[21] The rise of the organization of these two opposing powers demonstrates that each was looking for backing and support from the santri class and that each regarded the abangan as an object to be "Islam-ized".[22] Among the santri themselves, the general tendency was that the Muhammadijah received the backing of those santri who were called moderen--who in strictly religious matters were directly oriented to the Quran and Hadith and who placed greater emphasis on the original forms in religious life, while in secular affairs wished to make Islam consistent with modern times and conditions, while N.U. held the support from the so-called kolot--conservative santri--who in religious matters followed the scholastic-mazhabite teachings (Shafi'ite) and in secular affairs were suspicious and restrained and who saw Islam as an all-inclusive teaching.[23] Therefore, from still another aspect this means that the Muhammadijah had more of an urban character and was supported by the elite minority of the santri, while N.U. had a rural character and was supported by the grass-roots majority of the santri. Yet, up to a point it is certain that this difference also has a geographical character, in the sense that one village may be dominated by the

other.

Nevertheless, a difference which is purely in the structural-institutional sphere certainly cannot be a basic element.[24] From the conservative side, the N.U., whether clandestinely or openly, whether slowly or quickly, has also adopted the means carried out by Muhammadijah, which in the end not only resembles competition but also a race. The type of pesantren resembling the typical one described above, which taught nothing but religious studies, and with the traditional methods, now began to be hard to find. Many N.U. pesantrens had already begun to adapt to modern times. Moreover, one would be surprised to see the flourishing of N.U. pesantrens such as the Pesantren Tebuireng in Djombang, which from the beginning has been a center of education and training for N.U. santris,[25] now so modernly organized, with a modern building and not less than 2000 students. The Pesantren Tebuireng in the beginning was founded in 1906 by the founder of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Kijahi Hadji Hasjim Asj'ari, and had only one simple house divided into two parts, one part as a residence for Kijahi Asj'ari and the other as a musalla, a place for santris to pray, to study, and even to sleep. A description of the conditions at Tebiureng is given by Hadji Abubakar as follows:[26]

"In addition to the old-fashioned studies in Pesantren Tebuireng there were madrasah, religious schools organized in an up-to-date fashion, with attractive buildings, classes, desks, and blackboards, for all levels of study. There were primary madrasahs, as well as secondary and senior ones. The pupils came from all corners of Indonesia. As a language of

instruction, Indonesian was used, and for several courses Arabic was used. Foreign languages were also taught in that madrasah as general studies. Sanawijah, or the middle section, for example, was divided into two parts: A and B. Sanawijah part A had 75% religious studies and 25% general studies, while part B was the opposite, because the general instruction in part B was adapted to the instruction in the State Junior High Schools (Sekolah Menengah Pertama) part B (mathematics), so that the pupils could easily take the national schools' examinations.

"From this we can see that Tebuireng was a kind of little Al Azhar University, which contained two kinds of study, the " 'Am " section (pesantren fashion) which was not based on its time or on science, given in the mosque or near it, and the "nizam" section (madrasah or school fashion), which was special and based on its own time and the sciences, having its special building and special classes, having conditions for entering and requirements for graduating from its courses".

In the post revolutionary time, the N.U.'s activities in the field of education can be said to be so energetic that even N.U. now has its own university, in Solo, in addition to several B-I courses, various normal and intermediary schools, etc., which were spread through many cities in the country.

What really remains as a basic difference between N.U. (the conservative group) and Muhammadijah (the modern group) is found in their difference in the way of looking at religious as well as secular problems. This difference is partly merely one of gradualism, but is also

also partly fundamental, and also it is not unusually only a result of factors of history or sentiment. The writer, in this matter, does not agree with Benda who speaks of "the rift at no time extending to the doctrinal field proper."[27] The bases of this difference have been analyzed in the last chapter and need not be repeated here.

b. Langgar, mesdjid, pengulon.

If the pesantren holds the special function of a place to teach and train for santris and kijahis, the langgar and mesdjid (mosque) have many purposes. They are the house of worship (rumah ibadat), the place a Moslem carries out his prayer five times a day, and once a week it is a place of meeting, to pray and listen to khutbah on Friday. There is usually a difference between langgar and mesdjid.[28] One prays in the langgar only at the five appointed times, while in the mesdjid it is also used for djum'at gatherings. Ine one village, in addition to one mesdjid, there are commonly found two or three langgars. In general, a langgar is smaller, simpler in construction, and often is owned by just one person (a kijahi). Even there are langgars formed from one corner of a house, which are meant by the owner to be a hibah[29] or wakap[30] for the 'house of the Lord'. And in every pesantren, there is certain to be a langgar, whether located on the pesantren grounds or near it. In this mosque, twice yearly it is used for Hari Raya prayers (Idul Fitri, I Shawal and Idul Adha, 9 Zul-Hiddjah). The Muhammadijah modernists, however, prefer to hold it out-of-doors, in aloon-aloons or public squares, while the conservatives (N.U.) still meet in the mosques.[31]

The langgar and mesdjid are also the place for holding pengadjians (Jav. pengaosan; Ar., tabligh), which, in Geertz's explanation, "related the Javanese ummat to the wider Islamic world and defined the nature of orthodoxy for it." He continues, "Through the returned hadji-kijahi, the concepts of orthodoxy current in the world capital of Islam filtered down to the mass of the ummat, first to his santris, then to the rest of the population through the mosques and langgars, which were the real terminal points of the communication network."[32)] This pengadjian, which ordinarily was held once or twice a week, sometimes was held specifically for men or for women only, or at other times for both separated by a curtain. The mosque and langgar which were the "nucleus of rural Islamic social structure," in other matters were also a place of meeting to discuss social problems, political problems, and for various other religious ceremonies. In the mosque and langgar the penghulus[33)] performed marriages, divorces, and reconciliation (Nikah, Talaq, Rudju', N.T.R.), determined the division of inheritances, and so on. And, least but not least, this mosque and langgar were also used by unmarried youths as their dormitory and place to sleep at night.

Concerning the regulation of the mosque, in Java and Madura there is some difference from the system in the other islands. Kern explains the difference as follows:

> "In Java and Madura, they form a regular hierarchy; this holds also for the relation of the larger and smaller mosques to each other. A mosque serves the requirements of a definite area; the staff of the mosque at the chief place in a smaller district is subordinate to that of a larger one and so on up to the capital of a regency (which is the highest native administrative unit).

> At each mosque a superintendent is appointed and the head of the mosque at the capital of the regency is regarded as head of all the mosque officials in the whole district. On the other islands the native, political organization is less developed, the hierarchy of the secular power therefore less influenced by it. Generally speaking the personnel of the mosque is the same everywhere; the more the secular hierarchy is graded, the more noticeable is the classification of the personnel of the different mosques into various ranks; but we always find one recognised as the head of the staff."[34)]

The system of ruling the mosque in prewar times as described by Kern, _mutatis_ _mutandis_ is valid today. The _pengulu_, or _penghulu_, who is the head of the mosque is, in general, also a government official from the Ministry of Religion and holds official power to determine matrimonial problems (N.T.R.). Besides attending and registering the marriage ceremony, he sometimes also acts as _wakil_, _wali_, or _wali_ _hakim_.[35)] However, the _penghulu_ himself does not always, and in fact rarely, perform the marriage ceremony in person. Ordinarily he turns over this task to a subordinate (_penghulu_ _naib_, or _naib_). And his place or office, which ordinarily is located in a part of the mosque or beside it, where these things are taken care of, is called _pengulon_ as _kenaiban_. Unlike that of the majority of the people, the marriage contract (_akad nikah_)[36)] ceremony for those of the upper classes (_prijaji_) is ordinarily held in their home, and in this instance, it is the _penghulu_ himself who officiates.[37)]

There are several other posts connedted with the mosque, like _imam_ (prayer leader), _katib_ (or _khatib_, who reads the _khutbah_), _kadi_ (or _qadi_, namely _penghulu_ or _penghulu naib_, who deals with marriages and acts as judge in religious jurisdiction) _bilal_, or _modin_ (or _muadzin_,

who calls the people to pray by proclaiming the adzān, and who becomes the mosque's janitor), and so forth.[38] These posts need not be described here. However, some attention to the machinery of the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the lower level should be given here, as a stepping stone for discussing and delving deeper into the function and position of the kijahi on the political and administrative level in the villages.

c. Kementerian Agama (the Ministry of Religious Affairs), its power and influence in the villages:

With the existence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs in the "Pantjasila" based Republic, Indonesia was a unique secular religiously neutral state.[39] Although in principle a secular, one not based on religion, nevertheless its position, with regard to religions and religious movements is actively characterized by a helpful and protective attitude and this is proved by the work carried out by the Ministry.

Viewed from internal departmental organization, the Ministry covers four main fields. First, the Djawatan Urusan Agama (Department of Religious Affairs) which handles the problems of N.T.R., Wakaf, Mesdjid, pilgrimage and general administration such as the collection of various statistics on the number of religious schools, the number of teachers and students in those religious schools, the number of children circumcized, and so on. As is understood, the technical arrangements of pilgrimage are organized by the government in great details. Secondly,

the *Djawatan Pendidikan Agama* (Department of Religious Education), which supervises government owned religious schools, like P.G.A. for training religious teachers, S.G.H.A. for training religious judges, a State College of Islamic Studies (*Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri*) in Jogjakarta, and an Academy of Religion (*Akademi Ilmu Agama*) in Djakarta, provides religious teachers in government public schools; subsidizes private religious schools; provides *imams* for prisons, the armed forces, the police, and so on; prints and circulates school books which relate to religion, religious ethics; and so on. Thirdly, the *Djawatan Penerangan Agama* (Department of Religious Information), which works to publish pamphlets, booklets, posters, and the like, concerning Islam provides the *khutbah* texts for use in mosques if the mosque officer should request it. Fourthly, the *Biro Peradilan Agam* (Bureau of Religious Justice), which handles religious courts in each *kabupaten*, and a *Mahkamah Islam Tinggi* (High Religious Court) in Solo. These courts give advice and settle lawsuits dealing with matrimonial problems of the Islamic community and certain other special religious cases.[40)]

Although there are four departments, only one the Department of Religious Affairs has offices straight through to the district; nevertheless, it is recognized that the influence of all the Departments on the spiritual and social life of the village people is very great. It is also these Departments which, properly speaking, open the door for the *kijahis* and religious leaders to sit at the table of government and gives them status as state "PGP" officials, one thing which, in the history of the *kijahi* occurred only after independence. Since this Ministry was

organized by the first Religious Minister, H. Mohd. Rasjidi, in 1946, many _kijahis_ have entered the Ministry. This is one Ministry, which since its inception, it can be said, was monopolized from top to bottom by just one special social class, that is the _santri_ class.[41] With the emergence of polarizing conflicts within the _santri_ group itself, which in broad outline was expressed in the disagreement between N.U. and Muhammadijah plus Masjumi, this Ministry also became the object of contending elements. Therefore, to a certain point, it can be said that the history of the Ministry is part of the history of their struggles. Finally, this Ministry also witnessed the two polar and dichotomized _santri_ personalities become two party blocs which sought their own roads, as a result of viewing with each other for the highest leadership of the Ministry.[42]

The political and psychological effects of the Ministry--and of the changing social and political structure of society as a whole--on the position of the _kijahi_ in the villages are not insignificant. Many situations which formerly were handled and faced alone by the _kijahi_ only because of his charismatic, or traditional charismatic, position which was simply and solely based on the faith in him held by the people, are now still handled by him but in his capacity as government representative for religious affairs. Formerly, the _kijahi_ was only the bearer of the new voices from Mecca as "a specialist in the communication of Islam to the mass of the peasantry,"[43] and on the other hand, he carried and introduced them to the wider world, now the _kijahi_ also sits at the table of government and concerns himself with the political problems of

the country. He now, no longer only forms an intermediary or "cultural broker" as Wolf and Geertz state,[44] who is a connecting link between the microcosmic world of the village and the macrocosmic world outside, but also holds the reins of political leadership in the villages.

What does this mean?

The changing role being played by the kijahi actually did not arise by itself. It was closely related to the changing structure and patterns of the society as a whole. It was made possible by the social changes which clearly emerged after the national struggle for independence had delivered to the Indonesian people a social organization where the reins of leadership from top to bottom was left in their own hands. High and middle level offices, which formerly were monopolized by the colonialists, now were filled by their own people. And it was logical, since the rising national movement during that period had been pioneered by those who belonged to the Western educated intellectual group, that members of this group now filled these vacancies. Through the great opportunities suddenly obtained to fill vacancies at the national level, they gradually left behind their traditional and local ties. Meanwhile that tendency toward a hiatus noted by social scientists who follow the social changes of newly arisen countries emerged between the national community characterized by an urban-centered social world, culturally sophisticated and industrialized and a local community which still retains its traditional, local and folkloristic culture. Robert Redfield,[45] for example, in analyzing the development of village society and its culture, tries to draw a formal distinction between the two types of community and tries

to find a third connecting type between the two which structurally appears to find its stable position. It can not yet be perceived who actually forms this third group for Indonesian society as a whole, who "stand guard over the crucial junctures of synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole,"[46] but for Javanese society in particular, among the candidates, according to Geertz, is "the same man who mediated one of Indonesia's two classical great traditions: the local Moslem teacher, or kijahi."[47]

> "In his classical role," he says, "the kijahi fits most exactly Redfield's specifications: he is a specialist in the communication of Islam to the mass of the peasantry. As an established religious scholar directing his own religious school, he has long occupied the focal position in the social structure of tradition through which the monotheistic, exclusivist Moslem creed has penetrated the tolerant, syncretist-minded countryside. Insofar as Java has in fact been part of the great, Mecca-centered international world of Islam--and it has been so only in part and to a degree--it has been the kijahi who has been the main connecting link, who has joined the local system to the larger whole. And it is upon his performance of this broker function that his enormous prestige and power in the countryside has rested."[48]

> "But," Geertz continues, "over the past fifty years or so, his role has began to change. Under the pressure of nationalism, Islamic modernism, and the whole complex of social transformations which have taken place in Indonesia in this century, he is becoming, or attempting to become, a new kind of broker for a different sort of society and a different sort of culture, that of the nationality centered, metropolitan-based, intelligensia-led "New Indonesia." And, as such, he has increasingly found himself occupying a new social role pregnant with possibilities both for securing and enhancing his social power and prestige, and for destroying the essential foundations of it: that of local party leader. In this effort of the kijahi to combine the role of traditional religious scholar with that of nationalist politician are mirrored many of the conflicts and contradictions which characterise the contemporary, rapidly changing Indonesian society in general."[49]

The changing position exhibited by the kijahi on entering the

political field--especially in the villages--must be seen from the basic points of view. First, their attitude toward the conceptions of "state and church," formerly and now. Secondly, the political situation which propelled them to take this opportunity.

Formerly, while the state was under foreign control, the kijahi, intentionally or not, had drawn a sharp line dividing state and church. The state was something which must be labeled kafir and nadjis (infidel and impure) and must be avoided, while the church, that is Islam, must be defended against all outside influences. This situation can partly be explained by the negative and suspicious attitudes toward Islam and the kijahi held by the rulers themselves--including within this group, the Dutch Christian missionaries, the Western educated intellectuals, and the Indonesian feudal aristocrats who held power in the lower echelons of government. It is also partly explained by the kijahi who felt that the church (Islam) could only be saved if it was isolated from all outside influences, especially those of Western secularism and Islamic reformism. As a result, the kijahi were driven to become true experts in ummat life, to guide and control their spiritual life and to associate themselves with an Islamic world through pesantrens, langgars and the pilgrimage.

Now the state is in their own hands, as a result of the developing nationalist movement and struggle for independence, led by the Indonesian intellectual group. The question now faced by the kijahi is whether the sharp line between church and state should be removed, because part of the reasons for its existence are gone, with the exit of the infidel and

impure colonialist, or whether it should be maintained because the Republic of Indonesia which has been founded appears as a religiously secular and neutralist state. This question, apparently so easily formulated, appears to have entered the thoughts of the kijahi sufficiently so that they were split. Those who thought that the proclaimed Republic of Indonesia was a secular state, religiously neutral and not based on Islam and because of this was in reality the same as the former government by the infidel Dutch, finally chose their own road by founding Darul Islam (D.I.), Negara Islam Indonesia (N.I.I.),[50] and so on, whose strength has already been felt, in any case, by the Republic of Indonesia in West Java, Atjeh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, and so on. While those who chose the peaceful road, and believe that an Islamic Indonesian Republic must be fought for through legal channels within the Republic of Indonesia are reluctantly forced to devote their energies and thoughts to organizing a program of parliamentary, democratic battle in order to proceed in the direction of ummat ideals, i.e., a 'glorious Islamic state, willed by God (baldatun tayyibatun wa Rabbun ghafūr). And this means active participation in national political policy through sending representatives to Parliament and Constituent Assembly, entering government bodies, taking part in the battle for cabinet chairs and for representative positions overseas, and on the lower level, spreading its influence to the masses, through forming political parties, social, educational, cadre, labor, peasant, trade, youth and women's organizations, etc.

The struggle carried out through legal-democratic and parliamentary channels is in one way or the other intensified by the political and ideological conflicts in the country which have developed in the meantime: first between the parties which struggle for the secular Pantjasila State (nationalist, socialist, communist abangans) and the parties which fight for an Islamic State; and secondly among the Islamic parties themselves which in broad outline takes shape in the collision between the progressive intelligentsia of the Muhammadijah-Masjumi, and the conservative-kijahi N.U. The second of these finally separated the N.U. from the Masjumi and founded its own political party.

From all of this, it can be understood that the kijahi who formerly defended their fortresses (langgar and pesantren) now have taken an offensive attitude by entering the political fields which have been opened to them. And the N.U., from this point of view, is significant as a political party through offering the widest opportunity for kijahi to take on new roles as political leaders especially in villages, beside their old roles as spiritual and religious leaders in the villages. Or, to borrow Geertz' words: "The kijahi role is set now not only in the wholly religious (or economic and religious) institution of the pesantren, as a broker for Islamic civilization, but also in the political and religious institution of the prayer meeting, as a broker for the recently emerged national government. His relation to his ummat is now both more complex and more secular; in addition to being scholar, curer, and mystic teacher, he is now a politician."[51)]

And the victory achieved by the N.U. in the General Elections, in 1955, was actually the result of maximum effort by the kijahi in the village who staked their charm and charistmatic influence as the holders of village spiritual and political leadership.

FOOTNOTES :

1. The important role played by Hizbullah and Sabilillah People's Armies during the first years of Revolution which were led by kijahis and religious leaders, was highly recognized. Not to say that Bung Tomo, one of the prominent revolutionary leaders, utilized the spirit of jihad to encourage the people to go to the war, and employed the kijahis for propaganda purposes.
2. See, R.A.Kern, "Pasantren", Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp. 460-462; Abubakar, "Sedjarah Pesantren; Pengadjaran dalam Pesantren", Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, chs. 12 and 13, pp. 43 - 52; Clifford Geertz, Modjokuto: Religion in Java, ch. 14.
3. Geertz, ibid., p. 326.
4. R.A.Kern, op.cit., p. 461.
5. Ibid., pp. 460-61; cf., Geertz, op.cit., "Pondok: the traditional pattern", pp. 326, sqq.
6. Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat, Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Acmad Djajadiningrat, G.Kolff, Amsterdam and Batavia, 1936.
7. R.A.Kern, op.cit., p. 461.
8. The santris who live in pesantrens usually fast and pray not only on the certain appointed times and the required, obligatory,ones, but also in ordinary times and not required (sunnat). They frequently fast on every Thursday and Monday (Njenen Kemis).
9. C.Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behaviour in a Central Javanese Town", Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, 2, January, 1956, p. 145.

10. Supra, pp. 107-108; p. 126.

11. Concerning the analyses and descriptions of the spread of Islam by way of trading to the interiors, see, J.C.van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, esp. chs. 1, 2, 3, and 4; W.F.Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change, esp. ch. 8; B.Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, II, Book 2, ch. 4 (The Penetration of Islam in the Archipelago).

12 and 13. As to the philosophic meanings of "alus" and "kasar" in the Javanese culture, see, R.M.Koentjaraningrat, A Preliminary Description of the Javanese Kinship System, Cultural Report Series, Yale University, New Haven, 1957; C.Geertz, "Religious Belief...", op.cit., pp. 153 ff.; C.Geertz, Modjokuto, op.cit., III,(The Prijaji Variant).

14. Geertz, "Religious Belief...", ibid., p. 155.

15. See, H.J.Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 17. On the statistical accounts of the pilgrimage to Mekkah since 1878, see, Indische Verslag, 1941 (Batavia, 1942), II, p. 150. As to the importance of Mekka for the development of religious orthodoxy in Indonesia, see, Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century, (London, 1931), pp. 290 sqq; D.van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and its importance to the Neth.East Indies", The Asiatic Review, 36, 1940, pp. 588-97. See also, "The Arab Minority", Indonesia in the Modern World, I, pp. 250-74 (Van der Kroef).

16. See, Geertz, "Religious Experience versus Religious Behavior", Modjokuto, op.cit., pp. 278-84.

17. See, H.J.Benda, "Indonesian Islam and the Foundations of Dutch

Islamic Policy", and, "The Renaissance of Indonesian Islam", in The Crscent, op.cit , pp. 24, 34-40; B.H.M.Vlekke, Nusantara, pp. 328-29; Moh.Natsir, "Oleh2 dari Algiers", Capita Selecta, I, pp. 153, sqq.; G.H.Bousquet, A French View of the Netheralnds India, (Shanghai, 1940), a revised tr. of La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays-Bas (Paris: Paul Hartman, 1938).

18. On the origin and struggles of the Sarekat Islam, see, Timur Djailani, The Sarekat Islam Movement; Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism (McGill M.A.Thesis, 1959); J.Th.P.Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands Indie, 1931, pp.55-89, 311-338; J.M.van der Kroef,"The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics", The Western Political Quarterly, XI, 1, March, 1958, pp. 43 sqq.

19. On the role of Muhammadijah in Indonesian Islam, see, Abdul Mukti Ali, The Muhammadijah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction, (McGill M.A.Thesis, 1957); Blumberger, ibid., pp. 90-101, 339-47; L.H.Palmier, "Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadijah after Independence", Pacific Affairs, XXVII, 3, 1954; Encyclopaedia van Ned.Oost Indie, VI, pp. 267-70.

20. According to Suara Muhammadijah, Nov., 1952, the number of Muhammadijah schools throughout Indonesia in 1951, from lower to higher levels, was 2,004 , with 230,408 students and 4,144 teachers. See also, Federspiel, An Aspect of the Muhammadijah, an Islamic Society (an Essay submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill Univ., Montreal, 1959).

21. Supra, ch.1, p.3

22. Among the conservative santris many who believe that the abangans are not true Muslims, therefore they have to be proselytized.

23. Supra, ch. IV, pp. 147 sqq.; See also, J.M.van der Kroef, "Indonesia: Conservatism and Reform", Current History, June, 1957, pp. 357-63.

24. Regarding this, Benda for example says, "...On the other, in matters of organizations and even worship, N.U. was driven to copy the methods which had so signally contributed to the success of Muhammadijah..."; op.cit, p. 51.

25. It is not surprising that a great many of the contemporary N.U. leaders were graduates of Tebuireng. On the history and development of Pesantren Tebuireng, see H.Abubakar, Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, op.cit., pp. 77-98. Besides Tebuireng are also known Pondok Gontor and Termas.

26. Abubakar, ibid., pp. 94-95.

27. See, Benda, op.cit., p. 51.

28. In Sunda (West Java) the word for langgar is used tadjug, in Minangkabau, surau, and in Atjeh, rangkang.

29 and 30. On the meanings of hibah and waqf, see Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp. 624-28.

31. This is more debated in villages than in towns. In towns many N.U. members or sympathizers who go to aloon-aloon.

32. Geertz, Modjokuto, op.cit., p. 333.

33. In Sumatra the word penghulu means chief of the clan, while for the same purpose is used the Arabic term, Kadi. See, R.A.Kern, "Panghulu", in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp. 457-59.

34. R.A.Kern, "Masdjid in the Neth.Indie", Encyclopaedia of Islam, II, pp. ; cf., Geertz, Modjokuto, op.cit., pp. 332-336; G.F.Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica, ch. on "De Vrouw en de Moskee" (Leiden, 1934).
35. On the meaning of these terms, see, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, "Nikah", pp. 447-49; "Panghulu", pp. 457-59.
36. Ibid., "Nikah".
37. R.A.Kern, ibid., "Panghulu".
38. On the functions of these posts, see Shorter Encycl. of Islam, "Masdjid", "Pasantren", and "Panghulu".
39. The first pillar of Pantjasila is "Believe in God the Only One". The existence of a Ministry of Religion in a secular State, says the late K.H.A.Wahid Hasjim, former Minister of Relgious Affairs, is not common. It was true that before the establisment of Israil as a State, Indonesia on this matter was unique. On the origin and historical development of Kementerian Agama, see, Kementerian Agama, Penjaiaran Kem.Agama no.11; Pedoman Pendjabat Kantor2 Agama, 2 vols., Penerbitan Kem.Agama, 1955; Lapangan Pekerdjaan Kementerian Agama, Kem.Agama bg.Penerbitan, n.d.; Working Paper, Rentjana Lima Tahun (1955-1959) dari Kementerian Agama R.I., Kem.Agama, Djakarta.
40. See, Pedoman Pendjabat Kantor2 Agama, ibid.; Geertz, pp. 373 ff.
41. In this connection Geertz mentions, "...Although there are Protestant, Roman Catholic, and "Other Religions" Sections, the Ministry of Religion is for all intents and purposes a santri affair from top to bottom". Modjokuto, p. 373. Cf., J.M.van der Kroef, "Pantjasila", Indonesia in the Modern World, part II.

42. _Supra_, ch. I

43. Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji, the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker", _Comparative Studies in Society and History_, II, 2, Jan. 1960, p.230.

44. Eric Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society", _American Anthropologist_, vol.88, no.6, Dec. 1956, pp. 1065-78; Geertz, _ibid._, p. 229 and _fn._

45. R.Redfield, _Peasant Society and Culture_ (Univ.of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1956), esp. ch. 3; _cf._, Geertz, _ibid._, p. 229 and fn.

46. E.Wolf, _op.cit._, quot. from Geertz, _ibid._, p. 229.

47. Geertz, _ibid._, p.230.

48. and 49. _Ibid._, p.230.

50. See, C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, _Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia_ (The Hague/Bandung:W.van Hoeve, 1958), ch. on "The Darul Islam Movement in Western Java". The article was also found in _Pacific Affairs_, 23, 1950, pp. 164-84. See also, J.M.van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia", _Far Eastern Survey_, 22, 1953, pp. 121-25; "Muslim Movements in Indonesia", _Eastern World_, 8, 1954, pp. 18-20; "Communism and Islam in Indonesia: A Western View", _India Quarterly_, 10, 1954, pp. 314-52. Also, George McT.Kahin, _Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia_ (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952), pp. 327 ff.

51. Geertz, "The Javanese Kijai", _op.cit._, p. 247.

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VI. Conclusion :

1. There are two major reasons for the N.U.'s quitting the Masjumi, and for the former's then establishing itself as a political party. First are the reasons which lie in the structural organization of the Masjumi, which drew no clear lines between it as a federative political party, and the member organizations which were of social, educational and religious character. The transgression of Masjumi's platforms beyond its political boundaries was seen by the N.U. as the source of tensions between the Masjumi and the N.U. Another complementary reason in this field is the existence of a dualistic character of Masjumi's membership system. Masjumi, in addition to having member organizations, had also individual members, in the sense that besides being a federative body of various member organizations, it was also an ordinary political party with individual members. This dualistic character of Masjumi was considered by the N.U. an anomaly. The N.U. therefore proposed that the Masjumi was to be strictly a federative body of the whole Muslim organizations, social as well as political. The Masjumi, on the other hand, feared that the acceptance of N.U.'s opinion would be a step toward dividing the strength of the Muslim ummat.

Second and more meaningful are the psychological reasons. In his own words the writer expresses his opinion somewhere

in chapter I, that, "...it is the increasing tension of the polaristic tendency of the two power factions that answers the question of why the N.U. had to secede from the Masjumi. Had the Muhammadijah rather than the N.U. been pushed aside in the struggle for the hegemony of the Masjumi, it would have been logically not the N.U. but Muhammadijah which would have seceded from the Masjumi and established its own independent political party: Partai Muhammadijah". The victory of Muhammadijah and the intellectual groups in the Masjumi was, however, logical and understood. Nonetheless, the reverse logical consequential should also be faced: The secession of N.U. from Masjumi and its emergence as an independent political party!

2. The three year period, from its becoming a political party to the holding of the General Elections, was really short and even decisive for the N.U. Within this short span of time it had not only to furnish itself with necessary organizational equipment, as is normal for any political party, but it had also to prepare and be ready for the coming General Elections which will decide the "to be or not to be" of the N.U. as a political party. The General Elections, along democratic lines, were believed to be the political barameter which tells the strength of each competitor in the election race. In other words, people here

become the Judge, and their voice rules: Vox populi vox Dei. The lack of time, the inadequate materials --when compared to other parties which long had prepared for the Elections-- and the public assumption which was not aware of the potential strength of the N.U., "deemed" incompatible with the success gained by this party, both for the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly. When it quit the Masjumi in 1952, the N.U. had only eight representatives in the provisional Parliament. After the Elections the N.U. succeeded in multiplying its seats to 45 (almost six times) in the Parliament and 99 in the Constituent Assembly. Says Herbert Feith in analyzing the results of Indonesian first General Elections of 1955, "Probably the biggest were the success of the Nahdlatul Ulama which was to raise its parliamentary representation from 8 to 45..."; while Van der Kroef mentions in his article, "Indonesia's First National Election":

> "That the outcome of the first Indonesian Election turned out to be a decisive and surprising victory for the forces of traditionalism and nativism can be demonstrated also by the new position of the Islamic parties in Indonesia. In the world's largest nominally Islamic Republic, it is again a determinedly anti Western and "nativistic" brand of Islam that proved to possess a remarkable following among the electorate. Thus it catapulted a hitherto minor party, the Nahdlatul Ulama (N.U.), into a position of holding something very much like the balance of power".

In this thesis the approach to reveal the origin of its success was made through two major bases: the political basis, and the cultural, sociological and re-

ligious basis:

3. Political basis: The amateuristic and opportunistic tendencies of the N.U.'s political plays were also made possible and well provided by the political atmosphere at home in the meantime. The two contending "giants" (P.N.I. and Masjumi), which apparently had equal strength, had directly or indirectly invited the "pelanduks" (mouse-dear) --means minor parties-- to be the third middle-man party to solve their contentions. But what happened? The pelanduks dropped their weights to one side (viz., P.N.I.) and went rowing together in the same boat (the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet) that carried all the materials for the coming General Elections. The benefits gained as co-partner in this ruling group which was directly respomsible for the preparation of the Elections were substantial. This was openly acknowledged by the N.U. itself:

> "That we have interest as to the continuance of this cabinet until the holding of the General Elections has been clear and understood; for the participation of the N.U. Party in a cabinet which is preparing for the General Elections will certainly give us a tremendous benefit, especially for the gaining of the election victory". ("Siaran no 35", Risalah Lapunu no 1, p. 31)

4. Cultural, sociological and spiritual basis: N.U., as is revealed by its very name, is a party of the ulama or kijahi. The term kijahi itself reflects two functional meanings: first, kijahi as spiritual leader, and second,

kijahi as holder of economic keys, especially in the village --who acts as trader, employer, or landowner. With the emergence of N.U. as a political party, to this functional meaning is added one more: kijahi as political leader, in the village. The three functional meanings of kijahi are actually closely dependent to each other:

As a spiritual leader in the village, he occupies the focal position of all religious -spiritual as well as ritual-activities in the village. He is the teacher, he is the ulama, he is the dukun (healer), and he is, above all, the "warathat-al anbiya'" (successor of the Prophets of God).

As a trader, employer, or landlord, he is a middle-class capitalist. Primarily he determines the economic life in the village.

And as a newly emerged political leader in the village, he is a political "broker" who relates the villagers to the wider world and represents them in the government bureaucracy or in the house of representatives.

5. Finally, the mobilization of the above mentioned functions of the ulama or kijahis in their maximal capacity, especially during the time facing the elections, and to some extent also the political position of N.U. as a balance of power between the two contending parties (P.N.I. and Masjumi), which, according to the present writer in this thesis, reveal the answer

of the electoral success of N.U. in 1955. By discovering this, the writer, in a way, also feels that he has participated in inquiring into a certain aspect of religious life in Indonesia whose field is largely still unexcavated.

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Glossary

abangan - literally means reddish in contrast to mutihan (whittish). Abangan are those who do not perform their religious duties of five daily prayers, fasting, etc., despite their belief in Islam. Mutihan,on the contrary, are those who observe their religious duties.

adat - tradition, custom

adzan - summons to prayer

agama - religion, belief

ahkām al khamsah - five religious injunctions

ahlussunnah wal djama'ah - the majority of Muslims in distinction of Shiite Muslims who lay stress on the problem of khilafat, namely that the person who should have succeeded the prophet was Ali instead of Abubakar.

akad nikah - marriage contract

alim ulama - religious professors, religious leaders

Allahu Akbar - Allah is Great

anak mas - favorite son

badan chusus - autonomous daughter organization

bangsawan - noble, nobleman

barzandji - a homage for the Prophet written in Arabic by a native from Barzandj in Persia

batik - printed cotton for dress

bayan - elocution

beleid - policy

bid'ah - innovation

bilal - summoner to prayer (=muadzzin, modin (Jav.))

bupati - regent, kabupaten head

chatib (khatib) - one who reads the sermon

chutbah (khutbah) - sermon

djama'ah - group, pilgrims

djawaz, djaiz - permitted

djembel - the poor

dzikr (djikir) - recitation

fardlu 'ain - obligatory to every one

fatwa - religious advice given by the ulama

fiqh - doctrine of duties, religious jurisdiction

gambus - a six-stringed lute, Arabic orchestra

gotong-rojong - mutual aid

guru - teacher

guru tua - assistant (chosen from among the senior students)

hadith - tradition, saying, records of Muhammad's deeds

hadji - pilgrim

hakekat (haqiqat) - literally means truth or reality. In the context of the thesis hakekat means the reality (God) whom the mystics strive to know

halal - permissible

haram - prohibited

hibah - donation, gift

hisab - calculation, to see the coming moon by using the astronomical arithmetic

Idul Adha - Islamic Holiday, 9 Zul Hiddjah

Idul Fitri - Islamic Holiday, 1 Shawwal,

idjma' - unanimous opinion, opinion of the majority of ulama

idjtihad - study and interpret independently

ilhad - atheism

ilmu - knowledge, science

imam - leader, prayer leader

irshad - guidance

Isra - Prophet's journey from Mecca to Jerusalem in the night of mi'radj (ascending to the Heaven)

jihad - holy war

K.U.H.P. - Kitab Undang2 Hukum Pidana, Penal Code

kabupaten - region below province

kafir - infidel

kas - fund; kas Masdjid - Mosque fund

kasb - effort

kaum muda - younger generation, modernists

kaum tua - elder generation, conservatives

kawedanan - district (below kabupaten)

kementerian - ministry

keramat (karamat) - wonders or miraculous things which happen to a mystic. The Indonesians often use it as adjective, meaning: who can produce wonders

kerdja-sama - cooperation, mutual help

ketjamatan - sub-district (below kawedanan)

ketoprak - a people's theatre

khashyah - warning

khurafat - superstition

kijahi, kiai, kijaji - religious leader, ulama

kolot - old fashion, fanatic, conservative

kraton - court

kretek - clove cigarette

langgar - small mosque

ma'ani - a branch of rhetoric in Arabic

madrasah - school, religious school

makripat (ma'rifat) - knowledge or action of knowing. In the context of the thesis means the highest stage of religious life where the mystic knows the reality (God).

makruh - objectionable

maulud - birthday, dies natalis

maw'izah - warning, advice

mazhab - school of law. In the context of the thesis means the existing four schools of law in Sunnite Islam

mesdjid - mosque

mi'radj - Prophet's ascension to the Heaven

muballigh - Islamic propagator, missionary

muhdathah - innovation

munafik - hypocrite

munkar shar'an - disavowal of God's law

musalla - place for prayer, small mosque

musjakkat - doubtful

musjrik - polytheism

mu'tamar - congress, conference

N.T.R. (Nikah, Talaq, Rudju') -- marriage, divorce, reconciliation

nadjis - religiously impure

nahwu - syntax, grammar

naib - substitute. In Indonesian, if the word stands alone, not in possessive case, it means lower mosque functionary.

nas - text

nasihat - advice

pamong-pradja - government official

Pantjasila - five principles of Indonesian state philosophy

Partai Buruh - Labor Party

Partai Murba - Proletariat Party

pengadilan - justice

pengadjian (pengaosan, Jav.) - lecture, religious causerie

penghulu (panghulu, pengulu) - qadi, highest mosque official, village head

pengulon - office of penghulu

pengurus besar - supreme board, headquarters

pesantren - religious school, monastery

pondok - dormitory, religious school

prijaji - feudal cast, noble man

perintah alus - gentle pressure

puasa - fasting

qada, qadar, taqdir - fate, predestination

qaidah (kaedah) - regulation, axiom

qanaah - contentment, modest, self-sufficient

qasidah (kasidah) - song, Arabian song

qaul ulama - ulama's saying, advice, idea

qiyas - analogy

Quran - Holy book of Islam descended to Muhammad

rangkang meunasah - religious school in Atjeh

rasul - messenger, prophet

risalah - article, thesis, booklet

rodi - statute labor

ru'yah - observing the first moon

salat - prayer

sanawijah - secondary school

santri - religious student, middle-class, those who observe religious duties.

saraf - estimology

sarengat (shari'ah) - religious law. In the context of the thesis sarengat means the lowest stage of religious life.

shaikh, sjech - chief, religious professor, old man

Sjuriah - legislative council

SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia),- Coummunist Trade Union

soko guru - one of the four principle pillars which sustain a Javanese house. Figuratively means a very important member of an organization, party, etc.

sufi - mystic

suluk - meditation

sunnah - tradition

surau - small mosque

ta'lim - training

tarekat (tariqah) - method, way. In the context of the thesis tarekat means a stage of religious life higher than mere observance of rituals.

tasawwuf - mysticism

taswir - picture of animal being

tauhid - monotheism

ulama - religious leaders, religious professors

ummat - Muslim people

wadah - bowl, foundation, disposition

wadjib - obligatory

wajang orang - stage play

wajang kulit - puppet play

wakap (waqf) - pious endowment

wakil - representative

wali - guardian

walijul amri dlaruri bisj-sjaukah - a ruler by necessity owing to his de facto power

zakat - religious tax

zuhud - asceticism

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